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Abstract
This dissertation analyzes the optimal coordination of dynamic pricing, dynamic
advertising, and inventory management. We consider different optimization prob-
lems for a monopolistic retailer who faces a time-dependent deterministic demand.
In Chapter 2, we generalize the model of Rajan et al. (1992). The retailer is al-
lowed to choose a dynamic price, a dynamic advertising rate, and the inventory
capacity for a sales period of fixed length so that the present value of revenue minus
inventory, purchasing and (nonlinear) advertising costs is maximized; in addition,
the inventory deteriorates at an exponential rate. We derive the optimal dynamic
price-advertising control and the optimal inventory capacity and also consider the
partially static cases when only the price is dynamic and the advertising rate is fixed
and vice versa. For the optimally controlled dynamic model we carry out a sensi-
tivity analysis with respect to the model parameters and we compare the results of
the dynamic model for the optimal profit with those of the partially static models.
In Chapter 3, we interpret the sales process as the controlled adoption process of a
new product and the inventory capacity as untapped market share. The initial state
is assumed to be exogenously given and the demand depends on the current state
of the system. We exclude, however, deterioration effects and any other costs but
the cost of advertising. We derive the optimal controls using a different technique
than Helmes et al. (2013) - we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principle. As an in-
teresting application we consider the controlled von Bertalanffy model. In Chapter
4, we extend the analysis of one-period models to multi-period models and long-
term average models. Assuming that the optimal controls derived in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 are applied throughout a cycle, we treat the cycle length and the capacity
as decision variables. We distinguish between the maximization of the present value
of N identical cycles and the maximization of the average profit per time unit. We
derive conditions that ensure the existence of an optimal pair of cycle length and
capacity. Various examples and illustrations are given, and structural properties of
the optimal pair are verified. For a special case we derive an extended formula of
the economic order quantity.
Keywords:
dynamic pricing and advertising, inventory management, new-product
adoption models, optimal control, Pontryagin’s maximum principle
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation analysiert das optimale Zusammenspiel dynamischer Preisset-
zung, dynamischer Werbung und Bestandsmanagement. Wir betrachten verschiede-
ne Optimierungsprobleme für einen monopolistischen Händler bei gegebener zeit-
abhängiger deterministischer Nachfrage. In Kapitel 2 erweitern wir das Modell von
Rajan et al. (1992). Der Händler darf einen dynamischen Preis, eine dynamische
Werberate und die Lagergröße bei fester Verkaufsdauer wählen, so dass der Barwert
von Umsatz minus Lager-, Einkaufs- und (nichtlinearen) Werbekosten maximiert
wird; zusätzlich zerfällt der Lagerbestand mit exponentieller Rate. Wir ermitteln
die optimale Preis-Werbe-Steuerung und die optimale Lagergröße und betrachten die
semi-statischen Situationen, wenn nur der Preis dynamisch gewählt werden darf und
die Werberate fix ist und umgekehrt. Wir führen eine Sensitivitätsanalyse im Hin-
blick auf den Einfluss der Modellparameter auf die optimalen Ergebnisse durch und
vergleichen die Ergebnisse des dynamischen Modells mit denen der semi-statischen
Modelle im Hinblick auf den optimalen Gewinn. In Kapitel 3 interpretieren wir den
Verkaufsprozess als gesteuerten Diffusionsprozess eines neuen Produktes und die La-
gergröße als unerschlossenen Marktanteil. Der Anfangszustand ist exogen gegeben
und die Nachfrage hängt zusätzlich vom gegenwärtigen Zustand des Systems ab. Ein
Zerfall des Lagerbestandes und alle Kosten bis auf Werbekosten sind ausgenommen.
Anders als in Helmes et al. (2013) leiten wir die optimale Steuerung mithilfe des Pon-
trjaginschen Maximumprinzips her. Als Anwendung betrachten wir das Modell von
von Bertalanffy. In Kapitel 4 erweitern wir die Analyse von einperiodigen Modellen
auf mehrperiodige und langfristige Modelle. Die Länge des Verkaufszyklus und die
Lagergröße sind Entscheidungsvariablen, wobei die optimalen Steuerungen aus Ka-
pitel 2 und Kapitel 3 während eines Zyklus angewandt werden. Wir unterscheiden
zwischen der Maximierung des Barwertes von N identischen Zyklen und der Ma-
ximierung des Durchschnittsgewinns pro Zeiteinheit. Existenzbedingungen für ein
optimales Paar aus Zykluslänge und Lagergröße werden hergeleitet. Wir analysieren
verschiedene Anwendungs- und Illustrationsbeispiele und verifizieren Strukturaus-
sagen der optimalen Entscheidungsgrößen. Für einen Spezialfall leiten wir eine er-
weiterte Form der klassischen Losgrößenformel her.
Schlagwörter:
dynamische Preis- und Werbesetzung, Bestandsmanagement, Diffusions-
modelle, optimale Steuerung, Pontrjaginsches Maximumprinzip
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1 Introduction
Time-based pricing has always played an important role in the sales business. Black
Friday, season sale, or clearance sale are keywords that have attracted customers for
decades. In retailing these events are inextricably linked with price and quantity dis-
counts, special buys, and hot deals. Customers are used to such extraordinary sales and
adapt their purchasing behavior accordingly. Dynamic pricing - closely related to rev-
enue management or yield management - is a more subtle tool than just cutting prices
radically and regularly. The aim is to set prices strategically in order to maximize profits
by anticipating and considering consumer behavior. In the 1980s, dynamic pricing was
first applied in the airline industry which is still one of the largest fields of application.
With the development and employment of computer-based pricing, storing, and booking
systems, dynamic pricing found its way into many commercial domains.
The success story of the Internet has had a lasting effect on the world of retailing in
the last decade. Customers who buy on the Internet are not reliant on opening hours,
local reachability and availability, or purchase advice. On the other hand, the online
retailer neither needs a physical store nor sales staff and she is able to target customers
directly with promotion instruments such as newsletters or personalized advertising.
Many points are taken into consideration that determine differences between classical
store retailing and electronic commerce. A major feature supported by computer-based
techniques is that prices can be set truly dynamically. In E-commerce, the expenditure
of time and money on computer- and algorithm-based price labeling tends to zero. This
does not mean that dynamic pricing comes at no cost, but the technical act of changing
the price causes infinitesimal costs. So once an algorithm has been implemented, it is a
machine’s job to adjust prices. However, this flexibility in price setting is not restricted
to online stores: data mining based on cash registers is standard practice in almost
any shop nowadays. Many supermarkets use electronic price tags, and smart phones
find a variety of application possibilities in electronic and store shopping. Technological
progress does not only influence the pricing process in the retail industry but also affects
another classical marketing instrument: advertising. Today, a company can choose from
a wide range of promotion instruments, e.g., classical advertisement in a newspaper,
commercials on radio and TV, and Internet-based instruments such as online advertising
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services or browser cookies. Furthermore, this diversity is enhanced by the opportunity
to dynamize these advertising efforts to control consumer interest and (potential) sales
in favor of the profit maximizing company. In industries such as consumer electronics or
the movie business, the introduction of a new product is often accompanied by a huge
promotion campaign, whereas there is only little advertising effort during the actual
sales period once the product has been launched. On the other hand, local retailers
often focus on promotion on special occasions or on clearing inventory and selling the
remainder of stock at the end of the sales period.
The possibility of having a more extensive influence on the individual customer be-
havior and the aggregated sales process goes hand in hand with an increasing need to
plan and manage inventories. What if a boost in sales due to an advertising campaign
meets an empty inventory? Then potential sales are wasted by insufficient supply chain
management. Actually, unsatisfied demand can even have a lasting negative effect on
future sales since disappointed customers might not return to the store. What if a high
price policy goes along with a bulging inventory? Or if only one product occupies most
of the given shelf space? Typically, in both cases, valuable storage capacity and sales
space is blocked without corresponding earnings. Furthermore, if the inventory is sub-
ject to deterioration effects, then not only does the opportunity cost lower the potential
profit but additional losses are also realized because of overcapacity.
It is clear that marketing instruments must go hand in hand with production, capacity,
and inventory decisions. This thesis makes a contribution to the optimal coordination
of dynamic pricing, dynamic advertising, and inventory management. Throughout this
thesis we consider a deterministic setting: there is no uncertainty about customer be-
havior, production, advertising and sales responses, or inflation. In our analysis we want
to focus on the underlying characteristics and implicit decisions; that is why we exclude
any stochastic disturbances. Accordingly, we are not interested in the buying decision
of a particular customer but pool the individuals’ behavior in a sales rate to represent
the demand side. At this aggregated level we assume the potential buyers to be sen-
sitive with respect to the current price p and the current advertising level w. We will
also incorporate the current state x of the system, the inventory at hand, via a system
function ψ to model its influence on demand. In general, we assume a demand rate λ of
multiplicative form
λpt, p, w, xq “ μptqp´εptqwδptqψpxq. (1.1)
This kind of demand function is often used in the management literature. It allows
the parameters of the model to be estimated by considering a log version of (1.1) and
applying standard regression tools. The time-dependent function μ captures seasonal
2
and scaling effects as well as effects that can not be influenced directly by the decision
maker. The price elasticity of demand ε, ε ą 11, and the nonnegative advertising
elasticity of demand δ play a crucial role. They determine the market characteristics
alongside the arrival intensity μptq ą 0.2 The system function ψ acts as a response of
the demand to the current inventory level. For example, if ψ is an increasing function,
the demand is larger if the company is well stocked than if only a few items are at
hand. This effect is often observed in retailing and plays an important role in shelf-
space management. Incorporating the current state of the system also allows us to
analyze (controlled) new-product adoption models. For such models, the main question
is how the total market reacts to the introduction of a new product, how to sell goods
at a profit on an individual retailer’s level. In terms of the work by Selten (1965), the
function ψ can be interpreted as a measure of demand inertia: consumers are inert with
respect to price changes and also consider the (cumulative) adoption by the market.
More details of the demand rate and assumptions about the parameter values and their
interpretations are given in each chapter.
Throughout this thesis we consider a monopolistic retailer or producer. In Chapter
2 and Chapter 3, the sales period T is exogenously given and fixed. In Chapter 4, the
sales horizon T becomes a decision variable. In Chapter 2, we are interested in finding
an optimal pricing and advertising control and an inventory capacity so that the profit
earned over a sales period of length T is maximized. In addition to the advertising
expenditures, the monopolist has to take into account holding costs, purchasing costs,
deterioration effects and discounting. In Chapter 3, we study the adoption process of
new products or technologies, and the (optimal) influence of dynamic price and dynamic
advertising controls on this process if the time horizon and the size of the market are fixed
(and known beforehand). We consider no costs but the advertising costs and allow for
general system functions ψ. For a special system function suggested by von Bertalanffy
in the context of biological growth processes we analyze the optimal control and the
system evolution in detail. In Chapter 4, we aim at maximizing the long-term profit by
choosing a cycle length and an inventory capacity assuming that within each cycle the
(optimal) controls derived in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are applied. We consider this
optimization problem for two objective functions: the average profit per time unit as
well as the present value of N ą 1 identical cycles.
The starting point of our analysis is the model analyzed by Rajan et al. (1992) which
considers joint dynamic pricing and ordering decisions. Their model is an extension of
1The assumption ε ą 1 is necessary for certain statements to be derived in the following.
2If p “ w “ ψpxq ” 1, the demand equals the function μptq.
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the model by Cohen (1977) who considers one fixed price throughout the whole sales
period. Both deterministic models allow for an exponential decay of the stock and assume
that the decision maker chooses the inventory capacity such that the inventory runs out
exactly at the end of the sales period. Considering a single inventory cycle of fixed length
T ą 0, in Chapter 2 we generalize these models and introduce (dynamic) advertising to
influence the demand rate; advertising costs are modeled by a specific nonlinear term.
Moreover, we allow for time-dependent storage costs and discounting of costs and profits.
We assume the system function ψ to be a constant, i.e., in Chapter 2 the sales rate does
not depend on the inventory level. We derive an optimal dynamic price-advertising
control that maximizes the present value of one cycle (Section 2.2) as well as optimal
mixtures of dynamic and static controls, i.e., constant advertising and dynamic pricing
as well as constant pricing and dynamic advertising (Section 2.3). When both marketing
tools, price and advertising rate, are dynamic, the optimal price is a markup on the cost
function that accounts for all the costs (except for advertising costs), for interest, and for
deterioration effects. Moreover, the optimal price is not influenced by the opportunity
to advertise. Under normal market conditions the consumers as well as the retailer
benefit from advertising. More customers will purchase the product for the same price
(as the optimal price is the same with or without advertising) and the retailer nets
more profit by selling more items and paying only a fraction of that additional revenue
as advertising expenses. Only if the consumer interest is extremely low, see Corollary
2.2.3 for details, then a retailer will sell fewer products in a market situation where
advertising is effective than in a market where advertising has no effect. The optimal
price, however, still remains unchanged. In particular, it is optimal for the retailer to
set the prices and the advertising rates in such a way that at any time the ratio of
revenue (rate) and advertising spending is proportional to the efficiency of advertising
- measured in terms of the advertising elasticity and an advertising cost coefficient -
and the price elasticity. This is a dynamic version of the well-known Dorfman-Steiner
relation. Moreover, the net profit margin associated with an optimal control can be
expressed as a product of the discount factor, the optimal advertising cost rate, and
a factor depending on the advertising efficiency. In Section 2.4, we analyze structural
properties of the optimal controls and associated values, examine the effect of parameter
changes (sensitivity analysis), and compare the optimal dynamic price and dynamic
advertising model with the optimal partially static models with the help of an illustrative
example. While the major share of the additional benefit in the dynamic model stems
from the opportunity to set dynamic prices, it turns out that dynamic advertising also
leads to a significant increase of the total profit, especially, if the arrival intensity μ
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fluctuates over time.
In Chapter 3, we drop all cost aspects except the advertising costs themselves and
allow for a non-constant system function ψ, i.e., the state of the system influences the
sales rate. While this framework can still be applied to inventory control problems, we
introduce new-product adoption models and interpret the state of the system as the
(fractional) untapped market share. Starting from a given initial market potential (the
initial inventory or capacity), a monopolist seeks to capture the market by setting dy-
namic prices and dynamic advertising rates over a finite sales horizon in such a way
that the present value of revenue minus advertising costs is maximized. This problem is
closely related to the problem considered by Teng and Thompson (1985) who incorporate
(state-dependent) learning cost effects into the production costs but assume only linear
costs of advertising and do not allow for a time-dependent demand rate. Helmes et al.
(2013) solve the problem by applying the Dynamic Programming method and consider
the special cases when the system function ψpxq is a power function and a Bass func-
tional. In this thesis, we apply Pontryagin’s maximum principle to derive the optimal
control in case of a general system function (Section 3.2). The properties of this system
function determine the behavior of the optimal dynamic price path while the cumulative
arrival intensity - the total market potential - determines the price level. It is optimal
to set the advertising rate proportional to the arrival intensity μptq. One implication of
using this optimal control is that the associated path - the controlled adoption process -
hits zero at the end of the planning horizon, i.e., it is optimal to act in such way that the
whole market is tapped (exactly) at time T ; moreover, the dynamic Dorfman-Steiner
relation still holds for the optimal control. As an application we consider the (controlled)
von Bertalanffy model which allows for more flexible structural properties than the Bass
model (Section 3.3). In particular, we analyze the behavior of the optimal price function
over time (market skimming or market penetration) and the question when prices will
reach their minimum and maximum - issues that are often emphasized from a consumer’s
point of view. Depending on the influence of the word-of-mouth effect - in essence, this
effect captures how strong a non-adopter is influenced by the customers who have al-
ready purchased (adopted) the product - we derive an expression that characterizes the
point in time when prices peak in the time-homogeneous market situation. Before this
point in time, it is optimal to strictly increase prices (penetration strategy) and thereafter
to steadily lower prices (skimming strategy). If the influence of the (early) adopters is
rather large, it is optimal to apply a price skimming strategy from the beginning, i.e.,
prices decrease over the sales horizon.
In Chapter 4, we expand our analysis from one-period models to multi-period ones
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and to long-term considerations. We assume that whenever the inventory is depleted
at the end of one cycle, it will (instantaneously) be replenished and a new cycle begins.
We introduce fixed order costs that arise once per cycle when the inventory is refilled; in
particular, these costs do not depend on the volume of replenishment. While the cycle
length has been arbitrary but fixed in Chapter 2 and, in addition, the capacity has also
been fixed in Chapter 3, we now treat both quantities as decision variables. As far as the
objective is concerned, we distinguish between the maximization of the present value of
N identical cycles, N finite or infinite, and the maximization of the average profit per
time unit.
In Section 4.2, we assume that throughout each cycle of length τ - the change in
notation indicates that the cycle length is now a decision variable in contrast to the
exogenously given value T - the profit maximizing dynamic price and advertising con-
trols derived in Chapter 2 are applied. The expressions to be examined depend on the
optimal net profit margin associated with these optimal controls rather than the con-
trols themselves. Since the value of the (optimal) capacity is implicitly defined by the
(optimal) controls and the choice of the cycle length, see above, we face a (nonlinear)
one-dimensional optimization problem. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions
that guarantee the existence of a (unique) optimal cycle length (Theorems 4.2.1, 4.2.2,
and 4.2.3). Although we base our analysis on the optimal control derived in Chapter
2, it is important to note that for any profit rate satisfying the optimality conditions
a (sub)optimal cycle length is characterized. Thus, our framework is not restricted to
the particular case when the controls throughout the cycle are optimal but applies to a
broader class of inventory control systems. We illustrate our theoretical findings with ex-
amples that shall emphasize the influence of the arrival intensity and we derive structural
properties of the optimal cycle length value for special parameter settings. In particular,
we show that if the optimal advertising rate lies above a threshold determined by the
advertising efficiency, then the opportunity to advertise benefits the retailer also in the
long run and leads to shorter inventory cycles. Due to shorter inventory cycles, cus-
tomers also benefit because of fresher products while prices remain unaffected (Theorem
4.2.4).
In Section 4.3, we assume that the revenue maximizing controls derived in Chapter
3 are applied throughout each inventory cycle. Since the revenue maximizing controls
account for no costs except for the costs of advertising, we evaluate the running costs
along the optimal path; the purchasing costs and the order costs have to be paid at the
beginning of each cycle. While the order costs are fixed and the costs of purchasing
(or production) only depend on the inventory volume, the running costs depend on the
6
capacity and the cycle length. Also the revenue of each cycle - the expression for the value
function at time zero derived in Chapter 3 - depends on both quantities, the capacity
and the cycle length. Similarly to Section 4.2, we consider the N cycle problem and
the time-average problem. However, the resulting optimization problems are now two-
dimensional; the cycle length and the capacity are decision variables. We first consider
one-dimensional subproblems by keeping one of the decision variables fixed. We derive
optimality conditions that ensure the existence of an optimal cycle length if the inventory
capacity is fixed. Alternatively, we keep the cycle length fixed and formulate optimality
conditions for a capacity to be optimal. Finally, we formulate optimality conditions for
the two-dimensional case. These conditions are quite general. We illustrate our results
with examples. In a particular parameter setting, we are able to derive explicit solution
formulas for the optimal cycle length value and the optimal capacity value. We refer to
this result as the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula (Proposition 4.3.8).
When considering multi-period decisions, we pay particular attention to the question
whether or not an order scheme is feasible, i.e., if a pair of cycle length and capacity
values guarantees nonnegative profits. Since the (optimal) profit rate derived in Chapter
2 is strictly positive and takes all costs, except the (fixed) setup costs, into account, in
Section 4.2 an order scheme is feasible if the cumulative profits over one cycle cover these
setup costs. The analysis in Section 4.3 is based on the revenue maximizing policies
derived in Chapter 3 which do not consider any costs (except the costs of advertising).
Thus, inventory costs have to be evaluated along the path associated with a particular
cycle length and capacity value. Hence, it becomes more difficult to determine whether
or not an order scheme is feasible. The order schemes derived in Section 4.3 are only
suboptimal compared to those which solve the profit maximizing problem. However,
the former allow for a state-dependent demand rate, whereas in Chapter 2 we assume
ψpxq ” 1, see above. Moreover, these suboptimal solutions will lead to a reasonable
decision rule in many applied cases.
A literature review focusing on corresponding topics can be found in the introduction
of each chapter; particular references are also given in each section. We typically consider
a monopolistic retailer who faces joint pricing, advertising, and inventory decisions. In
Chapter 3, we focus on new-product adoption models by interpreting the inventory as an
untapped (fractional) market share. However, this thesis makes a contribution to many
economic applications and situations: a producer who has to optimally set a production
capacity and faces marketing decisions, a deterministic news-vendor who may choose
the order quantity and the (dynamic) price and advertising rate, a manager who faces a
resource extraction problem, or a decision maker who aims for the optimal forest rotation
7
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age. By abstracting from price and advertising as specific interpretations of the controls,
our models and solutions apply to different subjects. Here is another example: tool wear
problems, where (1.1) describes the wear-out effect and the goal is to control the wearing
process so that a (utility) function is maximized.
A precise description of themonopolistic retailer framework together with explanations
and interpretations of the model’s parameters and assumptions is given in Chapter 2.
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2 Optimal Dynamic Pricing and Advertising
with Inventory Cost
2.1 Introduction
As a starting point of our analysis, we introduce the model by Rajan et al. (1992).
These authors consider a monopolistic retailer who is allowed to choose the length of an
inventory cycle, the initial inventory level, and a dynamic price control pptq throughout
the cycle, cf. Chapter 1. The time- and price-dependent deterministic demand rate
λRpp, tq is assumed to be a nonincreasing separable function of price and time.1 A
key assumption which underlies the analysis by Rajan et al. (1992) is that the value of
the initial inventory at the beginning of a cycle is solely subject to the decision of the
monopolist. This assumption and the fact that the demand rate does not depend on the
inventory level allows Rajan and co-authors to solve their problem in two steps. First,
the cycle length T ą 0, T finite, is assumed to be fixed and the objective is to choose a
dynamic price control that maximizes
Tż
0
ppptq ´ cRptqqλRppptq, tqdt, (2.1)
where cRptq is a cost functional; the function cRptq takes constant unit costs and inventory
costs affected by deterioration effects into account. The precise definition and derivation
of the function cRptq is given below. The inventory level xptq at time t P r0, T s satisfies
the following differential equation with terminal condition xpT q “ 0:
9xptq “ ´λRppptq, tq ´ qptqxptq, xpT q “ 0, xp0q ą 0; (2.2)
the wastage coefficient qptq ě 0 may vary over time. Thus, the initial inventory associated
with a pricing policy pptq and duration T is implicitly given by the solution of (2.2). The
1Rajan et al. (1992) require the demand rate not to increase in t to guarantee the uniqueness of the
optimal cycle length, see below. For the solution of their dynamic pricing problem it is sufficient to
assume that λR is nonincreasing in p only.
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optimal pricing strategy which maximizes (2.1) yields the associated value of the optimal
initial inventory. In the second step, Rajan et al. (1992) maximize the expression
1
τ
»
– τż
0
ppptq ´ cRptqqλRppptq, tqdt ´ k
fi
fl (2.3)
with respect to the cycle length τ applying the optimal price policy obtained in step
one, cf. Chapter 4. The setup cost k ą 0 has to be paid once per cycle.
We will extend their model by assuming the demand to depend explicitly on an adver-
tising component. Thus, the monopolist must set the advertising level wptq ě 0, t ě 0,
and incurs an advertising cost (rate) of wptqaptq, aptq ą 0. The function aptq is assumed
to be piecewise continuous, strictly positive, and bounded from above, see below. In con-
trast to the situation where no active promotion is considered - which can be thought
of as an external advertising factor of one - our model assumes that the monopolist can
boost the sales rate by paying for the promotional effort made. Actually, the monopo-
list is obliged to promote her product as otherwise demand will decline or even dry up.
So it is not clear under which circumstances the decision maker will benefit from the
opportunity to advertise and whether she will benefit at all. Therefore, it is difficult to
compare results of our model with those of the pure pricing model. Nevertheless, we will
compare both models by assuming certain demand structures.
Our analysis will be split into two parts. In the following Section 2.2, we first consider
the dynamic pricing and advertising problem with a given time horizon r0, T s. We will
examine the case of a multiplicative demand rate extending the pricing problem consid-
ered by Rajan et al. (1992) by an advertising component. In addition, we incorporate
time-dependent elasticities and time-dependent inventory cost. Throughout this thesis
all functions will be assumed to be piecewise continuous.2
All revenues and costs are subject to a time-dependent discount rate rptq ě 0.3 We
define the cumulative discount rate Rptq :“ şt0 rpsqds and a future payment t periods
ahead is discounted by the factor ξptq :“ e´Rptq. Setting rptq ” r results in the common
exponential discounting, ξptq “ e´rt. The time-dependence of the discount rate enables
us to consider also other discounting methods, e.g., hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic
discounting models time inconsistencies in the behavior of economic agents, i.e., the de-
cision between two alternative payments will not only depend on the size of the payment
2We call a function piecewise continuous if it has finite values and at most a finite number of disconti-
nuities on its domain and if the function is bounded on any compact interval.
3Since Rajan et al. (1992) aim for the (time) average problem they abstain from considering any
discounting effects explicitly, i.e., rptq ” 0. Nevertheless, their value drop component, see below, can
be interpreted as acting like a discounting factor.
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but also on the point in time when the payment is made. A common observation is
that people become more patient when choosing between a smaller reward earlier and
a larger reward later if the delay is the same but occurs later: when choosing between
one dollar today and two dollars tomorrow a certain fraction of all agents prefers the
one dollar today. But having the choice between one dollar in one year or two dollars
in one year and one day, most agents will prefer the two dollars; their decision is time
inconsistent. Frederick et al. (2002) give a review of different approaches to discounting
and time preferences and discuss several functional forms ξh of hyperbolic discount-
ing that have been proposed in the literature. For example, Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992) suggest ξhptq :“ 1{ p1 ` αtqβ{α, α, β ą 0, where α determines the extent to which
the hyperbolic discount deviates from the common exponential discount function4; note,
limαÑ0 ξhptq “ e´βt. Then, today’s present value of a payment of size one paid tomorrow
(t “ 1) equals ξhp1q{ξhp0q “
´
1
1`α
¯β{α
. The present value at time t ą 1 of a payment of
size one paid at t ` 1 is given by ξhpt ` 1q{ξhptq “
´
1`αt
1`αpt`1q
¯β{α “ ´1 ´ α1`αpt`1q¯β{α,
which can easily be proved to be larger than ξhp1q{ξhp0q, i.e., the agent becomes more
patient when time increases. For the classical concept of exponential discounting with
rptq ” r - in contrast to hyperbolic discounting - the valuation is independent of the
point in time since ξp1q{ξp0q “ ξpt ` 1q{ξptq “ e´r, t ą 0. In the following, we will as-
sume the discounting rate to be of the form e´Rptq, Rptq defined as above. To model the
situation of hyperbolic discounting one can simply choose rptq ” β1`αt , α, β ą 0, t ě 0.
Then, Rptq “ βα logp1 ` αtq and e´Rptq “ ξhptq.
While Rajan et al. (1992) assume the demand rate λR to be a nonincreasing function
of time, see above, we also allow for demand rates that are increasing in time, i.e.,
assuming a constant price and a constant advertising rate, an increasing number of
customers is willing to purchase the product for the same price and marketing level.
For the general dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising problem and for special cases
and parameter settings, we derive sensitivity results and study numerical examples. We
will also address the problem of determining an optimal static advertising rate, i.e., a
constant advertising rate throughout the whole cycle, while prices are still dynamic. This
enables us to compare the two models - the pure pricing model analyzed by Rajan et al.
(1992) and our (general) model. We complete the analysis of the one-cycle problem by
also considering static prices and dynamic advertising rates.
In Chapter 4, we face the inventory control problem of determining a cycle length that
maximizes the average profit per unit of time when the optimal price and advertising
4Other possible choices are, for example, ξhptq “ 1{t, or ξhptq “ 1{p1 ` αtq, α ą 0, see Frederick et al.
(2002), pp. 360.
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schemes are applied. We will give conditions under which the existence and uniqueness
of an (optimal) finite cycle length can be guaranteed.
2.2 The Dynamic Pricing and Advertising Model
We extend the pricing problem in Rajan et al. (1992), cf. Section 2.1, by the opportunity
to advertise. A monopolist wants to maximize her profit by choosing a pricing and
advertising scheme and the initial inventory level under the consideration of production
and inventory costs. In addition, she has to pay for the promotion which she is able
to control. The length of the finite time horizon is denoted by T and is assumed to be
fixed. We assume a time-dependent discount rate rptq ě 0 and we let Rptq “ şt0 rpsqds
denote the cumulative discount rate, see above.
The deterministic demand rate λ ě 0 is of multiplicative form and depends on the
control uptq “ ppptq, wptqq, the price p and the advertising effort w at time t, 0 ď t ď T ,
and time itself, i.e.,
λpuqptq :“ λpt, uptqq “ λpt, pptq, wptqq “ μptqpptq´εptqwptqδptq, (2.4)
where 8 ą εptq ě ε ą 1 is the (time-dependent) price elasticity and 0 ď δptq ă aptq ď a
is the advertising elasticity; aptq is a cost parameter to be specified below. The parameter
functions aptq, δptq, and εptq are assumed to be piecewise continuous, see above. The
lower bound ε and the upper bound a are assumed to be arbitrary but fixed numbers.
These bounds ensure the integrability of expressions wherever aptq, δptq, and εptq show up
in an exponent. The demand (2.4) is a special case of (1.1) when ψpxq ” 1, i.e., the state
of the system - the inventory level - has no influence on the demand. Let Δptq :“ δptqaptq ;
this (parameter) function quantifies the advertising efficiency. Note, the function Δptq
only takes values in the interval r0, 1q. An increasing price elasticity captures situations
where customers become more price sensitive over time. This might be the case with
fashion goods: at the beginning of the season the willingness to pay is high as the fashion
is new and trendy. As time passes, more and more people adopt the new fashion and it
becomes less desirable to buy the dated goods. On the other hand, when selling airline
tickets the customer’s price elasticity typically decreases over time. At the beginning of
the sales horizon the (potential) passengers are flexible and they might choose another
airline or flight if the price is too high. The nearer to the departure date the less flexible
the customers are, so that - especially - business travelers are willing to pay very high
prices if they need a flight the next day. In both cases, the price elasticity may not only
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depend on current time but also on the length of the sales period, i.e., εptq :“ εpt, T q.5
Although we do not explicitly consider adoption effects - the demand does not depend
on the inventory level or the amount already sold since ψpxq ” 1, cf. (3.4) - such kind
of effects can (somewhat) be modeled by a properly chosen time-dependent elasticity as
indicated in the fashion example above. Likewise, the time dependence of the advertising
elasticity accounts for the fact that customer’s response to advertising may change over
time. For instance, to go in line again with the fashion example, promoting a brand new
product might yield a larger effect than promoting an already established product. By
allowing the cost coefficient aptq to depend on time one is able, for example, to model
the diminishing advertising effect over time in case of a (nearly) constant δ. It becomes
more expensive over time to maintain a given advertising rate. The specific values of
aptq and δptq matter only in particular cases; typically, the ratio of the two functions,
the advertising efficiency Δptq, is important.
Actually, we could parametrize our model simply in terms of the advertising efficiency
Δ. The cost term to be considered in the objective (2.6), see below, is wptqaptq; the
amount of dollars that has to be paid to advertise at a rate wptq at time t.6 By introduc-
ing W ptq :“ wptqaptq as the decision variable the factor wptqδptq in the demand rate can
be replaced by the factor W ptqΔptq. Then, the number of parameters has been reduced
by one since only the efficiency parameter Δ has to be considered. However, we retain
the two-dimensional parametrization in a and δ to be able to compare many specific
models. For instance, Sethi et al. (2008) consider a quadratic cost function and a linear
factor for the advertising rate (aptq ” 2 and δptq ” 1) while Vidale and Wolfe (1957)
emphasize the linear cost structure (aptq ” 1), cf. Appendix 2. In particular, the two
parameters a and δ enable us to distinguish between the effect of advertising (measured
in terms of the exponent δ) and the spending on advertising (measured in terms of the
exponent a).
We call γptq :“ εptq´Δptq1´Δptq the leveraged price elasticity of demand. This elasticity de-
scribes the effect of the interaction of both marketing instruments, price and advertising.
If δ “ Δ “ 0, the leveraged price elasticity of demand simply equals the price elasticity
of demand - a natural result since advertising has no effect and the demand rate is only
time- and price-dependent. Lacking any impact, it is optimal to set the advertising rate
zero equal to zero. Then, the model becomes the pure pricing model considered in Rajan
et al. (1992). If Δ is positive, advertising has an impact; this impact is quantified by
the value of γ. Note, γ increases in ε and Δ.
5In the following, we will only write εpt, T q if we want to put the focus on the cycle length dependence.
Apart from that, we adhere to write εptq to not overload the notation.
6Note, that wptqaptq can be interpreted as thousands or millions of dollars.
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The time-dependent expression μptq ą 0 reflects a possibly seasonal component or a
structural influence on demand that is not subject to the decision by the monopolist;
different effects can hereby interfere. In specific applications, μ may have a product form
where each factor has its own economic interpretation. For instance, if μptq “ μ1μ2μ3ptq
the constant μ2 can represent the average flow of customers; the time-dependent μ3 can
be thought of as the seasonal component and μ1 is the so-called response constant, cf.
Chapter 3. The classical interpretation of this response constant is the number of sales
per advertising dollar spent. This interpretation of the first factor μ1 carries over to our
case. In the Vidale-Wolfe model, cf. Appendix 2, w linearly enters the dynamics and
the objective, while in our case w enters the dynamics and the objective function as a
power expression with exponent δptq and aptq, respectively. Equation (3.67) in Chapter
3 provides another example of a μ function which is motivated by the model of Bemmaor
(1994).
We call μ the arrival intensity or the basic demand. It reflects the standard buying
behavior of customers over time. All the above-mentioned factors are pooled in μptq and
enter the demand rate (2.4). Furthermore, this innocent looking function μ provides
the opportunity to model diverse effects. Given an advertising rate of value one and
a price of value one, e.g., a break even price relative to costs, see below, the demand
rate equals μptq. Due to the fact that the price enters the demand as a power function
expression, namely p´εptq, this expression can become very small for large price values
and/or large values of ε. For example, (grocery) discounter stores face customers that are
very price sensitive: if the prices for convenience goods, which are usually store brands,
increase (too much), the customers simply change their local supplier; an (interstore
or intrabrand) price elasticity near ten is not uncommon. For example, Bucklin and
Srinivasan (1991), based on survey data, estimate the price elasticity for various coffee
brands to range from minus twenty to minus five.7 As a consequence, the values of the μ
function can be very large, and the numerical analysis becomes challenging: considering
a (large) price p, no advertising influence (δ ” 0) and a value of ε “ 10, the function μ
must take a value of p to the power 10 in order to represent a total demand rate of one
unit. Therefore, p can be interpreted as a price relative to some reference price level p0
or the unit cost c0, see below. Then, p “ pˆ{p0 or p “ pˆ{c0, and pˆ is the price observed
by customers. If p is defined as such a fraction, p will take values close to one and the
power expression with large exponents is much easier to handle. A side benefit of this
relative price interpretation is that μ can be interpreted as a natural or market-driven
7Taken the whole market, the (long-run) demand of convenience goods is assumed to react (particularly)
inelastic to price changes with values above ´1, see, for example, Table 5.3 in Mansfield (1994).
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sales potential, i.e., the rate of customers willing to buy the product at unit price and
unit advertising rate.
An example for declining demand over time is the case of selling certain perishable
products, e.g., fruits or flowers (or fashion).8 At the beginning of the sales period the
goods are fresh and attractive, and demand is relatively high; over time, the goods perish
or become outdated, and fewer customers are willing to spend their money (in addition
to the effect that customers become possibly more price sensitive as indicated above).
Rajan et al. (1992) model such situations by introducing an increasing function μr which
they call the value drop component. Rajan et al. postulate that the price to be observed
by the customers is given by prpt, pq :“ μrptq ˚ p; p is the price set by the retailer. Since
pr increases over time the rate of sales associated with a fixed price pr decreases over
time (the value of the price p drops over time). Except for the value drop component
and the price to be chosen, Rajan et al. (1992) allow no other time dependence on the
demand. In contrast, we allow explicitly for a time component μptq, which might also
increase over time. We assume μptq to be a positive piecewise continuous function on the
interval r0, T s. Naturally, the demand decreases in p and increases in w; the latter only if
δptq ą 0. Recall, throughout Chapter 2, we do not assume that the demand rate depends
explicitly on the current value of the inventory, i.e., we consider a special case of the
demand function considered in Chapter 3; we set ψpxq ” 1. Let c0 ą 0 denote the cost of
production (or purchasing) per unit, and let ptq ě 0 be the (time-dependent) carrying
cost rate per unit. This function ptq not only captures the costs of physically storing
the goods but might also include the cost of capital, e.g., the interest on working capital,
(inventory level dependent) insurance costs, costs for labeling prices, etc. We assume
that the advertising costs accrue at a rate wptqaptq, which allows for convex and concave
cost functions. In practice, the monopolist can potentially spend her money on a large
number of advertising efforts. For example, these expenditures might be the cash flow
rate an advertising agency receives in order to run a campaign. Alternatively, the budget
flow can be spend on an internal advertising department. Another interpretation could
be the number of assistants in a shop advising (potential) buyers, or the length of the
assistants’ working time. The longer assistants are working the larger the operating costs
- especially wages - which (to a certain degree) can be assigned to the advertising costs.
If δptq ą 0, a retailer’s decision to spend no money on advertising is then interpreted as
closing the shop and to run no business at all.
We assume the demand to be deterministic. However, one interpretation of the de-
mand (2.4) is that the advertising efforts influence the number of people who are willing
8Perishable products are products that worsen in quality over time, and become lesser in value.
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to buy the product, and the price level influences the probability of purchasing.
The restriction aptq ą δptq, t P r0, T s, on the parameter functions ensures that the
leverage effect of advertising remains bounded; otherwise, there is the incentive to in-
crease the promotional spending to infinity in order to increase demand, and thus the
revenue would also tend towards infinity. Let xptq, 0 ď t ď T, denote the inventory level
at time t. This is the state of the system. We do not allow for backlogging, i.e., xptq ě 0.
The initial inventory level is denoted by x0, i.e., xp0q “ x0, and is subject to the decision
of the monopolist. In order to explicitly account for the perishability of the items to be
sold we model the inventory level at time t to deteriorate at a rate qptq ě 0. We assume
qptq as well as ptq and rptq to be nonnegative piecewise continuous functions and thus
to be integrable on r0, T s. For any admissible control u, see below, the inventory process
evolves as
9xptq “ ´λpuqptq ´ qptqxptq, xpT q “ 0, (2.5)
where 9xptq “ dxptq{dt denotes the derivative with respect to t. Note, the terminal
condition together with λpuqptq ě 0 and qptq ě 0 implies the inventory process to be
nonnegative, i.e., no backordering will occur. For T arbitrary but fixed, let UT denote
the set of feasible controls:
UT “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
u
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
uptq “ ppptq, wptqq , and uptq is a vector-valued piecewise continuous
function on r0, T s, 0 ď t ď T, such that the solution of (2.5) with
respect to xptq is uniquely determined and all integrals to be
encountered in the sequel exist; moreover, pptq ą 0, wptq ě 0
,////.
////-
.9
The decision problem is to choose a control uptq “ ppptq, wptqq P UT , 0 ď t ď T, that
maximizes
π1 pT, uq “
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
pptqλpuqptq ´ ptqxptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt ´ c0x0. (2.6)
The costs of purchase c0x0 have to be paid at the beginning of the sales period and
are thus not discounted.10 Although this problem looks very similar to the control
9While we are interested in determining optimal price and advertising policies we could as well consider
the demand and advertising rate as controls. Then, the price associated with a demand-advertising
policy is obtained by rewriting (2.4). This corresponds to a quantity based approach often applied in
microeconomics since optimizing over the demand means essentially choosing an initial inventory level
(or capacity). Influenced by the literature on revenue management we choose price and advertising
as controls and deduce the demand via (2.4), but both approaches are possible (and lead to the same
results).
10Recall, instead of costs of purchase one can think of production costs.
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problem which we are going to consider in Chapter 3 there is a crucial difference: the
initial inventory level (or capacity) x0 is not exogenously given but will be implicitly
determined by the price and advertising control the monopolist chooses. Equation (2.7),
see below, defines the relation between an admissible control u and the associated state
process. To see why it is reasonable to assume the terminal condition xpT q “ 0, cf.
(2.5), consider the monopolist who chooses xp0q “ xA together with a control uA such
that xpT q “: xTA ą 0. Then, the same pricing and advertising scheme can be run but
with initial inventory xp0q “ xB “ xA ´ xTA . The revenue is the same for both initial
values as the demand rate remains unchanged (it is independent of the inventory level),
but the costs will decrease: the level of the inventory process initiated with xp0q “ xB
is below the one starting at xp0q “ xA for every point in time, i.e., the production and
inventory costs are smaller. However, as the clearance rate of the inventory does also
depend on the current level through qptq ě 0, this will not imply that xpT q “ 0 (but
guarantees that xpT q ě 0). Thus, it is optimal to control the inventory in such way, that
it is depleted at the end of the sales horizon, i.e., xpT q “ 0. Making use of the state
equation (2.5) and the terminal condition we are able to rewrite the objective function
(2.6) solely in terms of the controls (and parameters) and independent of the current
state of the system.
Let Qptq :“ şt0 qpsqds denote the cumulative loss rate. Then, 0 ď t ď T ,
d
dt
´
xptqeQptq
¯
“ eQptq 9xptq ` qptqxptqeQptq “ ´eQptq p´ 9xptq ´ qptqxptqq “ ´eQptqλpuqptq,
where me make use of (2.5). Integrating from t to T and using the boundary condition
x pT q “ 0 we obtain
´xptqeQptq “
Tż
t
´eQpsqλpuqpsqds.
Thus, the controlled inventory process follows the trajectory
xptq “ e´Qptq
Tż
t
eQpsqλpuqpsqds. (2.7)
Equation (2.7) is important as it links the inventory level at time t with the values of the
pricing and advertising policies on rt, T s. Formula (2.7) determines the initial inventory
level (or capacity) x0 for any given control u, especially for the optimal control. Now,
we are able to quantify the inventory cost of the trajectory xptq, see (2.6), in terms of
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the demand rate by applying Fubini’s theorem:
Tż
0
e´Rptqptqxptqdt “
Tż
0
e´Rptqptq
¨
˝e´Qptq
Tż
t
eQpsqλpuqpsqds
˛
‚dt
“
Tż
0
Tż
t
e´Rptqptqe´QptqeQpsqλpuqpsqdsdt
“
Tż
0
sż
0
e´Rptqptqe´QptqeQpsqλpuqpsqdtds
“
Tż
0
λpuqpsq
¨
˝eQpsq
sż
0
e´pQptq`Rptqqptqdt
˛
‚ds.
We introduce the cost function
cptq :“ eQptq`Rptq
¨
˝c0 `
tż
0
e´pQpsq`Rpsqqpsqds
˛
‚. (2.8)
Expression (2.8) can be rewritten as eQptq
tş
0
e´pQpsq`Rpsqqpsqds “ e´Rptqcptq ´ c0eQptq so
that the inventory cost of the trajectory xptq, see above, can be expressed as
Tż
0
e´Rptqptqxptqdt “
Tż
0
e´Rptqcptqλpuqptqdt ´ c0
Tż
0
eQptqλpuqptqdt.
Eventually, since x0 “ xp0q “
Tş
0
eQptqλpuqptqdt, we can rewrite the objective (2.6) as
follows:
π1 pT, uq “
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
pptqλpuqptq ´ ptqxptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt ´ c0x0
“
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
pptqλpuqptq ´ ptqxptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt ´ c0
Tż
0
eQptqλpuq ptq dt
“
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
ppptq ´ cptqqλpuqptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt.
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The cost functional cptq is independent of the controls and captures all inventory-
dependent costs: cptq is the future value of the costs related to the sale of one unit at
time t. It is the sum of the future value of the unit cost and the future value of the
present value of the inventory cost at time t. The costs associated with the deterioration
of the stock are taken into account by the factor eQptq: to sell one unit at time t the
monopolist must store eQptq units at the beginning. For example, if the inventory decays
at a rate of 10%, the monopolist must stock expp1q units at the beginning in order to be
able to sell one unit at t “ 10, i.e., more than 60% vanish and inflict nothing but costs.
The cost function is the equivalent of the function cRptq in (2.1) where the inventory
cost is constant and no discounting is considered, i.e., ptq ”  and rptq “ Rptq ” 0.
Expression (2.8) reveals that the terms Qptq and Rptq, the cumulative deterioration
rate and the cumulative interest rate, act in a similar way: the inventory decay can be
thought of as an additional interest factor - or the interest rate acts like an additional
decay rate. So for the evaluation of the purchase and inventory costs it does not matter
whether the discount rate or the decay rate is larger, but what matters is the sum of
both quantities. However, from a practitioner’s point of view it certainly is of interest if
higher costs arise from a higher inventory level (as a consequence of a larger decay rate)
or are simply due to discounting.
The function cptq is differentiable11 and increasing in t since
9cptq “ pqptq ` rptqq cptq ` ptq ě 0, (2.9)
cp0q “ c0; cpT q ă 8 if T is finite, and lim
tÑ8 cptq “ `8 if ptq ` qptq ` rptq ą 0. In the
time-homogeneous case, i.e., ptq ” , qptq ” q, and rptq ” r, cptq simplifies to
cptq “
#
epq`rqt
”
c0 ` q`r
`
1 ´ e´pq`rqt˘ı , if  ě 0, q ` r ą 0,
c0 ` t, if  ě 0, q “ r “ 0.
If  “ q “ r “ 0, the cost function cptq is constant and it only accounts for the unit cost
c0; if  ą 0, it increases linearly over time at rate . The cost function together with the
function μ is of great importance as the (optimal) controls will depend on cptq. Thus,
the cost structure and associated parameters will influence the behavior of the system
over time. Figure 2.1 depicts the cost function cptq on the interval r0, 10s for different
parameter settings; the unit cost equals one, i.e., c0 ” 1.
We define the instantaneous profit margin ν; in the pure pricing model it was intro-
duced by Rajan et al. (1992). Now, it also accounts for the (discounted) advertising
11Except at most finitely many points.
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Figure 2.1: The cost function cptq, see (2.8), where c0 ” 1 and piq ptq “ qptq “ rptq “ 0,
piiq ptq “ 0.05, qptq “ rptq “ 0, piiiq ptq “ 0.05, qptq “ 0, rptq “ 0.11`t ,pivq ptq “ 0, qptq ` rptq “ 0.1, pvq ptq “ 0.05, qptq ` rptq “ 0.1.
spending:
νpt, uq “ νpt, p, wq :“ e´Rptq
”
pp ´ cptqqλ pt, p, wq ´ waptq
ı
. (2.10)
The profit margin ν is piecewise continuous in t and differentiable in the arguments p
and w. Let π1˚ pT q :“ π1pT, u˚q denote the optimal value of the control problem (2.6),
and let u˚ “ pp˚, w˚q denote the optimal control12, i.e.,
π1˚ pT q “ sup
uPUT
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
ppptq ´ cptqqλpuqptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt (2.11)
“ sup
uPUT
Tż
0
νpt, uqdt
ď
Tż
0
sup
tpą0,wě0u
tνpt, p, wqu dt. (2.12)
Although T is exogenously given, we stress the dependence of the (optimal) profit on
12The existence and finiteness of the optimal value and the existence and uniqueness of the optimal
control are proved below.
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the sales period T . Later on, we are interested in choosing an optimal cycle length that
maximizes, for example, the average profit per time unit, cf. Chapter 4. Given the upper
bound (2.12) on π1˚ pT q, we consider for every point in time t the auxiliary problem of
finding pointwise solutions pp˚ptq, w˚ptqq which satisfy
pp˚ptq, w˚ptqq “ argmax
pą0,wě0
νpt, p, wq. (2.13)
In the following, we will show that under (relatively mild) parameter restrictions the
control u˚, where u˚ptq “ pp˚ptq, w˚ptqq satisfies (2.13) pointwise, is a feasible policy in
UT , and thus solves problem (2.11). Let λ˚ptq :“ λpt, u˚ptqq denote the sales rate and let
ν˚ptq :“ νpt, u˚ptqq be the profit margin associated with the (pointwise) optimal control
at time t. From the first order conditions for p˚ and w˚ being optimal, see below, the
dynamic equivalent of the well-known Dorfman-Steiner relation follows, 0 ď t ď T ,
w˚ptqaptq
p˚ptqλ˚ptq “
Δptq
εptq . (2.14)
Thus, at any time t, it is optimal to keep the ratio of the advertising expenditures and
the revenue equal to the rate Δptq{εptq; see Dorfman and Steiner (1954) for the static
case and the original reference. If Δptq ” Δ and εptq ” ε, it is optimal to keep this ratio
constant all the time. Inventory and purchasing costs do not affect the optimal ratio of
the expenditures on advertising to the revenue rate. Multiplying both sides of equation
(2.14) with e´Rptqp˚ptqλ˚ptq and integrating from zero to T with respect to t, we obtain
ż T
0
e´Rptqw˚ptqaptqdt “
ż T
0
e´Rptq Δptq
εptq p
˚ptqλ˚ptqdt.
The present value of the optimal total expenditures on advertising is a fraction of the
present value of the optimally attainable revenue; recall, εptq ą 1 ą Δptq. The verifica-
tion of (2.14) is part of the proof of the following results which characterize the optimal
control u˚.
Theorem 2.2.1 Let εptq ě ε ą 1, 0 ď δptq ă aptq ď a, Δptq “ δptq{aptq, and
γptq “ εptq´Δptq1´Δptq , 0 ď t ď T . Let cwptq :“
„
Δptq
εptq´1
´
εptq´1
εptq
¯εptqj 1aptq´δptq
and let cλptq :“´
εptq´1
εptq
¯εptq
cwptqδptq. Let μptq ą 0 and let the demand follow λpt, p, wq “ μptqp´εptqwδptq.
Let the cost rate cptq be given by (2.8). Then, the price function p˚ and advertising rate
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w˚ which satisfy (2.13) for every t, 0 ď t ď T , are given by
p˚ptq “ εptq
εptq ´ 1cptq, (2.15)
and
w˚ptq “ cwptq
ˆ
μptq
cptqεptq´1
˙ 1
aptq´δptq
. (2.16)
The sales rate λ˚ptq and the profit margin ν˚ptq associated with the optimal price control
(2.15) and the optimal advertising control (2.16) are13
λ˚ptq “ cλptq
ˆ
μptq
cptqεptq´Δptq
˙ 1
1´Δptq δptqą0“ εptq ´ 1Δptq
w˚ptqaptq
cptq , (2.17)
and
ν˚ptq “ e
´Rptqcλptq
γptq ´ 1
ˆ
μptq
cptqεptq´1
˙ 1
1´Δptq “ e
´Rptqcptq
γptq ´ 1 λ
˚ptq δptqą0“ e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq w
˚ptqaptq.
(2.18)
Proof. For any t, the derivatives of the demand rate λpt, p, wq with respect to the
control values are given by, p, w ą 0,
Bλ
Bp pt, p, wq “ ´
εptq
p
λpt, p, wq, and BλBw pt, p, wq “
δptq
w
λpt, p, wq;
the second derivatives are given by
B2λ
Bp2 pt, p, wq “
εptqpεptq ` 1q
p2
λpt, p, wq, B
2λ
Bw2 pt, p, wq “
δptqpδptq ´ 1q
w2
λpt, p, wq,
and B2λ
BpBw pt, p, wq “ ´
δptqεptq
pw
λpt, p, wq.
Since ν is differentiable in p and w, the (pointwise) first order conditions in the interior,
13By l’Hôpital’s rule the formulas (2.17) and (2.18) are also justified for the case δptq “ Δptq “ 0, cf.
Corollary 2.2.2.
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i.e., p ą 0 and w ą 0, for p˚ and w˚ to be optimal imply
Bν
Bp pt, p
˚, wq “ e´Rptq
ˆ
λpt, p˚, wq ` pp˚ ´ cptqq BλBp pt, p
˚, wq
˙
“ e´Rptqλpt, p˚, wq
ˆ
1 ´ εptqp
˚ ´ cptq
p˚
˙
!“ 0, (2.19)
Bν
Bw pt, p, w
˚q “ e´Rptq
ˆ
pp ´ cptqq BλBw pt, p, w
˚q ´ aptqw˚aptq´1
˙
“ e´Rptq
ˆ
δptq
w˚ pp ´ cptqqλpt, p, w
˚q ´ aptqw˚aptq´1
˙
!“ 0. (2.20)
Solving (2.19) for pp˚´cptqq and substituting this expression into the optimality condition
(2.20) implies the Dorfman-Steiner relation (2.14). From (2.19) the expression of the
optimal price policy (2.15) follows by elementary calculations. Inserting p˚ into the
Dorfman-Steiner relation and solving for w˚ yields equation (2.16). The expressions for
λ˚ and ν˚ follow by simply using the formulas of the optimal controls and by making
again use of the Dorfman-Steiner relation and the definitions of the various parameters.
To see that p˚ and w˚ indeed satisfy (2.13), notice that p˚ and w˚ are unique solutions
of the first order conditions. Moreover, since for the extreme cases limpÑ0 νpt, p, wq ă 0
and limpÑ8 νpt, p, wq “ ´e´Rptqwaptq ď 0, the value of p˚ lies in the interior of the
interval p0,8q. If δptq “ 0, it is optimal not to advertise at all; this observation goes in
line with equation (2.16): if δptq “ 0, then cwptq “ 0. Assuming a positive advertising
elasticity δptq, the demand at time t is zero if w “ 0, i.e., νpt, p, 0q “ 0. Since aptq ą
δptq for all t P r0, T s, it follows that limwÑ8 νpt, p, wq “ ´8. Thus, the advertising
expenditures exceed the revenue p˚ptq ¨ λ˚ptq, and an optimal advertising rate will be
finite. Since μptq ą 0 and cptq ą 0 by assumption, the profit rate associated with the
optimal price and advertising control is positive for any t ě 0, i.e., ν˚ptq ą 0. Next, we
check the sufficient conditions for optimality.
The second derivatives of the profit margin evaluated at the optimal policy values are:
B2ν
Bp2 pt, p
˚ptq, w˚ptqq “ ´pεptq ´ 1qe´Rptq λ
˚ptq
p˚ptq ă 0,
B2ν
Bw2 pt, p
˚ptq, w˚ptqq “ ´aptqpaptq ´ δptqqe´Rptqw˚ptqaptq´2 ă 0,
B2ν
BpBw pt, p
˚ptq, w˚ptqq “ δptqe´Rptq λ
˚ptq
w˚ptq
ˆ
1 ´ εptqp
˚ptq ´ cptq
p˚ptq
˙
“ 0.
Obviously, the Hessian matrix of ν with respect to p˚ptq and w˚ptq is negative definite
at any t. Thus, p˚ptq and w˚ptq are the (pointwise) global maximizers of νptq and are
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points in the interior of the set tpp, wq|p ą 0, w ě 0u. 
Corollary 2.2.1 The strategy u˚ with u˚ptq “ pp˚ptq, w˚ptqq0ďtďT defined in Theorem
2.2.1 is a feasible control which belongs to UT . Thus,
π1˚ pT q “ π1 pT, u˚q .
Proof. Since μptq, cptq, and all other time-dependent functions are assumed to be piece-
wise continuous the controls p˚ and w˚ are also piecewise continuous, and ν˚ is inte-
grable on r0, T s. The restrictions on the parameters imply that p˚ptq ą cptq ą 0 and
w˚ptq ě 0 throughout the interval r0, T s. The state equation (2.5) is satisfied, and
the initial value x0 is given by x0 “ x˚p0q “
şT
0 e
Qpsqλ˚psqds according to (2.7). Since
u˚ptq “ pp˚ptq, w˚ptqq P UT and
π1˚ pT q “ sup
uPUT
π1pT, uq ď
Tż
0
max
pą0,wě0 tνpt, p, wqu dt “
Tż
0
νpt, p˚ptq, w˚ptqqdt “ π1 pT, u˚q
the policies p˚ptq and w˚ptq maximize π1pT, p, wq. 
The pointwise maximization of the integrand in (2.11) determines maximizers of the
value of the integral. The optimal controls p˚ and w˚ only depend on the current
point in time t and not on the time-to-go or the value of T : considering distinct time
horizons T1 ă T2, the optimal price and the optimal advertising rate will be the same
for the interval r0, T1s.14 At any time t, 0 ď t ď T , the optimal price depends only
on the price elasticity εptq and the cost function cptq. In particular, it does neither
depend on the arrival rate μptq nor on the advertising coefficients aptq and δptq. Thus,
the optimal price policy is the same whether the monopolist is allowed to advertise -
or obliged to pay for promotion - or not! Equation (2.15) is the common static price
formula of a monopolist which is also known as the Amoroso-Robinson relation: the
marginal revenue pεptq ´ 1q{εptqpptq must equal the (marginal) cost cptq at every point
in time t.15 The monopolist pursues a markup strategy where the size of the markup is
determined by the term εptq{pεptq ´ 1q. Therefore, the evolution of the price function
depends on the price elasticity and the cost function. The optimal price trajectory starts
at the value εp0q{pεp0q ´ 1qc0. Except for the special case ptq “ qptq “ rptq “ 0, cptq
14Note, if the parameter functions depend on T , for example εptq :“ εpt, T q “ ε˜eT ´t, ε˜ ą ε, 0 ď t ď T ,
i.e., the price sensitivity decreases towards T , the (optimal) policies will naturally depend on T .
15We multiply both sides of (2.15) by pεptq ´ 1q{εptq.
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is always increasing over time, cf. (2.9). Thus, the optimal price will increase whenever
the elasticity is constant or is decreasing, i.e., it is optimal to (temporarily) run a market
penetration strategy.16 Whenever εptq is increasing, there is no general statement on how
the optimal price trajectory will evolve over time. To specify circumstances in which
price skimming is optimal, i.e., prices decrease over time, we compute the derivative of
the optimal price with respect to time17:
9p˚ptq “ p˚ptq
ˆ
9cptq
cptq ´
9εptq
εptqpεptq ´ 1q
˙
εptq”ε“ ε
ε ´ 1 9cptq. (2.21)
Hence, price skimming ( 9p˚ ă 0) will be optimal if and only if the relative increase in ε
(divided by the term ε´1) exceeds the relative increase of the cost function. In practice,
both cases can be observed. Airlines typically raise their ticket prices towards the date of
departure as business travelers are often last-minute bookers and less price-sensitive than
tourists who buy their tickets weeks or months in advance. A price skimming strategy
can often be observed when the freshness or up-to-dateness of the goods for sale is
of concern: as the selling time progresses the customer’s willingness to pay decreases
for perishable products such as fruits or fashion, in other words: the customer’s price
sensitivity increases.
Another consequence of Theorem 2.2.1 is that if the price elasticity is nonincreasing,
optimal prices might become very large and possibly tend to infinity if T Ñ 8. This is
the case because it is possible to set the price of the goods equal to any large value and
still have positive demand (and thus a positive profit margin). In practical applications,
one might often observe that c0 " , e.g., the value of a car in an exhibition room of a
(luxury/classic) car retailer is relatively large compared to the costs of storing the car,
and thus the relative price increase over time is very small. Although equation (2.15)
gives the exact value of how to price the good(s), in such cases, a practitioner might be
advised to keep the price constant over time (maybe at a value of p˚pT {2q right from
the beginning) and save the cost of relabeling prices. The cost of relabeling can be
considered to be part of the carrying cost . In Section 2.3.2, we will examine the case
of constant prices and dynamic advertising in more detail.
The optimal advertising strategy w˚ depends on all model parameters. The ratio of
the arrival intensity μ and the cost function c is of special importance: whenever the
ratio μptq{cptqεptq´1 is constant on some subinterval of r0, T s, it is optimal to keep the
16If the price elasticity is constant and cptq is constant, the special case ptq “ qptq “ rptq “ 0, then the
optimal prices are also constant.
17All derivatives are assumed to exist. Equation (2.21) can be expressed in terms of elasticities with
respect to time, cf. Section 2.4.1.
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advertising level equal to const
1
aptq´δptq ¨ cwptq. Since the parameter function cw only
depends on the values of aptq, δptq, and εptq, it is optimal to advertise at a constant level
if the price elasticity and the adverting efficiency are also constant on the subinterval.
Since εptq ą 1 ą Δptq ě 0, the terms pεptq ´ 1q{εptqq and Δptq{εptq are both less than
one. Thus, it is obvious that the value of
cwptq “
«
Δptq
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptqff 1aptq´δptq
“
«
Δptq
εptq
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq´1ff 1aptq´δptq
is between 0 and 1. Moreover, in case μptq “ cptqεptq´1, it is optimal to advertise at a rate
smaller than one, i.e., it is profitable for the monopolist to discourage potential buyers.
In general, the optimal advertising rate, see (2.16), is larger than one if at time t the
value of the arrival rate exceeds a term which depends on the cost rate, viz., Δptq ą 0,
μptq ą εptq ´ 1Δptq
ˆ
εptq
εptq ´ 1
˙εptq
cptqεptq´1 “ εptqΔptqp
˚ptqεptq´1. (2.22)
If inequality (2.22) is satisfied, the arrival intensity is at such a (high) level that it pays
off to stimulate demand even more, i.e., to choose w˚ptq ą 1 such that w˚ptqδptq ą 1. In
case the right-hand side of (2.22) is too large, it is optimal to actually curb the demand.
This is the case if promotion is relatively expensive and has only a small effect, i.e., the
advertising efficiency parameter Δptq is close to zero (δptq ! aptq). From a different point
of view the monopolist might argue that, if the costs are relatively high in relation to
the arrival intensity μ, it does not pay off to attract more people. Hence, people should
be discouraged of considering buying the retailer’s goods. In practice, this might be
achieved through a decreasing number of shop assistants or a reduction of their business
hours as outlined above. In both cases the (labor) costs decrease; if these costs are
(partly) assigned to promotions, see above, this decrease results in cutting back the
promotion expenses.
We summarize the effect of advertising in the following two corollaries. The first one,
Corollary 2.2.2, considers the case when advertising has no effect, i.e., δptq “ 0 for every
point in time. The results are directly deduced from Theorem 2.2.1 and by allowing the
value δptq for each time t to tend to zero. Naturally, it is optimal to set the advertising
rate to zero, and the model becomes a pure pricing model. We state the optimal policies
and associated values of this pure pricing model; we label these optimal values with the
subscript ”R”, a reference to the pure pricing model of Rajan et al. (1992). Corollary
2.2.3 compares the optimal policies and associated optimal values of the pure pricing
26
2.2 The Dynamic Pricing and Advertising Model
model (δptq “ 0) with the optimal policies of the model where advertising has an effect
(δptq ą 0). Although the optimal pricing strategy is not influenced by the value of the
parameter δ, we are able to formulate conditions such that a retailer benefits from a
market environment where promotion is effective.
Corollary 2.2.2 Assume the conditions of Theorem 2.2.1 hold and let δptq ” 0 for all
t P r0, T s. Then, the price pR and advertising rate wR which are determined by the
right-hand side of (2.13) for every t, 0 ď t ď T , are given by
pRptq “ εptq
εptq ´ 1cptq, (2.23)
and
wRptq “ 0. (2.24)
The sales rate λRptq and the profit margin νRptq associated with the price control (2.23)
and the advertising control (2.24) are
λRptq “
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μptq
cptqεptq , (2.25)
and
νRptq “ e
´Rptq
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μptq
cptqεptq´1 . (2.26)
Proof. To derive the formulas of Corollary 2.2.2 we use the formulas of Theorem 2.2.1
and let, for each t fixed, the value δptq tend to zero. Note, if δ tends to zero, then Δ also
tends to zero.
To see (2.23), notice that the optimal price (2.15) does not depend on δ. Hence,
pRptq “ p˚ptq, t ě 0. To see that wRptq ” 0 whenever δptq is zero, consider (2.16). For t
fixed, the parameter cw tends to zero if δ tends to zero. Hence, (2.24) follows.
To see that (2.25) holds, notice that
cλptq “
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq
cwptqδptq
“
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq « Δptq
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptqff δptqaptq´δptq
“
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq´1` Δptq1´Δptq ¯ ˆ 1
εptq ´ 1
˙ Δptq
1´Δptq
Δptq Δptq1´Δptq
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converges to
´
εptq´1
εptq
¯
if Δptq goes to zero. Thus, λ˚ptq “ cλptq
´
μptq
cptqεptq´Δptq
¯ 1
1´Δptq con-
verges to
´
εptq´1
εptq
¯εptq
μptq
cptqεptq “ λRptq. Formula (2.26) follows directly from equation
(2.18), ν˚ptq “ e´Rptqcptqγptq´1 λ˚ptq, and the fact that γptq “ εptq´Δptq1´Δptq
Δptq“0“ εptq. 
Corollary 2.2.2 is a special case of Theorem 2.2.1 whenever δ equals zero. Moreover,
Corollary 2.2.2 states the solution to the optimal pricing problem of Rajan et al. (1992)
if the sales rate follows equation (2.4).
The scenario when δ equals zero is important. In some countries it is forbidden to
promote pharmaceuticals, alcoholic drinks, or health care services.18 The arrival rate
μ in Corollary 2.2.2 can be interpreted to represent the arrival rate in a market where
advertising is prohibited or where customers do not react to advertising. The discussion
before Corollary 2.2.2 centered on the question whether sales are boosted by advertising
at a given time point t, i.e., λ˚ptq ą λRptq, or not. Such a comparison assumes that
the arrival rates and the price paths in both models are the same. By Corollary 2.2.2
we know that p˚ ” pR. Since λ˚ptq “ μptqp˚ptq´εptqw˚ptqδptq and λRptq “ μptqpRptq´εptq,
the inequality λ˚ptq ą λRptq is equivalent to w˚ptq ą 1, see (2.22). Hence, if w˚ptq ą 1,
then the revenue rate p˚ptqλ˚ptq at time t exceeds pRptqλRptq. However, the model with
active advertising incorporates the cost w˚ptqaptq. Therefore, it is not at all clear when
advertising is beneficial at time t, i.e., whether ν˚ptq ą νRptq, or not. To compare both
profit rates (and both sales rates), we assume that a positive arrival rate μR in the model
without advertising is given, and the rate μ in the model with advertising is the product
of μR and the reciprocal of a positive bounded function βptq, i.e.,
μptq “ 1
βptqμRptq. (2.27)
Then, the demand rates of both models do not only differ by the factor w˚ptqδptq but also
by the factor βptq. Since p˚ ” pR the optimal sales rate in the model without advertising
equals λRptq “ μRptqpRptq´εptq “ μptqp˚ptq´εptqβptq. Thus, the factor βptq replaces the
factor w˚ptqδptq in the sales rate λ˚ associated with the model with advertising. In
contrast to the advertising cost rate w˚ptqaptq the factor βptq incurs no cost; β acts like
a free promotion rate.
At the beginning of this section we argued that the function μ may have a product
form where each factor has its own economic interpretation. For the product (2.27) we
18For instance, Example 11.1 in Mansfield (1994), p. 344, considers the effect of a ban on advertising of
eyeglasses in some states of the US.
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offered a possible interpretation of the factor μR, viz. μR is the arrival intensity of a
market where advertising has no effect. The factor 1βptq can then be interpreted to be a
(modified) response constant, cf. Appendix 2.
Corollary 2.2.3 Let μptq ą 0 and let p˚, w˚, λ˚, and ν˚ be given by Theorem 2.2.1. Let
βptq ą 0 and let pR, λR, and νR be given by Corollary 2.2.3 when the arrival intensity is
μRptq :“ βptqμptq, t ě 0, ceteris paribus.
(i) Then, t ě 0,
p˚ptq “ pRptq, (2.28)
λ˚ptq “ w
˚ptqδptq
βptq λRptq, (2.29)
and
ν˚ptq “ 1 ´ Δptq
βptq w
˚ptqδptqνRptq. (2.30)
(ii) For any t ě 0, if w˚ptqδptq ą βptq, then
λ˚ptq ą λRptq. (2.31)
If w˚ptqδptq ă βptq, the inequality (2.31) is reversed; if w˚ptqδptq “ βptq, then
λ˚ptq “ λRptq
(iii) For any t ě 0, if w˚ptqδptq ą βptq1´Δptq , then
ν˚ptq ą νRptq. (2.32)
If w˚ptqδptq ă βptq1´Δptq , the inequality (2.32) is reversed; if w˚ptqδptq “ βptq1´Δptq , then
ν˚ptq “ νRptq.
Proof. piq Equation (2.28) follows from equations (2.15) and (2.23). To see (2.29) and
(2.30) we rely on Theorem 2.2.1 and Corollary 2.2.2 and the following calculations.
Step 1: If δptq ą 0, the optimal profit rate and the optimal advertising rate are given
by, see Theorem 2.2.1, t ě 0,
λ˚ptq “ εptq ´ 1Δptq
w˚ptqaptq
cptq ,
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and
ν˚ptq “ e
´Rptqcλptq
γptq ´ 1
ˆ
μptq
cptqεptq´1
˙ 1
1´Δptq “ e
´Rptqcptq
γptq ´ 1 λ
˚ptq “ e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq w
˚ptqaptq.
Moreover, the optimal advertising rate is given by (2.16),
w˚ptq “ cwptq
ˆ
μptq
cptqεptq´1
˙ 1
aptq´δptq “
«
Δptq
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μptq
cptqεptq´1
ff 1
aptq´δptq
.
Step 2: If δptq ” 0 and when the arrival rate is μR, the optimal sales rate and the optimal
profit rate are given by, see Corollary 2.2.2,
λRptq “
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μRptq
cptqεptq , and
νRptq “ e
´Rptq
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μRptq
cptqεptq´1 .
Step 3: Since μptq “ μRptqβptq , elementary calculations show that
w˚ptqaptq´δptq “ Δptq
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μptq
cptqεptq´1 “
Δptq
εptq ´ 1
cptq
βptqλRptq
“ Δptq
βptq e
RptqνRptq. (2.33)
Hence,
λ˚ptq “ εptq ´ 1Δptq
w˚ptqaptq
cptq “
εptq ´ 1
Δptq
w˚ptqδptq
cptq w
˚ptqaptq´δptq
“ εptq ´ 1Δptq
w˚ptqδptq
cptq
Δptq
εptq ´ 1
cptq
βptqλRptq “
w˚ptqδptq
βptq λRptq
yields (2.29). Similarly, we show equation (2.30) holds true:
ν˚ptq “ e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq w
˚ptqaptq “ e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq w
˚ptqδptqw˚ptqaptq´δptq
“ e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq w
˚ptqδptq Δptq
βptq e
RptqνRptq “ 1 ´ Δptq
βptq w
˚ptqδptqνRptq.
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piiq If, for any t ě 0, w˚ptqδptq ą βptq, then it follows immediately from (2.29) that
λ˚ptq “ w
˚ptqδptq
βptq λRptq ą λRptq;
if w˚ptqδptq ă βptq, then the inequality λ˚ptq ă λRptq follows. If w˚ptqδptq “ βptq, then
the equality λ˚ptq “ λRptq follows.
piiiq If, for any t ě 0, w˚ptqδptq ą βptq1´Δptq , then the inequality ν˚ptq ą νRptq follows
from (2.30). If we assume w˚ptqδptq ă βptq1´Δptq , then (2.30) implies ν˚ptq ă νRptq. If
w˚ptqδptq “ βptq1´Δptq , then ν˚ptq “ νRptq 
In the following, we apply Corollary 2.2.3 on the whole interval r0, T s. Corollary 2.2.3
enables us to compare two markets in terms of the optimal price, the sales rate, and
the profit margin: one market, where advertising has an effect, i.e., δ is positive on the
whole interval r0, T s, and another market, where advertising has no effect, i.e., δ “ 0
on r0, T s. From the consumer’s perspective it is important to note that the (optimal)
price is the same in both markets. Hence, if the optimal advertising rate is high enough
pw˚ptqδptq ą βptqq in the market where advertising has an effect, more customers will buy
the product: consumers are not disadvantaged by advertising. The monopolist attracts
more (potential) buyers and hence increases her revenue. However, since advertising
also incurs costs, the optimal advertising rate must be larger than pβptq{p1´Δptqqq1{δptq
to guarantee that the monopolist benefits from advertising at time t, i.e., the net profit
rate is larger in the market with advertising than in the market without. In contrast
to that, it is hard to imagine practical situations where the monopolist is doing better
in a market where customers are not receptive to advertising compared to a market
where advertising is effective. However, statutory regulations may prohibit advertising
and put the company into a position where the additional benefits from advertising are
unmarketable. Note, the profit rate of the monopolist is always strictly greater than
zero - independent of the influence of advertising, i.e., ν˚ptq ą 0 and νRptq ą 0 for all
t ě 0.
Right now, we postpone a more detailed analysis of the dynamic price-advertising
model to Section 2.4. There, we provide illustrations and numerical examples to examine
the dynamic price-advertising model at length. Comparisons between the dynamic price-
advertising model and the pure pricing model will also be part of the analysis in Chapter
4, where we compare the pure pricing model and the model that allows advertising with
respect to the (average) optimal cycle length, cf Theorem 4.2.4. In the following section,
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we consider the (partially) static models where only one of the controls, the price or the
advertising rate, are supposed to be dynamic and the remaining control has to be set to
a fixed value throughout the whole sales period.
2.3 Combinations of Dynamic and Static Controls
2.3.1 Dynamic Pricing but Advertising Rates are Constant
Corollary 2.2.3 quantifies the differences of the following two markets: one market where
advertising has no effect and another one where advertising is effective. But the two
distinct market settings allow for a second interpretation. When no advertising term is
explicitly included in the demand function, cf. the pure pricing model, the promotional
influence is captured by the term μR. Although we assume that this promotion comes
for free, one can still evaluate the cost of the free (constant) advertising rate.
In such cases the associated total advertising costs are fixed for a cycle of length T and
can be neglected when solving the optimization problem (the fixed cost actually provides
a lower bound for the value of the monopolist’s profit as the business operations must at
least compensate for this expense). It seems reasonable to include these costs but give
the retailer the opportunity to choose the level on her own. Alternatively, a company
might be committed to the advertising level it chooses and is not allowed to change
this total effort afterwards. Naturally, the profit will be smaller than the profit in the
dynamic setting, except for the case if μptq ” cptq and price and advertising elasticities
are constant, see condition (2.22); in this special case profit rates are equal. But what
is the benefit from being able to choose the advertising rate dynamically? One can also
ask: if the monopolist gets free promotion in the pure pricing model, which amount
should be charged to compensate for the external promotion effect captured by μ?
Since we are interested in a constant advertising rate, it makes sense to keep the
corresponding parameters also constant over time. In the following, we will consider
the advertising elasticity δ and the cost coefficient a to be constant, i.e., δptq ” δ,
and aptq ” a ă a. Thus, the parameter of advertising efficiency is also constant, i.e.,
Δptq ” Δ. Notice that we still allow for a time-dependent price elasticity εptq ą ε.
The analysis in the previous section, where we assume dynamic price and dynamic
advertising, shows that the optimal price policy p˚ does not depend on the advertising
rate.19 Hence, it is feasible to apply a two-stage approach. First, we solve for the optimal
(dynamic) pricing policy which - as expected - is identical to p˚. Second, we identify the
19Advertising at rate zero implies zero profit as long as δptq ą 0, i.e., the price is irrelevant since no
customers will be attracted and nothing will be sold.
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optimal (constant) advertising rate which will now depend on the cycle length T . The
state equation (2.5) remains valid, but the control u now consists of a (dynamic) pricing
scheme and a constant advertising level throughout r0, T s, i.e., uptq “ ppptq, wq P U¯T ,
where
U¯T “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
u
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
uptq “ ppptq, wq , and uptq is a vector-valued piecewise continuous
function on r0, T s, 0 ď t ď T, such that the solution of (2.5) with
respect to xptq is uniquely determined and all integrals to be
encountered in the sequel exist; moreover, pptq ą 0, w ě 0
,////.
////-
.
Note, U¯T Ă UT . Let MpT, pp¨qq denote the net present value of the price contribution to
the total profit of a given price strategy in the time interval r0, T s,
MpT, pp¨qq :“
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
ppptq ´ cptqqμptqpptq´εptq
ı
dt. (2.34)
Whenever a pricing policy has the property pptq ą cptq, 0 ď t ď T , then MpT, pp¨qq ą 0;
in particular, this is true, for the optimal pricing policy p˚, cf. (2.15). We call MpT, pp¨qq
the price contribution as it equals the present value of the net revenue (without adver-
tising cost) if the advertising rate equals one. Let DpT q denote the present value of a
”payment-flow-of-rate-one” received from presence until time T , i.e.,
DpT q :“
Tż
0
ξpsqds “
Tż
0
e´Rpsqds, (2.35)
where ξpsq is the discount factor, cf. the remarks on (hyperbolic) discounting in Section
2.1. Note, in case of a constant discount rate rptq ” r, we have DpT q “ 1´e´rTr ÑrÑ0 T .
For any feasible policy u P U¯T we can rewrite the objective function as follows:
π1 pT, uq “
Tż
0
νpt, uqdt “
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
ppptq ´ cptqqμptqpptq´εptqwδ ´ wa
ı
dt
“ wδ
Tż
0
e´Rptq ppptq ´ cptqqμptqpptq´εptq ´ wa
Tż
0
e´Rptqdt
“ wδMpT, pp¨qq ´ waDpT q,
where the last line states the objective function in terms of the total net present revenue
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minus the net present cost (of advertising). The leverage effect of advertising becomes
evident once more: MpT, pp¨qq, the net present value of the pricing policy, is enhanced
if w ą 1 and reduced if w ă 1. If w “ 1 (or δ “ 0), the total net revenue is equivalent
to the one of the pure pricing model. Another implication of this last line is that if
MpT, pp¨qq ą 0, there exists a positive advertising rate such that the profit will be
positive. If MpT, pp¨qq ď 0, it is optimal to set w ” 0 and make zero profit. However, we
will show that since it is always possible to choose a price policy such that pptq ą cptq
for all t P r0, T s, the function MpT, pp¨qq and thus the associated profit function π1 pT, uq
will always take positive values with an appropriate choice of w.
In the following, we will label results and expression related to the optimal solution in
case of a constant advertising rate by a ”¯” superscript. Let u¯, where u¯ptq “ pp¯ptq, w¯T q,
denote the strategy that maximizes π1pT, uq, and let π¯1pT q :“ π1pT, u¯q.20 Since the
value of the integral expression MpT, pp¨qq does not depend on the choice of w, the
aforementioned two-stage problem to be solved is
π¯1pT q “ sup
uPU¯T
π1pT, uq “ sup
wě0
#
wδ sup
pp¨qą0
tMpT, pp¨qqu ´ waDpT q
+
. (2.36)
The inner maximization problem in (2.36) provides the optimal pricing strategy by
maximizing the integrand of MpT, pp¨qq with respect to the price for every t. We will
show that, if the optimal price policy is used, MpT, p¯p¨qq is indeed positive. Similar to
the dynamic problem in Section 2.2, the Amoroso-Robinson relation holds pointwise for
the optimal price at time t. Given the optimal price, the outer maximization problem
can be solved and determines the best constant advertising rate. We will show that this
approach is feasible in the proof of the following result.
Theorem 2.3.1 Assume 0 ď δ ă a ă a, Δ “ a{δ, and εptq ą ε ą 1 for all t P r0, T s.
Let DpT q “
Tş
0
e´Rptqdt, and MpT, pp¨qq “
Tş
0
e´Rptq
“ppptq ´ cptqqμptqpptq´εptq‰ dt. Assume
μptq ą 0; let the demand follow λpt, p, wq “ μptqp´εptqwδ, and let the cost rate cptq be
given by (2.8). Then, the dynamic price p¯ptq, t ě 0, and the constant advertising rate
w¯T which solve (2.36) are given by
p¯ptq “ p˚ptq “ εptq
εptq ´ 1cptq, (2.37)
20The existence and finiteness of the optimal value and the existence and uniqueness of the optimal
control are proved below.
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and
w¯T “
ˆ
ΔM¯pT q
DpT q
˙ 1
a´δ
, (2.38)
where M¯pT q :“ MpT, p¯p¨qq “
Tş
0
e´Rptq 1εptq´1
´
εptq´1
εptq
¯εptq
μptq
cptqεptq´1 dt.
Proof : To solve the inner maximization problem in (2.36) we take the derivative of the
integrand of MpT, pp¨qq with respect to p for every t. Then, the first order condition for
the optimal price p¯ at time t, 0 ď t ď T , implies that
e´Rptqμptq
´
p¯´εptq ´ εptq pp¯ ´ cptqq p¯´εptq´1
¯
“ 0,
and equation (2.37) follows directly by elementary calculations. One can easily show
that the integrand of MpT, pp¨qq is strictly concave in p at every point in time t as long
as p ă pεptq ` 1q{pεptq ´ 1qcptq, and thus for p¯. Note, p¯ptq ą cptq for every point in time
t. Hence, M¯pT q “ MpT, p¯p¨qq is positive, and the optimal advertising constant will be
positive too. Thus, the outer maximization problem in (2.36) can be solved by applying
the first order condition, i.e., w¯T must satisfy
δw¯δ´1T M¯pT q ´ aw¯a´1T DpT q “ 0.
Formula (2.38) follows by solving for w¯T . The second order condition shows that w¯T is
indeed the profit maximizing advertising rate when the optimal pricing scheme satisfies
MpT, p¯p¨qq ą 0. To this end, notice that
B2π1
Bw2 pT, p¯p¨q, w¯T q “ δpδ ´ 1qw¯
δ´2
T MpT, p¯p¨qq ´ apa ´ 1qw¯a´2T DpT q
a‰1“ apa ´ 1qw¯a´2T DpT q
ˆ
δ ´ 1
a ´ 1Δw¯
δ´a
T
M¯pT q
DpT q ´ 1
˙
“ apa ´ 1qw¯a´2T DpT q
ˆ
δ ´ 1
a ´ 1 ´ 1
˙
“ ´apa ´ δqw¯a´2T DpT q
ă 0,
since δ ă a and DpT q ą 0. To see that the second derivative is negative in the case
a ” 1, notice that the first line immediately implies this fact. Thus, w¯T satisfies the first
and the second order conditions.
The price policy p¯ptq is piecewise continuous since it is a composition of two piecewise
continuous functions; moreover, w¯T is a positive constant. Thus, the integral in (2.3.1)
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is well defined for u¯, where u¯ptq “ pp¯ptq, w¯T q, and the state equation (2.5) is satisfied
with x¯0 “ x¯p0q “
şT
0 e
Qpsqλ ps, u¯q ds. Since u¯ptq P U¯T , it follows that
π¯1pT q “ sup
uPU¯T
π1pT, uq ď max
wą0 maxpp¨qą0
"
π1 pT, pp¨q, wq
*
“ π1pT, u¯q. (2.39)
Hence, u¯ maximizes π1pT, uq in all these cases where only static advertising policies are
allowed. 
Whether we consider a dynamic advertising rate or a static one, the optimal pricing
schemes are the same. The Amoroso-Robinson relation also holds if advertising has no
effect (δ ” 0). The optimal rate w¯T depends on all parameters. Similar to the dynamic
case the ratio of the arrival intensity μ and the cost functional cptq (to the power of
εptq ´ 1) is most important since it is part of the integrand of MpT q. The denominator
DpT q can be thought of as a time averaging component taking discounting into account.
Thus, the optimal constant advertising rate w¯T can be interpreted as the (time adjusted)
average of the dynamic rate. To be precise, it can easily be shown that
Tż
0
e´Rpsqw¯a´δT ds “ DpT q w¯a´δT “
Tż
0
e´Rpsqw˚psqa´δds. (2.40)
The present value of the constant rate w¯a´δT and the present value of the dynamic rate
w˚ptqa´δ, the right-hand side of (2.40), are equal. Without discounting the expression
DpT q equals T and the constant rate can be calculated by averaging the corresponding ac-
cumulated dynamic rate; rewrite the relation (2.40) as w¯pT q “ pşT0 w˚ptqa´δdt{T q1{pa´δq.
Comparing the dynamic rate with the constant one at a specific point t, one easily finds
that w˚ptq ą w¯T if and only if
μptq
cptqεptq´1 ą
şT
0 e
´Rpsq μpsq
cpsqεpsq´1 ds
DpT q . (2.41)
Thus, if the ratio of the arrival rate and the cost rate (to the power of εptq ´ 1) at
some point t is larger (smaller) than the average value of this ratio at present cost,
then the optimal dynamic advertising rate lies above (below) the optimal constant rate.
Since the cost rate increases over time, the dynamic rate will typically be larger at the
beginning of the interval r0, T s and will fall below the constant rate at the end of the
cycle. A property that follows directly is that the optimal sales rates in both models -
36
2.3 Combinations of Dynamic and Static Controls
the dynamic advertising model and the static advertising model - behave according to
the advertising rates since prices are identical. The sales rates of both models only differ
in the promotion component. Before we compare the sales rates and the profit rates of
the dynamic model with the rates of the static one we first give explicit formulas.
Corollary 2.3.1 Let the assumptions of Theorem (2.3.1) be satisfied. Then, the sales
rate λ¯ and the profit margin ν¯ associated with the (dynamic) price control (2.37) and the
(constant) advertising control (2.38) are given by
λ¯ptq :“ λpt, u¯ptqq “
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μptq
cptqεptq
ˆ
ΔM¯pT q
DpT q
˙ Δ
1´Δ
, (2.42)
and
ν¯ptq :“ νpt, u¯ptqq “ e´Rptqw¯aT
˜
1
Δ
1
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq DpT q
M¯pT q
μptq
cptqεptq´1 ´ 1
¸
. (2.43)
The profit of one cycle of length T associated with the optimal control u¯ P U¯T equals
π¯1pT q “
ż T
0
ν¯ptqdt “ 1 ´ ΔΔ DpT qw¯
a
T . (2.44)
Proof : The formulas of Corollary 2.3.1 follow by evaluating the sales rate and the profit
margin for the optimal control u¯ described in Theorem 2.3.1 and by simple algebra.
To derive formula (2.44), we make use of DpT q “
Tş
0
e´Rptqdt and the optimal price
contribution M¯pT q “ MpT, p¯p¨qq “
Tş
0
e´Rptq 1εptq´1
´
εptq´1
εptq
¯εptq
μptq
cptqεptq´1 dt:
ż T
0
ν¯ptqdt “
ż T
0
e´Rptqw¯aT
˜
1
Δ
1
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq DpT q
M¯pT q
μptq
cptqεptq´1 ´ 1
¸
dt
“ w¯
a
T
Δ
DpT q
M¯pT q
ż T
0
e´Rptq 1
εptq ´ 1
ˆ
εptq ´ 1
εptq
˙εptq μptq
cptqεptq´1 dt ´ w¯
a
T
ż T
0
e´Rptqdt
“ w¯
a
T
Δ
DpT q
M¯pT qM¯pT q ´ w¯
a
TDpT q
“ 1 ´ ΔΔ DpT qw¯
a
T .

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These results go in line with the observations made in the dynamic advertising case.
The optimally controlled sales rate co-moves with the value of μptq{cptqεptq. For instance,
in the case of a constant arrival intensity (μptq ” μ) the associated sales rate decreases
over time. The maximized profit is a fraction of the present value of the (constant)
advertising cost flow over the cycle. The value of the advertising efficiency parameter Δ
determines whether the factor p1´Δq{Δ acts as a markup or as a markdown on the (now
total) advertising costs. Note, due to the monopolist’s constraint to fix the advertising
rate, the Dorfman-Steiner relation, see equation (2.14), only holds on average. Thus, the
advertising-spending-to-revenue-ratio is not fixed and can even become larger than one
at some time t P r0, T s, i.e., the monopoly is temporarily running deficits. The parameter
restrictions on Δptq and εptq ensure that this will never be the case in the dynamic setup,
i.e., ν˚ptq ą 0 for all t P r0, T s, see Theorem 2.2.1. As shown above we can guarantee
that the retailer will make positive total profits over the cycle. It is however possible
that the profit rate is negative for some interval(s) in r0, T s. Formula (2.43) reveals
when this will be the case. Rewriting the difference in equation (2.43) and making use
of relation (2.40) one obtains that this difference - and thus ν¯ptq - will be negative if
w˚ptq{pTw¯T q ă Δ1{pa´δq. The profit rate is maximized pointwise in the dynamic case
and the optimal price strategies are identical in both settings. The maximized profit
rate associated with dynamic advertising will never be smaller than the one associated
with an optimal constant advertising rate. A comparison of the total profit per cycle in
both scenarios shows that the gain due to the opportunity to dynamically control the
advertising level can be written as
π1˚ pT q ´ π¯1pT q “ 1 ´ ΔΔ
Tż
0
e´Rptq pw˚ptqa ´ w¯pT qaq dt.
Thus, the benefit of dynamic advertising equals the factor 1´ΔΔ times the present value
of the difference in the total advertising spending.
Since cptq is a nondecreasing function we are able to derive bounds for the optimal
one-cycle profit in the time-homogeneous case.
Proposition 2.3.1 In the time-homogeneous setting, i.e., aptq ” a, δptq ” δ, εptq ” ε,
μptq ” μ, and if rptq ” 0, 0 ď t ď T , the optimal profit π1˚ pT q associated with dynamic
advertising (and dynamic pricing) and the optimal profit π¯1pT q associated with static
advertising (and dynamic pricing) satisfy the following inequalities:
1 ´ Δ
Δ cw
a
ˆ
μ
cpT qε´1
˙ 1
1´Δ
T ď π¯1pT q ď π1˚ pT q ď 1 ´ ΔΔ cw
a
ˆ
μ
cε´10
˙ 1
1´Δ
T. (2.45)
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If, in addition, the inventory cost and the decay rate are both zero, i.e., ptq “ qptq “ 0,
then all inequality signs of (2.45) will become equal signs.
Proof : Choosing a constant advertising rate is a feasible policy in the problem where
dynamic advertising is allowed. Hence, the optimal profit associated with dynamic
advertising can not be smaller than the optimal profit associated with the constant
advertising rate, i.e., π¯1pT q ď π1˚ pT q. The properties rptq ” 0 and μptq ” μ, 0 ď t ď T ,
imply DpT q “ T and
π¯1pT q “ 1 ´ ΔΔ cw
a
´μ
T
¯ 1
1´Δ
T
ˆż T
0
1
cptqε´1 dt
˙ 1
1´Δ
. (2.46)
Since cptq is a nondecreasing function, the integral on the right-hand side of (2.46)
is bounded from below by T {pcpT qε´1qq, and it is bounded from above by T {pcε´10 qq.
Hence, the first inequality in (2.45) follows for π¯1pT q. The corresponding analysis of
π1˚ pT q provides identical bounds.
In case ptq “ qptq “ 0 we have cptq “ c0, 0 ď t ď T , and the upper bound and lower
bound are the same. 
The results of Proposition 2.3.1 are of limited value if the bounds are far apart.
However, the proposition offers valuable insights in the following case: if the running
costs are small relative to the unit cost, i.e.,  ! c0, the lower and the upper bounds
on the profits are close. This effect is amplified by a small ε value (close to one) and a
small Δ value (close to zero). For instance, if ε “ 2,Δ “ 0.3, T “ 10, and the inventory
cost per time unit amounts to five percent of the unit cost, i.e., l “ 0.05c0, the lower
bound accounts for approximately 56 percent of the upper bound. If the inventory cost
per unit and period is only one percent of the unit cost, the lower bound accounts for
approximately 87 percent of the upper bound; if  “ 0.001c0, this value increases to
99 percent. Large differences between inventory cost and unit cost are not unusual in
high-priced retailing, for instance, in car retailing, in the jewelry business or in the art
business. We will give additional illustrations and examples in Section 2.4. There, we
will also analyze the results of this section in greater detail.
In the following section we will examine the case that is still missing in our analysis:
constant pricing but dynamic advertising.
2.3.2 Dynamic Advertising but Prices are Constant
In the previous sections we considered dynamic pricing. The results suggest synchroniz-
ing prices with cost rates. Since the cost rate monotonically increases over time, except
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for some very special cases, optimal dynamic prices should also increase over time. In
E-commerce, for example, when selling products on the Internet or selling Internet based
applications, the retailer is able to change prices continuously. Although technological
progress makes it possible to implement dynamic pricing in classic retailing, it is far
from being standard. If no electronic system is put in place that allows to adjust prices,
every price change induces price setting costs. Especially, when the price tags of many
different items have to be changed, as in grocery stores or supermarkets, these costs can
become large. Although the demand function that we consider does not account for such
factors as price changes or price persistence, customers become usually suspicious when
they observe regularly changing prices. In the sequel, we will consider the extreme case
of no price changes, i.e., a constant price is chosen throughout the cycle of length T .21
However, the advertising rate is supposed to be dynamically controlled.
A prominent field of application of the fixed-price-dynamic-advertising setting is the
so-called variety shops or dollar stores. The business concept dictates prices to be fixed,
i.e., the items are sold at one common price or a few distinct prices only. Except for
choosing the price category (one dollar, two dollars,...) the option to vary prices does not
exist. However, advertising activities, either by a wholesaler who promotes many stores
of the same brand or by an individual shop owner, that might vary over time play a
prominent role for the business concept. In general, customers will encounter a mixture
of both marketing tools. Dollar stores heavily rely on advertising as they usually sell
items that are lacking natural demand and bear no particular characteristics except the
common price.
Like in the previous section, it makes sense to assume a time-independent price elas-
ticity εptq “ ε ą ε ą 1, but to allow for time-dependent parameters aptq and δptq. We
will label expressions related to this setting - especially the optimal control and values
associated with the optimal control - by a “˜ “ superscript.
We denote by U˜T the set of feasible controls, i.e.,
U˜T “
$’’’’&
’’’’%
u
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
uptq “ pp, wptqq , and uptq is a vector-valued piecewise continuous
function on r0, T s, 0 ď t ď T, such that the solution of (2.5) with
respect to xptq is uniquely determined and all integrals to be
encountered in the sequel exist; moreover, p ą 0, wptq ě 0
,////.
////-
.
Let u˜ptq “ pp˜T , w˜ptqq, denote the optimal strategy, and let π˜1pT q :“ π1pT, u˜pp¨qq denote
21See, for example, Transchel and Minner (2009) for a model that considers a discrete number of prices
changes larger than one in an inventory control environment.
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the maximized profit22, i.e.,
π˜1pT q “ sup
uPU˜T
π1pT, uq “ sup
uPU˜T
Tż
0
νpt, uqdt. (2.47)
In Section 2.2, we considered dynamic pricing schemes, and the optimal price guaranteed
a positive price contribution; recall, p˚ptq “ p¯ptq “ εptq{pεptq ´ 1qcptq ą cptq ě cp0q,
0 ď t ď T . Furthermore, according to the Dorfman-Steiner relation, it is optimal to
advertise at a positive rate. If the retailer sets a fixed price p˜T for a sales period of
length T , three cases need to be considered: piq p˜T ă c0, piiq c0 ď p˜T ď cpT q, and
piiiq p˜T ą cpT q. In case piq, since the cost function cptq is nondecreasing, the price
contribution p˜T ´ cptq is negative for every t. Hence, to prevent losses, the retailer will
set the (optimal) advertising rate equal to zero and the retailer’s total net profit is zero.
In case piiiq, the price contribution is always positive, and it is profitable for the retailer
to set the advertising rate in such a way that the net profit rate is positive. We will
show that such dynamic advertising policies exist.
Case piiq, when the (optimal) price lies between cp0q “ c0 and cpT q, is the most
interesting scenario; recall, except for the very special case ptq “ qptq “ rptq ” 0 and
cptq ” c0, the cost function strictly increases. As long as the static price lies above the
cost rate, the price contribution is positive and the retailer has an incentive to advertise
at a positive rate. This situation is similar to case piiiq. When the value of the cost
function reaches the price p˜T , the price contribution is zero, and then becomes negative.
Therefore, a rational retailer will set the advertising rate equal to zero to avoid losses;
this situation is similar to case piq. To identify an optimal control we need to take a
closer look at cases piiq and piiiq.
Let T˜ ppq denote the first time point when the cost function cptq equals the price value
p. Except for the special case where cptq is (piecewise) constant, the cost function strictly
increases in t, and hence, this point T˜ ppq is unique in case piiq. Moreover, the inverse
function c´1 of the cost function exists. If p ă c0, case piq, we set T˜ ppq ” 0, and if
p ą cpT q, case piiiq, we set T˜ ppq ” T . Thus,
T˜ ppq :“
$’&
’%
0, if p ă c0 pcase piqq,
c´1ppq, if c0 ď p ď cpT q pcase piiqq,
T, if p ą cpT q pcase piiiqq.
(2.48)
22The existence and finiteness of the optimal value and the existence and uniqueness of the optimal
control are proved below.
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For instance, without discounting and deterioration, i.e., qptq “ rptq ” 0, and if the
inventory cost rate is constant, i.e., ptq ” , then the inverse function - and thus the
price threshold - is given by c´1ppq “ pp ´ c0q{.
From time T˜ onwards, selling goods causes a deficit contribution to the monopolist’s
profit. Since the advertising rate can be chosen dynamically and in order to avoid such
losses, the monopolist will set wptq ” 0 for all t ě T˜ ppq if δ ą 0.23 Thus, the optimal
dynamic advertising rate depends on time and on the (fixed) price p. Once an optimal
dynamic price-dependent advertising rate has been identified, the optimal fixed price
will have to be determined numerically.
Therefore, we consider the following two-stage problem: paq find a (price-dependent)
advertising strategy w˜pt, pq that maximizes
T˜ ppqż
0
ν pt, p, wptqq dt “
T˜ ppqż
0
e´Rptq
”
pp ´ cptqq p´εμptqwptqδptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt (2.49)
with respect to wptq; pbq maximize expression (2.49) with respect to p using the optimal
advertising strategy w˜pt, pq. We shall denote such an optimal (static) price by p˜.
Even for very special parameter settings, e.g., rptq “ qptq ” 0, Δptq “ 1{2, ε “ 2, we
are not able to derive a closed form solution of p˜. Only if δptq “ Δptq ” 0, we are able to
find a solution formula of the (now pure pricing) model. Since the advertising rate will
be set zero as soon as the profit margin becomes negative, and therefore no more sales
take place thereafter, the point T˜ ppq is identical to the point in time when the inventory
is depleted, i.e., x˜pT˜ ppqq “ 0. In our deterministic setting this point in time will be
known in advance. When planning her advertising strategy and when deciding on p, the
retailer will take the choice of T˜ ppq into account. Thus, analyzing the semi-static model
is more complicated than analyzing the model where the actual sales period does not
depend on price.
Before we continue with our analysis of the static-price-dynamic-advertising model we
present results concerning the optimal control.
Theorem 2.3.2 Let 0 ď δptq ă aptq ă a, Δptq “ δptq{aptq, and ε ą ε ą 1 for all
t P r0, T s. Assume μptq ą 0, and let the demand rate equal λpt, p, wq “ μptqp´εwδptq. Let
the cost function cptq be given by (2.8), and assume the price p ą 0 to be arbitrary but
23If δ ” 0 such losses can not be avoided due to the lack of advertising effect. Hence, w˜ptq ” 0onr0, T s
and the problem becomes the pure pricing model with dynamic cost and demand, cf. the fixed-price
setting in Rajan et al. (1992). We consider this special case in Proposition 2.3.2.
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fixed. Then, the dynamic advertising rate w˜pt, pq that maximizes (2.49) is given by
w˜pt, pq “
$’&
’%
ˆ
Δptqμptqp ´ cptq
pε
˙ 1
aptq´δptq
, if p ą cptq,
0, else.
(2.50)
The value of the optimal price p˜T that maximizes π1pT, p, w˜pt, pqq is a solution to the
equation
Bπ1
Bp pT, p˜T , w˜pt, p˜T qq “ 0. (2.51)
Proof : Assuming the price p ą 0 to be arbitrary but fixed, the expression to be maxi-
mized with respect to the advertising rate is given by the integral, cf. (2.49),
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
pp ´ cptqq p´εμptqwptqδptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt “
Tż
0
νpt, p, wptqqdt. (2.52)
Whenever 0 ă p ă cptq, 0 ď t ď T , the integrand νpt, p, wptqq in (2.52) is negative if
wptq ą 0. If wptq “ 0, then the integrand is zero. Thus, it is optimal to set w˜pt, pq “ 0
whenever p ď cptq.24 Since cptq is a nondecreasing function it is optimal to set the
advertising rate equal to zero until time T . Thus, the upper limit of integration in (2.52)
can be replaced by T˜ ppq, and we get
T˜ ppqż
0
e´Rptq
”
pp ´ cptqq p´εμptqwptqδptq ´ wptqaptq
ı
dt. (2.53)
To maximize (2.53) with respect to functions wptq, we will exploit the special struc-
ture of (2.53) and maximize the integrand νpt, p, wq with respect to w for eacht t, cf.
Section 2.2. Without loss of generality the integrand is positive, since, by definition,
p ą cptq on “0, T˜ ppq˘. The integrand νpt, p, wq is differentiable in w, νpt, p, 0q “ 0, and
limwÑ8 νpt, p, wq ă 0. Hence, for any 0 ď t ď T˜ ppq, νpt, p, wq attains its maximum with
respect to w at a finite value w˜pt, pq ě 0. Whenever δptq “ 0, the maximum is attained
at w˜pt, pq “ 0. Whenever δptq ą 0, the optimal advertising rate w˜pt, pq at time t must
satisfy the first order condition, 0 ď t ă T˜ ppq,
Bν
Bw pt, p, w˜pt, pqq “ e
´Rptq
ˆ
δptqμptqp ´ cptq
pε
w˜pt, pqδptq´1 ´ aptqw˜pt, pqaptq´1
˙
!“ 0. (2.54)
24If p “ cptq, the (net) revenue part of the integrand is zero and wptq ą 0 then implies costs only and
hence a negative value of the integrand. Thus, w˜pt, pq “ 0 is also optimal if p “ cptq.
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Solving for w˜p¨q yields (2.50); notice that w˜ is the unique solution of (2.54). Moreover,
w˜ is a piecewise continuous function on r0, T˜ ppqs since all terms of the right-hand side of
(2.50) are piecewise continuous. Furthermore, the values w˜pt, pq and νpt, p, w˜pt, pqq are
positive for any pair pt, pq that satisfies p ą cptq and δptq ą 0, 0 ă t ă T . Hence, w˜pt, pq
is the pointwise maximizer of the integrand in (2.53).
We evaluate π1
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜pt, pq˘ and obtain
π1
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜pt, pq˘ “
T˜ ppqż
0
νpt, p, w˜pt, pqqdt
Δptqą0“
T˜ ppqż
0
e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq
ˆ
Δptqμptqp ´ cptq
pε
˙ 1
1´Δptq
dt. (2.55)
Expression (2.55) needs to be maximized with respect to p ą 0. By definition, p ą cptq on
r0, T˜ ppqq, and the integrand of (2.55) will be nonnegative; thus, π1
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜pt, pq˘ ě 0.
If p “ c0, then T˜ pc0q “ 0 and π1 p0, c0, w˜pt, c0qq “ 0. If p “ cpT q, then T˜ pcpT qq “ T ,
and the positive profit margin on r0, T q ensures that π1 pT, cpT q, w˜pt, cpT qqq is a strictly
positive function. If the price is chosen to be very large, the total profit becomes small25;
in particular, limpÑ8 π1pT, p, w˜pt, pqq “ 0. Notice that by assumption ε ą ε ą 1, and
that the expression pp ´ cptqq{pε converges to zero. Since (2.55) is differentiable in p the
function π1
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜pt, pq˘ attains its maximum at some finite value p˜T ą 0. At p˜T
the first order condition (2.51) is satisfied.
Since p˜T is positive, and w˜pt, p˜T q is piecewise continuous, the policy we have con-
structed belongs to U˜T and is optimal. 
In general, we are not able to prove that p˜T is unique. In the sequel, we shall assume
that p˜T is the unique solution of (2.51). The following proposition specifies special cases
when the optimal price can be described very precisely.
Proposition 2.3.2 Assume the conditions that underlie Theorem 2.3.2 are satisfied.
(a) If δptq ” 0 for all t P r0, T s, then
p˜T “ ε
ε ´ 1
şT
0 e
´RptqμptqcptqdtşT
0 e
´Rptqμptqdt . (2.56)
25Below we will show that the profit function decreases in p if p ą ε{pε ´ 1qcpT q.
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(b) If δptq ą 0 for all t P r0, T s, then p˜T satisfies the following inequalities:
ε
ε ´ 1c0 ď p˜T ď
ε
ε ´ 1cpT q. (2.57)
(c) Let the assumptions of paq or pbq be satisfied. If, in addition, cptq ” c0 for all
t P r0, T s, then
p˜T “ ε
ε ´ 1c0. (2.58)
Proof : paq If δptq ” 0 on r0, T s, then Δptq ” 0 on r0, T s. Hence, by (2.50), w˜pt, pq “ 0 for
all pairs pt, pq, 0 ď t ď T, p ą 0, follows. Thus, the objective function to be maximized
with respect to p ą 0 is
π1 pT, p, 0q “
Tż
0
e´Rptqμptqpp ´ cptqqp´εdt. (2.59)
Note, since advertising has no effect the limit of integration is T . Equation (2.59)
specifies a differentiable function in p. Since cptq is increasing, except for the special case
cptq ” c0, the value of (2.59) is negative if p ă cp0q “ c0. If p “ cpT q, then T˜ ppq “ T and
the integrand of (2.59) is positive, and π1 pT, p, cpT qq is positive as well. By Lebesgue’s
Theorem we may interchange integration and the limit if p tends to infinity. For each
t, the integrand goes to zero if p goes to infinity. Thus, limpÑ8 π1 pT, p, 0q “ 0 and
π1 pT, p, 0q attains its maximum at some finite value p˜T ą c0. The optimal price p˜T
satisfies the first order condition
d
´şT
0 νpt, p, 0qdt
¯
dp
pT, p˜T , 0q “
Tż
0
e´Rptqμptqpp˜
ε
T ´ εpp˜T ´ cptqqp˜ε´1T
p˜2εT
dt
!“ 0. (2.60)
Solving (2.60) for p˜T we obtain (2.56). Since p˜T is the unique solution of (2.60), p˜T is
optimal.
pbq Since, by assumption, δptq ą 0 for all t P r0, T s, the objective function to be
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maximized with respect to p equals
π1
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜pt, pq˘ “
T˜ ppqż
0
νpt, p, w˜pt, pqqdt
“
T˜ ppqż
0
e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq
ˆ
Δptqμptqp ´ cptq
pε
˙ 1
1´Δptq
dt. (2.61)
By Leibniz’s rule, the derivative of π1pT˜ ppq, p, w˜p¨qq with respect to p is given by, p ą c0,
Bπ1
Bp
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜p¨q˘ “
T˜ ppqż
0
Bν
Bp pt, p, w˜pt, pqq dt ` ν
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜pT˜ ppq, pq˘ T˜ 1ppq. (2.62)
We will show that the second addend on the right-hand side of (2.62) equals zero.
If p P pc0, cpT qq, case piiq, then, by definition, T˜ ppq ă T and w˜pT˜ ppq, pq “ 0. Thus,
νpT˜ ppq, p, w˜pT˜ ppq, pqq “ 0. If p ě cpT q, case piiiq, then T˜ ppq “ T and T˜ 1ppq “ 0. Hence,
νpT˜ ppq, p, w˜pT˜ ppq, pqqT˜ 1ppq equals zero for the cases piiq and piiiq. Elementary calculus
shows that, see (2.55) for the formula of νpt, p, w˜pt, pqq,
Bπ1
Bp
`
T˜ ppq, p, w˜p¨q˘ “
T˜ ppqż
0
ν pt, p, w˜pt, pqq
1 ´ Δptq
ˆ
1
p ´ cptq ´
ε
p
˙
dt
“
T˜ ppqż
0
e´Rptqμptq
pε
ˆ
Δptqμptqp ´ cptq
pε
˙ Δptq
1´Δptq
ˆ
1 ´ εp ´ cptq
p
˙
dt.
(2.63)
The first order condition for p˜T being optimal implies that (2.63) equals zero if p is
replaced by p˜T . To see that the inequalities (2.57) hold, let us assume that p˜T ă εε´1c0.
Since cptq is nondecreasing, this inequality implies for any t P “0, T˜ ppq˘,
p˜T ă ε
ε ´ 1c0 ñ p˜T ă
ε
ε ´ 1cptq ô 1 ´ ε
p˜T ´ cptq
p˜T
ą 0.
Hence, the right-hand side of (2.63) would be positive, which contradicts the necessary
optimality condition for p˜T ; thus, p˜T ě εε´1c0. Along the same lines one verifies that
p˜T ď εε´1cpT q.
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pcq If δptq ” 0 and cptq ” c0 on r0, T s, then (2.58) follows by evaluating (2.56). If
δptq ą 0 and cptq ” c0 on r0, T s, the two inequalities (2.57) become equalities, and (2.58)
follows. 
In case of a static (time-homogeneous) monopoly environment without inventory cost,
i.e., all parameter values are constant over time and no discounting or deterioration
effects need to be taken into account, the cost function and the optimal prices are
constant over time; more precisely, p˜T “ p¯ptq “ p˚ptq ” ε{pε ´ 1qc0 for all t in r0, T s.
Consequently, the advertising rate is also constant. We will elaborate on this (classical)
results in the following section. In that section, we also compare different static and
dynamic settings and discuss numerical and illustrative examples. Moreover, we offer
comparative statics results.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we will further analyze the models which we have studied so far and we
will concentrate on how these models are used in practice. In Subsection 2.4.1, we first
study how the parameter values, μ, δ, etc., affect the optimal control and the associated
optimal sales rates and optimal profit rates. In this context, for example, the following
questions are of interest: how is the optimal advertising control affected by a change
in the price elasticity ε? How will the optimal profit rate be influenced by a change
in ε? How will the initial inventory level change if ε is changing? Since we derived
closed-form solution expressions of the optimal dynamic price and dynamic advertising
rate, cf. Theorem 2.2.1, we generally draw our conclusions by assuming the parameter
of interest to be independent of time and take the first derivative with respect to that
value. In the following, we assume all derivatives to exist. Let elx,y denote the elasticity
of x with respect to changes of y,
elx,y :“ BxBy
y
x
. (2.64)
For instance, elp˚ptq,ε denotes the elasticity of the optimal dynamic price at time t with
respect to a change in the price elasticity. We discuss structural results to be derived
for the dynamic model, i.e., the model where prices and adverting rates are allowed to
be chosen dynamically, cf. Section 2.2, and in Subsection 2.4.1 we present the results of
numerical studies which illustrate our findings.
In Subsection 2.4.2, we compare the performance of the dynamic model with the
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performance of the (partially) static settings. We are particularly interested in how
optimal profit margins, optimal capacities, and the associated sales rates depend on the
fact that optimal advertising is allowed to be dynamic, instead of being fixed throughout
the cycle.
In the following, we will choose several basic parameter settings in order to illustrate
our general results. Since all quantities of interest depend on the cost function cptq we
will frequently assume a time-homogeneous setting without discounting and deterioration
effects, i.e., qptq “ rptq ” 0 and ptq ” ; as a consequence, cptq “ c0 ` t, cf. Figure
2.1. This simple setting guarantees that the most important characteristic of the cost
function - to be an increasing function in t - is assured while the analysis is simplified.
In particular, we shall analyze how changes of the price elasticity or the advertising
elasticity affect the quantities of interest.
Our analysis is sometimes rather technical but the most important findings related
to the optimal dynamic pricing and the optimal dynamic advertising control can be
succinctly summarized as follows.
Remark 2.4.1 (management recommendations) The formulas of the optimal dy-
namic price p˚ and the optimal dynamic advertising rate w˚, cf. Theorem 2.2.1, support
the following recommendations:
• Optimal dynamic prices are neither influenced by the opportunity to advertise nor
by the efficiency of advertising. If the sales rate is boosted by advertising, more
customers will purchase the product for the same price.
• The optimal dynamic prices are not (directly) influenced by the arrival intensity
μptq, i.e., optimal prices are independent of the market size or the standard con-
sumer’s interest.
• The optimal dynamic prices only will be decreasing over time (a market skimming
strategy) if the price elasticity increases over time; typically, the optimal prices will
increase over time (a market penetration strategy).
• If all parameters of the model are constant and the cost function cptq increases over
time, then it is optimal to decrease the expenditures on advertising over time.
• The presence of production/purchasing and inventory costs leads to higher prices
and lower sales rate. The interest rate and the deterioration rate act like additional
cost factors and amplify the effect of higher prices and lower sales rates.
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• Whenever Δptq ” 0.5 on r0, T s, i.e., δptq ” aptq{2, the optimal profit rate equals
the optimal expenditures on advertising at time t. If Δptq ă 0.5, the optimal profit
margin is a fraction of the optimal advertising spending. If Δptq ą 0.5, the optimal
profit margin is a multiple of the optimal advertising expenses.
• If the optimal advertising rate w˚ptq is larger than one, then a monopolist benefits
from an increase in Δ. Both, the revenue rate and the profit rate will increase.
• A larger arrival intensity μ increases the optimal profit margin.
• The optimal advertising level depends (among other values) on the specific value of
the parameters δ and a. The optimal sales rates and the optimal profit rates only
depend on the advertising efficiency Δ “ δ{a, but not on the particular values of δ
and a.
2.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis of the Optimal Dynamic Model
In this subsection, we will analyze the optimal dynamic control and associated values
with respect to changes in the parameter values. Moreover, we are interested in the
behavior of the optimal price, the optimal advertising rate, the associated sales rate,
and the optimized profit rate over time. To do so, we analyze the formulas of Theorem
2.2.1. Table 2.1 summarizes our findings; below, we discuss more details and compute
elasticities of the quantities of interest with respect to changes of the parameter value,
cf. (2.64). The symbol ”`” (”´”) indicates that the quantity in the column header
increases (decreases) if the value of the quantity in the corresponding row header in-
creases. The symbol 1¨1 indicates that the quantity in the column header is unaffected by
a change of the quantity in the corresponding row. For example, the optimal dynamic
price p˚ decreases in the price elasticity ε and increases in the cost function cptq; any
change of the advertising efficiency value Δ has no effect on the optimal price. Since the
cost function increases in c0, , q, and r, see below, we only state cptq as a row header
and implications regarding changes of the components of cptq are easily deduced. While
the results are more or less clear when the value of the arrival intensity or the cost
function changes, the implications of a change in ε and in Δ depend on the level of the
optimal prices and the optimal advertising rates. For instance, the optimal advertising
rate increases in ε if the optimal price is smaller than one and decreases in ε if p˚ ą 1.
In the following paragraphs we derive the results of Table 2.1 and discuss these results
in more detail.
26This only holds if the change in Δ is subject to a change in δ and a is fixed. If δ is fixed and a changes
w˚ must be larger, respectively smaller, than e´p1{aq.
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p˚ w˚ λ˚ ν˚
ε ´ ` if p
˚ ă 1
´ if p˚ ą 1
` if p˚ ă e´ 1´Δε´1
´ if p˚ ą e´ 1´Δε´1
` if p˚ ă 1
´ if p˚ ą 1
Δ ¨ `
26 if w˚ ą e´p1{δq
´ if w˚ ă e´p1{δq
` if w˚ ą e´p1{aq
´ if w˚ ă e´p1{aq
` if w˚ ą 1
´ if w˚ ă 1
μ ¨ ` ` `
cptq ` ´ ´ ´
Table 2.1: Summary of the sensitivity results in the dynamic model. A ”`” (”´”) indicates that
the quantity in the column header increases (decreases) if the value of the quantity in
the corresponding row header increases (at time t). The ”¨” indicates that a change
of the value in the row header has no impact on the value in the column header.
The behavior over time
The optimal price policy p˚ will typically increase over the sales period. To be precise,
the marginal change of p˚ at time t, 0 ď t ď T , is given by
9p˚ptq “ p˚ptq
ˆ
9cptq
cptq ´
9εptq
εptqpεptq ´ 1q
˙
; (2.65)
alternatively, (2.65) can be formulated in terms of elasticities:
elp˚ptq,t “ elcptq,t ´
elεptq,t
εptq ´ 1 . (2.66)
Note, 9cptq is positive except for the special case when cptq is piecewise constant, cf.
equation (2.9). Thus, if the price elasticity is constant, εptq ” ε, the subtrahend on
the right-hand side of (2.65) equals zero and the relative price increase over time is
proportional to the relative cost increase. If the price elasticity varies over time, a
decreasing εptq value even boosts this effect, and it is optimal to run a market skimming
strategy, i.e., prices decrease monotonically over time. Only if customers become more
price sensitive, i.e., ε is increasing, then prices are increasing and a market penetration
strategy is optimal - provided the increase in ε is sufficiently large to compensate for
the (relative) increase in the cost function. A similar analysis applies to (2.66), where
elcptq,t is strictly positive except when cptq is piecewise constant. Thus, it depends on
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the elasticity elεptq,t if elp˚ptq,t is positive or negative.
The left panel of Figure 2.2 depicts optimal price processes considering a linear (in
time) elasticity function of the form εptq “ ε0 ` ε1t ą ε, 0 ď t ď T , and the cost
function cptq “ c0 ` t for different choices of ε0 and ε1. The optimal prices at time t are
bounded from below by the (increasing) cost function cptq. Hence, even if p˚ decreases
temporarily, the optimal prices cannot decrease forever when T becomes large, cf. the
case where εptq “ 1.5 ` t. As already pointed out above, we consider an increasing or
constant price elasticity as the typical case. Especially by assuming ε to increase over
time one can model business situations such as retailing out-of-date fashion, perishable
food, or outdated movies shortly before they become available for home entertainment.
By lowering prices the monopolist counters the lessened willingness-to-pay modeled by
an increasing price elasticity. A decreasing price elasticity is less common. A well known
example is the sales of airline tickets to business travelers: the closer the date of departure
the less important is the ticket fare if it is inevitable to take a certain flight. More
generally, such behavior is often observed when a unique or special event is close, e.g.,
the only concert in town, a sports event, or goods whose production will soon be stopped
and that become rarities. Other examples for an increasing price elasticity over time are
luxury or cultural goods that become more valuable as time passes, e.g., (quality) wine,
classic cars, or art. These are not the classical goods considered in revenue management
but reflect market situations where unique goods lead to a natural monopoly: there is
only one agency selling tickets for a certain event, or only one distillery is offering a
particular 15 year old scotch whisky. The price set by a company is (usually) observable
at the market. Although we face a deterministic demand rate, one can think of the actual
price to influence the (potential) customer’s buying decision, whereas the advertising rate
controls the flow of potential customers. Moreover, the advertising effort of a company
is not easily observable or measurable at all. While the monopolist knows the rate
at which she runs promotions, the market only observes the effects, e.g., additional or
fewer commercials on TV or radio, ads in a magazine, a fluctuating number of sales
staff, or varying business hours. We already argued in the remarks following Theorem
2.2.1 that the optimal advertising rate w˚ depends on all model parameters (functions).
According to equation (2.16), the optimal advertising rate at time t is given by w˚ptq “
cwptq
`
μptq{cptqεptq´1˘1{paptq´δptq, where cw is a function of the price elasticity and the
advertising elasticity. Assuming constant values for these elasticities (Δptq ” Δ and
εptq ” ε), the value cwptq ” cw is also constant. Then, the dynamics in the optimal
advertising process is solely determined by the ratio of the functions μptq and cptq; the
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Figure 2.2: (a) the optimal price p˚ptq “ εptq{pεptq ´ 1qcptq if cptq “ 1 ` 0.05t and for different
εptq functions (see labels). (b) the optimal advertising rate w˚ptq according to (2.16),
where μptq ” 10, aptq “ 2, δptq “ 1, cptq “ 1 ` 0.05t, qptq “ rptq “ 0, and different
εptq functions.
latter is taken to the power of ε ´ 1.27 If the arrival intensity μptq ” μ is constant, it
is optimal to decrease the advertising rate over time. Only if more and more customers
are arriving, i.e., μptq is an increasing function, it will be profitable to attract even
more customers with an increasing advertising rate, see below.28 Panel pbq of Figure
2.2 depicts the optimal advertising rate for the ε functions considered for the optimal
price trajectories (the colors coincide in both panels). Except for the case when the
price elasticity decreases over time (the green line) all graphs show the typical declining
behavior; recall, the arrival intensity is constant. If the price elasticity is decreasing
(εptq “ 2 ´ 0.1 ˚ t, 0 ď t ă 10), it is profitable to counter the positive impact on
demand by increasing prices, cf. the green line in 2.2a, and boost by additional spending
on advertising. As already pointed out in the discussion related to (2.22) the level of
advertising is of special importance: an advertising rate larger than one implies a boost
of demand while a rate below one acts as a demand-damper. The evolution of the
optimally controlled demand rate λ˚ is best analyzed by making use of the dynamic
Dorfman-Steiner relation (2.14), which we rewrite as
λ˚ptq “ εptqΔptq
w˚ptqaptq
p˚ptq , 0 ď t ď T.
27To simplify the analysis one can choose ε “ 2; this particular choice will often lead to handy expressions.
28In the absence of inventory cost and interest and deteriorating effects, i.e., cptq ” c0, ptq “ qptq “
rptq ” 0 for all t P r0, T s, the optimal advertising rate (and the optimal price) is constant for the
sales period.
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For a typical (time-homogeneous) case, so that the optimal price function is increasing
and the optimal advertising rate is decreasing, the demand rate decreases over time and
the sales rate peaks at the beginning of the sales period. An intuitive explanation of
this behavior of λ˚ is the following one: goods are purchased at the beginning of the
sales period and the cost c0x0 has to be paid at time zero. Storing these goods (in order
to sell them later) incurs inventory cost, discounting and losses due to deterioration.
To compensate for these costs the monopolist increases the prices over time, an action
which naturally curbs demand. Since Δptq ă 1 for all t P r0, T s, there is no incentive
to (fully) balance the loss in demand due to higher prices by a measured increase of the
advertising rate; and the rate of sales decreases. Certain market (parameter) conditions
are needed to create an incentive to increase demand, viz. an increasing arrival intensity
μptq. If the retailer expects more customers to enter the market, it is profitable to
support this effect by additional advertising spending. There are other situations when
λ˚ (temporarily) increases. In the subsequent paragraphs we examine the dependence
of the optimal controls on the parameter functions - the market conditions - in detail.
The behavior of λ˚ (and other values depending on the optimal control) can then be
deduced in particular cases.
There are many reasons why it is important to study the optimal sales rate. For
instance, the optimal rate of sales (together with depreciation effects) determines the
initial inventory value, cf. (2.7). Due to this relation the behavior of the optimal
inventory capacity with respect to changes in the parameter values can be analyzed using
the optimal demand rate. Other quantities of interest are the optimal profit margin and
the associated one-cycle profit - definitely the most important values for a retailer. We
will often make use of the fact that the profit margin is proportional to the expenditures
on advertising at time t, ν˚ptq “ e´Rptq 1´ΔptqΔptq w˚ptqaptq, see (2.18); the co-movement of
ν˚ and w˚ will simplify the analysis. In particular, we reiterate that, typically, the profit
margin declines over a cycle if w˚ptqaptq does; this effect is bolstered by the discounting
factor e´Rptq. The influence of Δ on both quantities, the optimal advertising rate and
the optimal profit margin, will be examined below.
The influence of the cost function
All quantities of interest depend on the cost function cptq which, in turn, only depends
on the inventory parameters c0, , and q and on the interest rate r.29 The value of the
cost function at time t clearly increases in all its parameters and thus, the optimal price
29Recall, wherever Qptq and Rptq appear in the cost function expression these terms appear as a sum.
From the cost aspect deterioration and discounting are equivalent; cf. (2.8) and comments below.
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of time t increases in these parameters as well. In particular, for any t, cf. (2.15),
elp˚ptq,c0 “
c0
c0 `
şt
0 e
´pQpsq`Rpsqqpsqds, (2.67)
and30
elp˚ptq, “ 
şt
0 e
´pQpsq`Rpsqqds
c0 ` 
şt
0 e
´pQpsq`Rpsqqds
. (2.68)
Both elasticities are positive. The impact of a change in the values of the production
cost c0 on price is biggest at the beginning of the sales period. The integral expression
which shows up in the denominator of the right-hand side of (2.67) equals zero if t “ 0.
Thus, elp˚p0q,c0 “ 1. If ptq ” 0 for all t P r0, T s, then elp˚ptq,c0 “ 1 for all t P r0, T s. If  is
positive, then elp˚ptq,c0 decreases and tends to zero in the course of time. Looking at the
price elasticity with respect to the inventory cost parameter, we observe the opposite
effect: while a change in  inflicts only small price changes at the beginning (none at
t “ 0) the value of elp˚ptq, increases monotonically towards one. The reaction of the
optimal price due to changes in the sum Qptq`Rptq goes along the same lines, but is not
captured by such simple expressions as equations (2.67) and (2.68). In Figure 2.1, see
Section 2.2, p. 20, particular choices of cost functions are displayed. Since optimal prices
are related to cost by a time-dependent markup factor, Figure 2.1 also shows graphs of
optimal prices whenever ε is constant.
Optimal prices increase with values of cptq. The optimal advertising rate w˚ decreases
in cptq, and so do the optimal sales rate (and thus the optimal inventory capacity) as well
as the associated profit margin.31 The exact amount by which these quantities decrease
as a function of time depends on the particular parameter setting.
The influence of the price elasticity
Figure 2.2 displays trajectories of optimal controls for different choices of price elasticity
functions. The response of the optimal price and the optimal advertising rate to changes
in ε is quantified by, 0 ď t ď T ,
elp˚ptq,ε “ ´ 1ε ´ 1 , (2.69)
30When computing the elasticity with respect to changes in the storage cost we set ptq “  and differ-
entiate with respect to .
31Note, the cost function shows up in the denominator of these expressions. The cost function enters
these expressions as a function with a positive exponent.
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and
elw˚ptq,ε “ ´ εaptq ´ δptq log pp
˚ptqq ; (2.70)
to obtain (2.69) and (2.70), we set εptq “ ε and differentiate with respect to ε. The effect
on the optimal price is solely determined by the level of ε, which is an implication of the
constant price elasticity model. Especially in markets with price insensitive customers,
i.e., ε is close to one, a small change in the value of ε (or its estimate) can have a large
effect on the optimal price; this effect is much smaller if ε is large. These findings go in
line with practical observations, e.g., ticket prices of a flight with plenty of time prior to
departure usually do not fluctuate much; typically, (potential) passengers are not com-
mitted to a certain flight time or airline. However, shortly before departure opportunities
are limited and potential passengers are less price sensitive. As a consequence, prices
typically go up the days before departure. Assuming that the medium to long-term de-
mand is primarily influenced by tourists and frequent flyers who are somewhat flexible
as far as the departure time of the flight is concerned, this aspect is responsible for rela-
tively large values of ε on individual flights. In contrast to tourists, the typical business
traveler is known for short-term booking and small price sensitivity. Thus, εptq should
be assumed to decreases over time and, as a consequence, prices will increase (especially
during the last days before departure). This fact is, basically, not due to the increasing
cost function but (mainly) because of the time-inhomogeneous price sensitivity. The
interplay of the optimal advertising rate and ε is less intuitive. This interaction actually
depends on the current price level. If p˚ ą 1, it is optimal to reduce the advertising rate
with increasing ε. This property is reasonable as the markup on the cost rate decreases
and promotion becomes (relatively) more expensive. If p˚ ă 1, i.e., logpp˚q ă 0, the
reaction of the optimal advertising rate with respect to changes in the price elasticity
is positive: it is optimal to fuel demand, although the markup on prices shrinks. This
odd behavior is due to the fact that if the price p is between zero and one, then the
term p´ε “ 1{ ppεq increases in ε, i.e., the demand increases, ceteris paribus. Setting
c0 ” 1, the cost function cptq will be larger than one. Then, εptq{pεptq ´ 1qcptq ą 1 for
all t ě 0, and it can be guaranteed that the optimal prices are larger than one and w˚
is decreasing in ε.32
The profit rate associated with the optimal control can be rewritten in terms of the
advertising spending, cf. (2.18). The monopolist will only benefit from an increasing
price elasticity if optimal prices are below one. The reaction of the optimal sales rate
with respect to changes of ε also depends on the current value of Δ. Sales are boosted if
32If c0 ” 1, one can think of the unit cost c0 as unit of account. All other costs and prices can be
considered in relation to this unit.
55
2 Optimal Dynamic Pricing and Advertising with Inventory Cost
the optimal prices are sufficiently small, viz. if p˚ ă e´ 1´Δε´1 ; observe e´ 1´Δε´1 ă 1. These
results follow from the evaluation of the corresponding elasticity expressions and can be
easily verified by elementary calculus:
elλ˚ptq,ε “ εε ´ 1
ˆ
1 ´ ε ´ 11 ´ Δptq log pp
˚ptqq
˙
,
and
elν˚ptq,ε “ ´ ε1 ´ Δptq pp
˚ptqq “ aptq elw˚ptq,ε.
The influence of the advertising parameters a and δ
In some cases, when analyzing the effect of a change in the advertising elasticity δ and the
advertising cost parameter a, we can restrict the analysis to a change of the advertising
efficiency parameter Δ. Note, the expression w˚ptqa only depends on Δ “ δ{a, cf. (2.16).
Since the optimal sales rate and the optimal profit rate can be written in terms of Δ
and w˚ptqa, cf. (2.17) and (2.18), these quantities of interest can thus be analyzed as
functions of Δ. The dependence on a and δ follows by observing that the advertising
efficiency parameter Δ increases in δ and decreases in a.
We calculate the elasticity of the advertising spending w˚ptqa with respect to the
advertising efficiency parameter Δ as well as the elasticity of the advertising rate w˚ptq
with respect to a and δ33:
elw˚ptqa,Δ “ 1 ` δ log pw
˚ptqq
1 ´ Δ , elw˚ptq,δ “
1 ` δ log pw˚ptqq
a ´ δ , (2.71)
and
elw˚ptq,a “ ´1 ` a log pw
˚ptqq
a ´ δ . (2.72)
It follows from (2.71) and (2.72) that the optimal advertising rate increases in δ (and
Δ) and decreases in a: since advertising becomes more efficient (or less expensive), the
promotional effort is boosted. Like in the case of price elasticity, there is an exception
to this rule. If the optimal advertising rate is so small that δ logpw˚ptqq ă 1, then
elw˚ptqa,Δ and elw˚ptq,δ become negative. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 depicts three funda-
mental situations: a constant Δ throughout the whole sales horizon (Δ1 and Δ2), a
first increasing and then decreasing Δ function (Δ3), and a first decreasing and then
increasing (U-shaped) Δ function (Δ4). Panel (b) shows the optimal advertising rate for
the different Δ-functions; we set aptq ” 2 and only vary the δ values. For simplicity, ε
33When computing the elasticity with respect to changes in the parameter of interest, we set aptq “ a,
δptq “ δ, and Δptq “ Δ and differentiate with respect to a, δ, or Δ.
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Figure 2.3: (a) different Δ-functions defined on the interval r0, T s, T “ 10: Δ1ptq “ 0.6, Δ2ptq “
0.1, Δ3ptq “ 0.7 tpT ´tqpT {2q2 , Δ4ptq “ 0.7 ´ Δ3ptq. (b) the optimal advertising rate w˚ptq
according to (2.16), where ε “ 2, μptq “ 10, cptq “ 1 ` 0.05t, qptq “ rptq “ 0, and
different Δ-functions (aptq ” 2).
and μ are constants and no discounting nor deterioration is considered (qptq “ rptq ” 0).
If Δ is constant (Δ1 and Δ2), then the optimal advertising rate strictly decreases over
time; in the case when Δ is small pΔ2q, the rate is almost constant. When Δ changes
over time the optimal advertising rate follows the pattern of Δptq, peaking at the same
point in time.34 In contrast to the Δ function, w˚ptq is not symmetric since the cost
function increases over time, cf. (2.16). If additionally cptq ” c0, one can indeed expect
constant optimal advertising rates when Δptq is constant, and symmetry around T {2 for
the dynamic cases Δ3 and Δ4. The asymmetric pattern for an increasing cost function
is persistent when we examine the associated optimal sales rates and profit margins as
shown in Figure 2.4. Most interestingly, the profit margin ν˚ is smaller for Δ1 “ 0.6
than for Δ2 “ 0.1. Although advertising is more effective and takes a larger value for
all t P r0, T s, cf. panel (b) of Figure 2.3, the monopolist reaps lower profit at all times.
Recall, the profit rate at time t can be expressed in terms of the advertising cost w˚ptqa
times the Δ-dependent factor (and the discounting factor which, for simplicity, is set to
one in the case at hand), namely ν˚ptq “ 1´ΔptqΔptq w˚ptqaptq, cf. Theorem 2.2.1. Actually,
there are two opposing effects at work. First, a larger value of Δ drives up the advertising
expenses w˚ptqa. Second, a larger Δ value reduces the value of the quotient 1´ΔptqΔptq . For
our illustrative parameter setting the optimal adverting cost rate is a square function
(aptq “ 2), i.e., w˚ptq2 « 1.52 “ 2.25 in the case of Δ1 “ 0.6, and w˚ptq2 « 0.52 “ 0.25
in the case of Δ2 “ 0.1. The values of the Δ-dependent factors are p1 ´ Δ1q{Δ1 “ 2{3
34This is not true in general as indicated above when w˚ptq takes very small values, cf. (2.71).
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and p1´Δ2q{Δ2 “ 9, respectively. Overall, for a monopolist it is more favorable to face
the advertising efficiency Δ1 than to face Δ2.
Although λ˚ and ν˚ fluctuate over time, the optimal sales rate and the optimal profit
rate might drop if w˚ is small and if Δ increases, cf. the scenario Δ3 in Figure 2.4. The
corresponding elasticity formulas are given by
elλ˚ptq,Δ “ Δ1 ´ Δ p1 ` log pw
˚ptqaqq , (2.73)
and
elν˚ptq,Δ “ Δ1 ´ Δ log pw
˚ptqaq . (2.74)
Thus, if w˚ptq ą e´1{a, then elλ˚ptq,Δ is positive, i.e., an increase in Δ leads to higher
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Figure 2.4: (a) the optimally controlled demand rate on r0, T s for different Δ-functions. (b) the
optimally controlled profit rate on r0, T s for different Δ-functions. The parameters
are: T “ 10, ε “ 2, μptq “ 10, cptq “ 1 ` 0.05t, aptq “ 2, qptq “ rptq “ 0, and the
Δ-functions given in panel (a) of Figure 2.3.
sales. In the illustrations, we choose a ” 2 and the inequality condition becomes w˚ptq ą
1{?e « 0.6. This condition explains the fluctuating behavior of λ˚ in the two cases Δ3
and Δ4, cf. panel (b) of Figure 2.3 and panel (a) of Figure 2.4.
Similarly, whenever w˚ptq ă 1, then log pw˚ptqaq ă 0 and the right-hand side of (2.74)
becomes negative, i.e., the optimal profit margin ν˚ decreases in Δ. If the market
conditions are favorable for the monopolist, e.g., a relatively large μ value and/or a
small ε value, see above, it is optimal to stimulate the demand by setting w˚ptq ą 1, and
the monopolist always benefits from an increase in Δ, i.e., elν˚ptq,Δ ą 0. Whenever it is
best to slow down the arrival rate by setting w˚ptq ă 1, an increasing Δ value diminishes
58
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
the slow-down factor and dampens the mitigation strategy. Recall, advertising at a rate
below one curbs the demand. This behavior is counter-intuitive. The common believe is
that as the advertising efficiency increases one expects the monopolist to be better off.
But the math reveals that this is not the case in the example depicted in Figure 2.3 and
Figure 2.4. For various Δ scenarios, the optimal advertising rate falls below one. The
condition that w˚ptq must be larger than one to observe the behavior one does expect
is equivalent to condition (2.22). In Figure 2.4, we set εptq ” 2 and condition (2.22)
becomes
μptq ą 4 cptqΔptq “ 2
p˚ptq
Δptq . (2.75)
If Δ is close to zero, the value μptq “ 10 - as chosen in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 - is simply not
large enough to entice the monopolist to attract more customers. Analyzing the two cases
when the advertising efficiency is constant over time (Δ1ptq ” 0.6 and Δ2ptq ” 0.1) shows
that the arrival intensity μ must be bigger than (approximately) 10.4cptq to guarantee
higher profits under Δ1 than under Δ2 at every point t.35 Equivalently, one can think
of a given value μ and compute a critical value of the price elasticity such that w˚ ą 1.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 depicts the profit margin for the four Δ-scenarios when μptq ” 20,
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Figure 2.5: (a) the optimal profit rate on r0, T s for different Δ-functions, where μptq ” 20, ε “ 2,
cptq “ 1 ` 0.05t, aptq “ 2, qptq “ rptq “ 0, and the Δ-functions given in Figure 2.3.
(b) the optimal one-cycle profit depending on Δ, where Δ is assumed to be fixed
throughout the cycle of length T . The black line corresponds to T “ 10, μptq ” 20,
ε “ 2, cptq “ 1`0.05t, aptq “ 2, qptq “ rptq “ 0, ptq “ 0.05; the colored lines deviate
by the value labeled at the corresponding graph.
35If rptq ” 0 and εptq ” 2, then ν˚pt,Δq :“ ν˚ptq “ 1´ΔΔ
´
Δ
4
μptq
cptq
¯ 1
1´Δ . Comparing ν˚ for Δ1 “ 1{10 and
Δ2 “ 3{5 it is easy to verify that the inequality ν˚pt,Δ2q ą ν˚pt,Δ1q is satisfied if (approximately)
μptq ą 10.4cptq.
59
2 Optimal Dynamic Pricing and Advertising with Inventory Cost
ceteris paribus. Now - with a larger μ value - the optimal profit rates co-move with the
Δ functions for most of the time; the decrease of ν˚ for the Δ1 and Δ2 scenario is
due to the increasing cost function. Since ν˚ptq is only a snapshot of the total profit
per cycle at time t, from a practical point of view, it is more relevant to analyze the
optimal total profit per cycle with respect to changes of Δ (and other parameters).
Panel (b) of Figure 2.5 illustrates how the one-cycle profit depends on (constant) Δ-
values (horizontal axis). The different graphs of π1˚ pT q as a function of Δ illustrate
variations of the basic parameter setting μptq ” 20, ε “ 2, cptq “ 1 ` 0.05t, aptq “ 2,
qptq “ rptq “ 0, ptq “ 0.05. The profit function related to this particular parameter
setting is represented by the black line. The label next to a line indicates which basic
parameter has been changed and displays the new value. The levels of the profit lines
vary, but all lines show a convex behavior. Most interestingly, for all parameter settings
one observes a decreasing behavior for small Δ-values, i.e., it would be favorable for the
monopolist to operate on a market where advertising has no impact (δptq “ Δptq ” 0),
but customers were to arrive by intrinsic motives. However, if Δ is large, advertising is
beneficial.
The influence of the arrival intensity μ
The analysis of how quantities of interest depend on the arrival intensity μ - the cus-
tomer’s basic arrival rate - is straightforward: the optimal price does not depend on
μ. Thus, neither the values nor changes of μ affect p˚. The optimal advertising rate,
the optimal rate of sales and the optimal profit rate co-move with the arrival intensity.
The arrival rate μ enters all formulas as a power expression; the exponent only depends
on a and δ. Hence, the corresponding elasticities are given by the following simple
expressions36:
elw˚ptq,μ “ 1aptq ´ δptq ,
and
elλ˚ptq,μ “ 11 ´ Δptq “ elν˚ptq,μ.
A higher arrival intensity is always profitable for a monopolist. Furthermore, it is best to
synchronize the advertising rate with the time-varying arrival rate. The interplay of μptq
and cptq, see (2.22), determines whether it is optimal to advertise at a rate above one or
at a rate below one. Recall, a rate higher (lower) than one implies boosting (curbing)
the rate of sales. We analyze the maximized cycle profit in the next section 2.4.2. There,
36When computing the elasticity with respect to changes in the arrival intensity, we set μptq “ μ and
differentiate with respect to μ.
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we also compare the dynamic model with the partially static models.
The return on sales
Another economic key figure of interest is the return on sales, also referred to as operating
margin. The definition of the (total) return on sales is the total profit in relation to
total revenue or, in everyday language, how many cents of each dollar taken in line a
monopolist’s pockets. We define the total return on sales ROS˚ associated with the
optimal control as
ROS˚ :“
Tş
0
ν˚ptqdt
Tş
0
e´Rptqp˚ptqλ˚ptqdt
εptq”ε
Δptq”Δ“ 1 ´ Δ
ε
. (2.76)
If the price and advertising elasticities are constant over time (εptq ” ε and Δptq ” Δ),
it is easy to see that ROS˚ “ p1´Δq{ε. We define the pointwise return on sales ros˚ptq,
0 ď t ď T , as
ros˚ptq :“ e
Rptqν˚ptq
p˚ptqλ˚ptq “
1 ´ Δptq
εptq ; (2.77)
it is the (adjusted) optimal profit margin37 divided by the revenue rate at time t. That
ros˚ is equivalent to p1´Δptqq{εptq is evident by recalling the Dorfman-Steiner relation
(2.14), namely w˚ptqaptq{ pp˚ptqλ˚ptqq “ Δptq{εptq, and the equation (2.18), which is
equivalent to w˚ptqaptq “ eRptqΔptq{p1 ´ Δptqqν˚ptq. Note, we compute the ros˚ptq at
current value at time t whereas the ROS˚ is defined in terms of the present value at
time zero.
Both terms, the return on sales and the total return on sales, decrease in ε, i.e.,
the more price sensitive customers are, the smaller is the profit margin relative to the
revenue. The optimally controlled return on sales also decreases in Δ, a property which
is intuitively clear. The opportunity to advertise admittedly increases the sales rate
if w˚ ą 1, but also incurs the cost of generating additional demand. Optimal prices
are not affected by Δ. Thus, if w˚ ą 1, larger revenue rates and larger profits, cf.
the discussion on pp. 56-60, can be observed, but the (pointwise) return on sales will
decrease if advertising becomes more efficient.
37The profit margin νptq is defined in terms of time zero dollars. Therefore, we multiply the numerator
by eRptq to account for the current value at time t.
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2.4.2 Optimal Dynamic vs. Optimal (Partially) Static Models
In the previous section, we focused on the effects of parameter changes on the optimal
controls and the optimally controlled system. Now, we compare the dynamic model with
the (partially) static models. Instead of analyzing a myriad of different models, we will
discuss an exemplary case study and summarize our general findings at the end of this
section. The numerical values of the following Example 2.4.1 are motivated by a report
on the situation and future of the German (food) discounter market, cf. GfK (2008).
We consider a manager who sets the pricing and advertising policy of a supermarket
for the sales period of two weeks. Such an example is not a typical inventory model.
In particular, it is not realistic to assume that a supermarket stocks the total inventory
for the whole planning horizon only once. This would imply that after two weeks all
shelves are empty and would all be replenished at one stroke. Instead, we assume
that replenishments will occur at several times during the 2-week period: fruits and
vegetables twice a week, most other products once a week. We abstract from particular
goods or items to be sold and introduce a so-called shopping card unit (SCU): an average
basket of goods. Furthermore, we assume the price and the advertising rate to be set
relative to their basic levels p0 and w0, respectively. Then, the factor μptq in the demand
rate (2.4) is given by μptq ” p1{w0qδ μ0p1{p0q´ε, cf. Section 2.2, p. 14. By choosing
this representation one can directly interpret the given parameter values as done in the
example, see below.
We introduce the relevant data in Example 2.4.1 and discuss these values afterwards.
Then, we illustrate the optimal price and advertising policies of our three models:
dynamic-price-dynamic-advertising, dynamic-price-static-advertising, and static-price-
dynamic-advertising, cf. Figure 2.6. Of particular interest is a comparison between
the dynamic-price-dynamic-advertising model - the benchmark model - and the static-
price-dynamic-advertising model - the most relevant practice model. We compare the
profit margins associated with the optimal policies, see Figure 2.7, and the optimal prof-
its of the whole sales period, see Table 2.2. Moreover, we analyze the inventory capacities
(the initial number of SCUs) and the sales rates associated with the optimal price and
advertising policies and we shortly discuss how the sales rates fit to observable customer
behavior.
Example 2.4.1 A supermarket sells a variety of goods, mainly food and convenience
goods, from Monday to Saturday. Management wants to set the pricing and advertising
policy for (the next) two weeks (T ” 2). Instead of considering particular items, we con-
centrate on the sale of an average basket of goods, a so-called shopping cart unit (SCU).
Assume that the unit cost of an SCU amounts to 15 dollars (c0 ” 15). The inventory
62
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
costs, including attributable labor, insurance, and opportunity costs, add up to one dollar
per SCU per week (ptq ” 1). Customers are assumed to be very price sensitive; if prices
are too high, they do their shopping at another supermarket.38 Advertising has only a
moderate appeal. The price and advertising elasticities are εptq ” 8 and δptq ” 0.15.
The advertising cost function is linear (aptq ” 1).
Assuming a weekly advertising effort of 1, 000 dollars pw0 “ 1, 000q and a price at unit
cost pp0 ” c0 “ 15q, on average, μ0 “ 20, 000 SCUs will be sold at unit cost per week.39
Typically, customers are sensitive with respect to price changes at a particular store
and decide to buy at another store if prices are too high. A value for the price elasticity
of ε “ 8 is fairly large but not uncommon in food retailing. For example, Hoffmann and
Hackelbusch (2013) estimate the value of the (cross) price elasticity of trademark goods
between German discounters to be around 13. The choice p0 ” c0 is motivated by the
question of how many customers will buy one SCU at cost. Since aptq “ 1, the advertising
rate can be interpreted as the amount of dollars spent per week. We assume w0 to
correspond to the weekly advertising effort (in dollars) that is typically needed to run such
a store, i.e., direct promotions (ads, flyers, etc.) and indirect expenditures on advertising
(sales staff, opening hours, etc.). If the supermarket management decides to set the price
pptq ” c0 “ 15 and to advertise at rate wptq ” w0 “ 1, 000, the model postulates that
μ0 “ 20, 000 customers would be attracted. If the advertising rate is set to wptq ” 500,
ceteris paribus, this reduces the number of (potential) customers by 10%; note, that the
factor pwptq{w0qδ in the demand rate is then p500{1000q0.15 « 0.9. Due to the small
δ-value, even at an advertising rate of only one dollar per week 35 percent of the buyers
are still willing to buy an SCU if the price equals p0. The effect of the choice of w0 clearly
depends on δ, but whenever δptq ą 0, no customers will show up if no money is spent
on advertising. This example will illustrate the importance and the implications of the
parameter values and their interpretation. The value of the μ function needed in order
to calculate the optimal policies is given by μptq “ p1{w0q0.15 μ0 p1{c0q´8 « 1.82 ¨1013 - a
value that numerically is not always easy to handle. According to our interpretation, μ
is the number of SCUs sold at a price of one dollar if the advertising rate equals one.40
Alternatively, one can set μptq ” μ0 and one obtains the optimal price and advertising
rate in terms of markups on c0 and w0, respectively. For example, an optimal price of 1.2
38Here, we assume no monopolistic retailer, but one can think of a local monopoly, e.g., the only
supermarket in a neighborhood. If the prices are relatively high compared to other stores nearby,
people are willing to do the shopping there.
39Since the actual sales price will be higher (« 18 dollars), the actual number of sales per week will be
much lower, see below.
40This amount is fairly large but buying a 15 dollar SCU for one dollar only is a really hot deal.
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then corresponds to a value of 1.2c0 “ 18 (dollars). Figure 2.6 depicts the optimal price
and advertising policies according to the theoretical results presented so far. The optimal
price in the static-price-dynamic-advertising model is p˜ « 18.25, which corresponds to
a markup of approximately 22 percent relative to the unit cost c0 “ 15. The optimal
S S
S	 
   
W




S
(a)
Z
Z
Z	
   
W




Z
(b)
Figure 2.6: Optimal prices (a) and optimal advertising rates (b) in the dynamic and partially
fixed control model for Example 2.4.1.
dynamic prices in case of the dynamic-price-dynamic-advertising and the dynamic-price-
static-advertising setting are increasing (in t) and are proportional to the cost function
cptq “ 15`t.41 The (theoretical) markup on the unit cost equals ε{pε´1q´1 “ 1{7 « 0.14
at the beginning (t “ 0) and increases linearly to ε{pε´1qcpT q{c0´1 “ 31{105 « 0.3 over
the two week period; the average optimal dynamic price is approximately equal to the
optimal fixed price.42 In the retail sector a markup between 15 and 30 percent (depending
on the goods and the cost structure) is realistic.43 The different pricing policies have only
little influence on the dynamic advertising rates, cf. Figure 2.6b. Although w˚ptq ą w˜ptq
at every point t, the values essentially differ only at the beginning and at the end of the
considered time horizon (w˚p0q « $2, 540 compared to w˜p0q « $2, 300, and w˚pT q « $900
compared to w˜pT q « $750, respectively); note, since aptq “ 1, w˚ptq corresponds to the
advertising cost rate. In both cases, it is optimal to start with a high advertising rate and
decrease the promotional effort monotonically over time. When the advertising rate has
to be fixed, it is optimal to set the value slightly below the average optimal dynamic rate
of the dynamic-price-dynamic-advertising setting (w¯ « $1, 559 ă $1, 569 « şT0 w˚ptqdt).
41Recall, the optimal dynamic price is the same regardless of whether advertising is dynamic or static.
42The average optimal dynamic price evaluates to $18.2857, whereas the optimal fixed price equals
$18.2548 (precise up to four digits).
43See IfH (2009) for estimates of the margin of the German retail industry.
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In all three cases advertising is used to boost the sales rate. However, the effect is limited
by the small advertising elasticity, e.g., w¯0.15 « 3.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.7 shows the sales rates of the three models considered. While λ˚
and λ¯ more or less co-move, λ˜ is almost constant! This has large implications in practice
as retailers often seek to smooth their sales over the planning horizon. Here, this effect is
achieved by setting a fixed price and advertising dynamically. Customers steadily make
their purchases with only a slight decline over time. When the prices increase over time,
most sales occur at the beginning of the sales period and the value of the optimal rates
λ˚ and λ¯ drops to approximately one third of their initial value close to the end of the
sales period. Figuratively speaking, many customers storm the market at the beginning
of the period when prices are low before they start increasing. Such a rush implies extra
costs which are, to some extent, taken into account by the higher advertising expenses
(more sales staff and/or extended opening hours). However, the cost function c only
depends on the internal cost parameters. It does not capture such external cost effects.
In general, the inventory cost ptq can be modeled in such a way to account for some of
these effects.
Λ

Λ
Λ
	
   
W






Λ
(a)
Ν
Ν
	
Ν

   
W





Ν
(b)
Figure 2.7: Optimally controlled sales rates (a) and optimal profit margins (b) in the dynamic
and partially fixed control model for Example 2.4.1.
In Example 2.4.1, we do not consider deterioration effects, i.e., qptq ” 0. Hence,
the initial inventory value associated with the optimal control in each of the models
considered equals the amount of total sales. The values of the initial inventory of the
three models are: x0˚ « 9, 260, x¯0 « 9, 186, and x˜0 « 8, 651. Despite the different
model settings, which imply different optimal policies, the differences between the total
number of sales of each model are quite small. The differences of the profit margins are
also small. Panel (b) of Figure 2.7 depicts the optimally controlled profit margins of the
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three model variants. It is apparent that all three graphs strictly decrease over time.
Hence, profits are mainly gathered in the first half of the sales period44; at time T , the
values of the profit rates have more than halved compared to their initial values. But
the differences between the profit rates, especially between ν˚ and ν¯, are small. These
observations go in line with the numerical values in Table 2.2. The first row displays
π1˚ π¯1 π˜1 π
fix
1
reference value
(aptq “ 1, δptq “ 0.15, ε “ 8, 17, 779 17, 663 17, 037 16, 922
μ0 “ 20, 000, qptq “ 0q p99.4%q p95.8%q p95.2%q
modification to example 2.4.1
ε ” 6 29, 151 29, 053 28, 489 28, 392
p99.7%q p97.7%q p97.4%q
ε ” 10 11, 914 11, 787 11, 128 11, 005
p98, 9%q p93.4%q p92.4%q
δptq ” 0 19, 442 19, 442 18, 746 18, 746
p100%q p96.4%q p96.4%q
δptq ” 0.3 21, 948 21, 530 20, 855 20, 438
p98.1%q p95.0%q p93.1%q
μ0 ” 10, 000 7, 866 7, 815 7, 538 7, 487
p99.3%q p95.8%q p95.2%q
μ0 ” 30, 000 28, 647 28, 460 27, 451 27, 266
p99.3%q p95.8%q p95.2%q
qptq ” 0.05 13, 090 12, 839 11.524 11, 268
p98.1%q p88.0%q p86.1%q
Table 2.2: The optimal profits (in dollars) of four different models and different parameter values:
π1˚ - dynamic-pricing-dynamic-advertising, π¯1 - dynamic-pricing-static-advertising,
π˜1 - static-pricing-dynamic-advertising, πfix1 - static-pricing-dynamic-advertising.
The first column indicates changes to the original parameter setting of Example 2.4.1.
The values given in parentheses are the percentage values of the profit in the corre-
sponding column and π1˚ .
the one-cycle profits of all three models, assuming the optimal policies are applied. The
numbers in parentheses are the percentage values of the particular setting relative to
44Approximately 63% of the profit is made in the first half of the planning horizon if prices and promotion
are controlled dynamically. Also, about 64% of the total sales take place in this period.
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the profit value of the dynamic case π1˚ , for example, the monopolist loses less than one
percent of this total profit (the benchmark) if she is obliged (or chooses) to advertise at
an (optimal) constant level. The last column represents the case when the price as well
as the advertising rate is constant throughout the cycle. The optimal fixed-price-fixed-
advertising pair is approximately given by p18.29, 1, 493q. The monopolist loses less than
five percent of the total profit that she obtains if allowed to dynamically control both
the price and the advertising rate. Similar observations can be made if one value of the
original parameter setting in Example 2.4.1 changes as indicated in the first column of
Table 2.2. Naturally, the values of π1˚ always exceed the other profit values. In this
study, the drops are not dramatic; the profit values are relatively close. The largest
deviation, see Table 2.2, occurs when we assume a (weekly) deterioration rate of five
percent (qptq ” 0.05). If the decision maker has the opportunity to dynamically control
the price and advertising rate, she will indeed benefit from this option. If we talk about
millions of dollars, five or ten percent more or less profit are substantial; and even in a
small (family) business, 500 dollars per week add up to more than 25, 000 dollars per
year.
Our results assume that the monopolist has complete foresight and full information
about the parameters of the model. In practical applications, the cost structure is
usually known, i.e., the values of c0, , q, and r are reliable, but there is often uncertainty
about the market parameters δ, ε, and μ. The functional expressions of the policies
are robust with respect to parameter misspecifications. Assuming a wrong parameter
(estimated) value and applying the suboptimal price-advertising strategy will naturally
lead to a lower profit compared to the case when the true parameter value is known and
the optimal policy is applied. However, in many cases the impact on the total profit
is relatively small, although the suboptimal policy and the optimal policy might differ
substantially. Panel (a) of Figure 2.8 shows the ratios of the total profit if the retailer
applies a price-advertising strategy assuming εptq ” 8 and the total profit if the retailer
applies the (optimal) price-advertising policy for the true price elasticity value according
to the abscissa. We distinguish the four cases piq dynamic-pricing-dynamic-advertising,
piiq dynamic-pricing-static-advertising, piiiq static-pricing-dynamic-advertising, and pivq
static-pricing-static-advertising. The results of cases piq and piiq hereby coincide almost
exactly; the same is true about the results of cases piiiq and pivq. Around the value
ε “ 8 the deviations are relatively small. For example, in case piq, if the true price
elasticity value is εptq ” 6, i.e., customers are less price sensitive than assumed, applying
the (optimal) policy for εptq “ 8 leads to a total profit that accounts for approximately
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Figure 2.8: (a) ratios of the total profit if the retailer applies a price-advertising strategy assum-
ing εptq ” 8 and the total profit if the retailer applies the (optimal) price-advertising
policy for the true price elasticity value according to the abscissa. (b) ratio of the
total profit if the retailer applies a price-advertising strategy assuming μ0 ” 20, 000
and the total profit if the retailer applies the (optimal) price-advertising policy for
the true μ0 value according to the abscissa. All other parameter values coincide with
Example 2.4.1. piq dynamic-pricing-dynamic-advertising, piiq dynamic-pricing-static-
advertising, piiiq static-pricing-dynamic-advertising, and pivq static-pricing-static-
advertising.
94 percent of the total profit associated with the truly optimal policy for εptq “ 6.45
If customers are more price sensitive, for example, εptq “ 10 is the true value, the
total profit associated with the suboptimal policy accounts for almost 95 percent of the
optimal total profit.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.8 illustrates the results of the corresponding analysis with respect
to changes in μ0; the average number of SCUs bought. All the model settings, cases piq
to pivq, show essentially the same behavior: a (much) smaller true value of μ0 reduces the
profits relatively strong and a larger value of μ0 reduces the profits only little if the (now)
suboptimal price and advertising policy is applied. For instance, in Example 2.4.1, if
the number of expected sales per week (at unit cost) doubles, i.e., μ0 ” 40, 000, running
the same advertising policy46 as if μ0 was equal to 20, 000 guarantees the monopolist
still more than 96 percent of the profit she can optimally obtain when the true μ0 value
is known. Varying the values of other parameters or disregarding a time dependence
of a parameter provides similar results: the optimal policies we derived in Sections 2.2
and 2.3 are robust with respect to misspecifications, i.e., if these policies are applied
45We neglect the effect that the retailer is committed with his order; instead, we assume that it is
possible to reorder or return any amount at unit cost c0.
46The optimal price policy is independent of μ and thus unaffected by changes of the μ0 value.
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using incorrect parameter (estimated) values, the resulting (suboptimal) total profits
are relatively close to the optimal ones. This observation is not confined to our example.
While one can always construct extreme scenarios where small differences between the
estimated and the true value have great consequences with regard to the optimal profit,
this robustness of the optimal policies is an essential feature of our model and the results.
The following Remark summarizes our findings in the context of Example 2.4.1.
Remark 2.4.2 For the parameter setting of Example 2.4.1 all four models piq to pivq,
see above, are robust with respect to parameter misspecifications. In particular, we make
the following observations.
• A fixed-price strategy smooths the sales rate.
• Deviations from the optimal price entail larger drops in profits than using a sub-
optimal advertising rate.
• If parameter values are unknown, it is recommended to use conservative estimates.
The parameter estimates can be updated over time.
• The larger the advertising efficiency parameter Δ, the larger are the benefits from
dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising.
• The larger the demand elasticity parameter ε, the larger are the benefits from dy-
namic pricing and dynamic advertising.
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3 Optimal Dynamic Pricing and Advertising
in New-Product Adoption Models
3.1 Introduction
The following framework provides a tool to analyze and understand controlled adoption
models. The adoption of a new product by a market eventually mirrors the sales process
of a (maybe very large) inventory. To this end, we occasionally switch between the
terms adoption (model) and inventory (model). This variation will also remind the
reader of the possible fields of application. A precise description of the model and
assumptions is introduced in Section 3.2. Two main results therein, Theorems 3.2.1
and 3.2.2, have been published in Helmes et al. (2013). There, the authors apply the
Dynamic Programming approach to derive and prove these theorems. In this thesis,
we make use of the Maximum Principle to derive these results. In Section 3.3, we
consider the particular class of von Bertalanffy adoption models to utilize and illustrate
the implications of the main theorems.
To begin with, we present the general ideas of the model and a classification within
the context of this work. Actually, we change perspectives: instead of looking from
the perspective of a single firm we now take a broader market view. In Chapter 2, the
models and the analysis were motivated from an individual company’s point of view:
faced with a specific cost structure and a particular market situation the retailer has
to choose the pricing strategy, the advertising strategy, and the associated inventory
capacity such that the total profit is maximized. One key assumption in Chapter 2 is
that the level of the initial inventory is subject to the choice of the decision maker. This
might be realistic in case of a (small) regional market where a retailer has full market
power. But commonly, there exists a maximum quantity or total value of goods that
can be sold, i.e., the market potential (of a single company) is limited to some positive
value M, or more generally, one can think of a maximum quantity of sales that can be
achieved by all companies in the market. Following the ideas of Chapter 2 the value M
is the (maximum) initial inventory or capacity - the maximum amount of goods that can
be sold on the market. But instead of working with absolute values, we let xptq denote
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the fractional market share still to be captured at time t, 0 ď t ď T . Naturally, xptq is a
number between zero and one. While the normalization of x is only a matter of scaling,
the main feature of the model analyzed in this chapter is that the initial value is now
assumed to be fixed and no longer subject to the choice of the decision maker. Except
for the cost of advertising wptqa, a ą δ ě 0, no other cost terms are considered, i.e., the
cost functional cptq introduced in Chapter 2, cf. (2.8), equals zero.1 Instead, we now
consider a state dependent demand, i.e., the demand rate at time t depends explicitly on
the value of xptq. We model this dependence by an additional factor ψpxq as part of the
demand rate (2.4), i.e., λpt, p, w, xq “ μptqp´εwδψpxq, see below. With the help of the
system function ψ one is able to model various effects. For example, if the function ψpxq
decreases in x, the demand rate increases if more customers purchase the product.2 In
Chapter 2, we (implicitly) considered the special case where ψ is constant; we assumed
this constant to be part of the μ function.
If ψ is non-constant, i.e., the demand at time t depends on the market share still
to be captured, there is a feedback between the state xptq and the control that led to
xptq. While we still assume the demand rate to be zero if advertising spending is zero
(in case δ ą 0), the actual market share (implicitly) remembers the expenditures on
advertising up to now: if the product (or market) has been strongly promoted (and/or
prices were set at a low level) one may expect the remaining market share to be relatively
small. If none or only few advertising campaigns have been run, the main fraction of
the market still waits to be captured. In the marketing literature this effect is often
directly modeled by (so-called) goodwill. The money invested in promotion builds a
sort of advertising capital (the goodwill). Nerlove and Arrow (1962) were one of the
first to consider this framework; hence, the model is widely known as Nerlove-Arrow
(advertising) model. Motivated by the empirical findings that the effect of advertising
persists but diminishes over time Nerlove and Arrow assume the stock of goodwill to
depreciate over time. Besides price and time, the rate of sales in their model depends
on the level of goodwill and rather not on the current advertising spending. The idea
is that goodwill attracts new customers or influences the preferences of customers. The
depreciation of goodwill over time is motivated by the observation that consumers drift
to other brands or (new) products. Considering only investments in goodwill and no
price control, Nerlove-Arrow show that it is best to build up an optimal goodwill level
1Applications, where marginal costs or variable costs are zero are, for example, licensed software or
electronic books, music, and movies distributed via the Internet.
2In the context of inventory control or shelf space management this corresponds to the situation when
customers become more interested in purchasing a product if the number of available items is small,
i.e., customers become impatient.
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as fast as possible. In the infinite horizon problem the monopolist aims at this optimal
level and only compensates the depreciation of goodwill; she will then advertise at a
constant rate; Appendix 1 provides more details on the Nerlove-Arrow model.
One key property of the Nerlove-Arrow model is that the selling horizon and the
amount that can be sold are unlimited as no market saturation occurs. A model that
accounts for saturation effects is the classical model of Vidale and Wolfe (1957), cf.
Appendix 2. Vidale and Wolfe were primarily interested in describing and explaining
actual market behavior instead of controlling the demand rate in favor of some payoffs.
They assume that the influence of advertising depends on two effects: the active response
of the market (share) still to be captured and the forgetting of the share that has already
been captured. The active response is modeled via the so-called response constant: the
number of sales generated per invested dollar of advertising. Usually, we assume the
response constant to be a factor of the more general function μ, cf. Chapter 2.3 Our
interpretation of such a factor diverges since w enters the dynamics and the objective as
power expressions with exponent δ resp. a. However, the idea of a response constant in
the model of Vidale and Wolfe carries over: one can think of a power form expression
μδ1 to represent the response constant, cf. Section 2.1, p. 14. The effect of forgetting
can be modeled via the system function ψ. While we assume that past expenditures
on advertising have no lasting effect and only the current advertising rate influences
the demand, the market memorizes past sales - which were influenced by past marketing
activities - by means of the remaining market share. For example, if ψpxq is an increasing
function, the demand rate declines with an increasing adoption of the product, ceteris
paribus. In particular, if ψpxq tends to zero for small market share values, it needs a
higher promotional effort (or a lower price) to draw the customers’ attention to remaining
items.
In the framework of marketing a new product or technology, the question of how
and when such a new product or technology is adopted and diffused by the market
has always been of particular interest. Influenced by contagion models in epidemiology
and behavioral sciences, researchers set up models of adoption and diffusion that fit the
empirical observations, see, for example, Mahajan et al. (1990) and Peres et al. (2010) for
a review on new-product adoption literature.4 One of the most important models is the
one by Bass (1969).5 Motivated and underpinned by empirical findings Bass finds that
the process of new-product adoption for consumer durable goods - the classical examples
3Since the function μ depends on time this also allows for the response to be a time-dependent function.
4See also Huang et al. (2012) for a review on Recent Developments in Dynamic Advertising Research.
5Hopp (2004) selects the paper by Bass to be one of Ten Most Influential Papers of Management
Science’s First Fifty Years.
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being refrigerators, (black & white) television, or room air conditioners in the United
States - can be (quite well) described by a (simple) nonlinear differential equation, t ě 0,
9yptq “ Ω p1 ´ yptqq ` Γyptq p1 ´ yptqq , yp0q “ 0, (3.1)
where yptq P r0, 1s is the ratio of the cumulative sales relative to a fixed market potential
M; Ω,Γ ě 0. The adoption and diffusion of a new product or technology depends on two
forces: innovation (Ω) is proportional to p1 ´ yptqq and imitation (Γ ) is proportional to
yptq p1 ´ yptqq.6 An innovator is not influenced by other (potential) customers’ decisions
or opinions, while an imitator’s timing of adoption is influenced by the decision of others
- the pressure of the social system or the so-called word of mouth effect. If more and
more people adopt the product, the pressure increases on the remaining non-adopters.
One immediate implication of the Bass model is that if no innovators appear (Ω ” 0),
the new product will not be adopted at all since yp0q “ 0. While the values of both
parameters determine the level of the (cumulative) sales rate, it is the ratio of both
parameters that determines the behavior or shape of the adoption process. Note, if the
external effects are shut down, i.e., Ω “ 0, and assuming 0 ă yp0q ă 1, the Bass model
is identical to the model proposed by Mansfield (1961). The empirical findings of Bass
(1969) and others, see, for instance, Mahajan et al. (1995) or Marković and Jukić (2013),
indicate that estimated values of Ω are relatively small, around 0.01 and often smaller,
rarely exceeding 0.03. Estimates of the parameter Γ take values between 0.2 and 0.7.
Mahajan et al. (1995) estimate, based on the results of Bass (1969), that 0.2 to 2.8
percent of all (potential) adopters are not influenced by the social system and adopt the
product due to external effects.
Our framework is motivated by (optimal) inventory control models. Therefore, we will
consider as state variable the remaining (fractional) market potential of a new product
rather than the (fractional) cumulative sales, cf. below. Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 depicts
the adoption rate and panel (b) of Figure 3.1 the remaining market potential 1´ yptq at
time t for different values of the parameter Ω; we set Γ ” 1. If the ratio of innovators
to imitators is small, e.g., Ω{Γ “ 0.001, the adoption of the new product starts slowly.
If the share of innovators is large (Ω “ 0.5), the market clears rapidly.
The Generalized Bass Model proposed by Bass et al. (1994) includes decision variables
- price and adverting - to describe and control the adoption process. Sethi et al. (2008)
6More generally, these two effects are often described as external influence (innovation) and internal
influence (imitation).
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Figure 3.1: Bass model: growth rate of a new product (a) and remaining market potential (b)
at time t P r0, 10s for different Ω values and Γ “ 1.
consider a particular version of the Generalized Bass Model, where the Bass functional
φBasspyq “ Ω p1 ´ yq ` Γy p1 ´ yq , y P r0, 1s,
is approximated by the function
?
1 ´ y when Ω “ Γ “ 1. Helmes et al. (2013) analyze
the accuracy of this approximation and associated optimal controls. The state variable
yptq, t ě 0, yp0q “ y0 P r0, 1s, denotes the fractional market share of a durable good, i.e.,
the cumulative sales relative to the absolute market potential of that product.7 Control
variables are price p and advertising rate w. Sethi et al. (2008) assume the deterministic
demand rate is λSpp, w, yq “ μSwfSppq?1 ´ y, where μS is a positive constant and fSppq
is a function of the price p. The authors consider the function fS to be either of the
linear form fSppq “ p1 ´ εSpq, 0 ď p ď 1{εS , εS ą 0, or to be isoelastic of the form
fSppq “ p´ε, ε ą 1. The profit function to be maximized by choosing control functions
pptq and wptq is
8ż
0
e´rt
“
pptqλSptq ´ wptq2
‰
dt, (3.2)
subject to the state equation 9yptq “ λSppptq, wptq, yptqq, yp0q “ 0. Except for the
quadratic advertising costs, which effectively act as costs for producing y, no inventory
costs, purchasing expenses, or other running costs are taken into account. In case of the
isoelastic demand function, Sethi et al. (2008) show the optimal price pS˚ is constant in
time, while the optimal advertising rate wS˚ is proportional to the approximating term
7In terms of inventory management yptq is the fraction of the total inventory sold at time t.
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?
1 ´ y, see below, αS “ const:
pS˚ “ ε{pε ´ 1qαS , and wS˚pyq “ μS2ε
ˆ
ε
ε ´ 1αS
˙´pε´1q a
1 ´ y.
The value function is of the simple form VSpxq “ αS y.
The (uncontrolled) Bass model has been found to fit empirical adoption processes in
many fields of application. Nevertheless, the basic structure of the model has been crit-
icized as being too rigid. To overcome this criticism, Mahajan et al. (1990) characterize
a diffusion model in terms of the point of inflection of the aggregate sales function -
the point in time where the diffusion rate peaks - and in terms of symmetry. For the
uncontrolled Bass model the point of inflection TBass can only occur before the product
has captured half of its market potential.8 Furthermore, the diffusion curve in the Bass
model is symmetric around the peak time TBass in the interval r0, 2TBasss, cf. panel
(a) of Figure 3.1. Mahajan et al. (1990), p. 10, claim that ”In practice as well as in
theory, the maximum rate of diffusion of an innovation should be able to occur at any
time during the diffusion process. Additionally, diffusion patterns can be expected to be
nonsymmetric as well as symmetric.” A model that allows for such flexibility has been
suggested by Easingwood et al. (1983). They assume a nonuniform influence (NUI) of
the word of mouth (the external or imitation effect) on the evolution of the state y, i.e.,
Θ ě 0,
φNUIpyq “
´
Ω ` ΓyΘ
¯
p1 ´ yq.
However, in contrast to the uncontrolled Bass model no closed-form solution of the
differential equation y1ptq “ φNUI pyptqq exists in the NUI model. A diffusion model that
can be solved explicitly has been proposed by Von Bertalanffy (1957) in the (biological)
context of metabolism and growth. Von Bertalanffy (vB) assumes that the growth rate
of the body weight y of an animal may be expressed as, θ ě 0, θ ‰ 1, Γ ě 0, 0 ă y ă 1,
φvBpyq “ Γ1 ´ θy
θ
´
1 ´ y1´θ
¯
. (3.3)
The parameters Γ and θ are constants related to anabolism and catabolism. In the
context of new-product diffusion the quantity y is the fractional market share and the
parameter Γ has the same interpretation as the internal influence (word of mouth)
coefficient in the Bass model. Due to the parameter θ, however, the word of mouth
effect changes over time in accordance with changes of the market fraction. As a result,
8The peak time is given by TBass “ ´ 1Γ `Ω log
`
Ω
Γ
˘
, and the remaining market potential at that point
equals y pTBassq “ 12 ` Ω2Γ ą 12 .
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the aforementioned flexibility in the characteristics of the diffusion curve is guaranteed.
In contrast to the function φBass, the expressions of φvB that depend on Γ and θ are
not split into two distinct addends. Instead, these expressions are multiplied. Panel
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Figure 3.2: Von Bertalanffy model: growth (sales) rates of a new product (a) and remaining
market potentials (b) at time t P r0, 10s for different θ values and Γ “ 1, yp0q “ 0.01.
(a) of Figure 3.2 illustrates the (uncontrolled) growth rate φvB for various θ values.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.2 shows the associated evaluations of the remaining market shares
defined by 1 ´ yptq, y1ptq “ φvBpyptqq, yp0q “ 0.01, t ě 0. Notice that there must be a
positive number yp0q of sales at hand to start the adoption process, since, if yp0q “ 0, the
process remains at zero.9 If θ ” 0, the function φvB reduces to Γ p1´yq. This expression
strictly decreases in y, i.e., the more customers adopt the product the smaller the rate
of adoption becomes. The adoption rate peaks at TvB “ 0 and monotonically decreases
over time. If θ ” 2, the model reduces to the model proposed by Mansfield (1961),
φMansfieldpyq “ Γyp1 ´ yq. In Mansfield’s model, the growth rate is symmetric around
the point of inflection TvB, see below. Generally, panel (a) of Figure 3.2 suggests that the
growth rate is skewed to the right whenever θ lies in the interval r0, 2q, i.e., the sales rate
peaks when less than half of the (potential) market share has been acquired. If θ ą 2, the
growth rates are skewed to the left: the maximum rate of sales is reached after more than
half of the overall market volume has been covered. In general, the point of inflection
- the point in time when the sales rate peaks - is given by, yp0q P p0, 1q, θ ě 0, θ ‰ 1,
9In the controlled model, when we consider the rate of adoption to depend on price and advertising
rate as well, the promotion acts as an external influence on customers. Thus, the case yp0q “ 0 will
also be considered.
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Γ ą 0,
TvB “
#
0, if yp0q1´θ ą θ,
´ 1Γ log
´
1´θ
1´yp0q1´θ
¯
, else.
If θ approaches 1, the model reduces to the Gompertz model characterized by the func-
tion φGompertzpyq “ Γy log p1{yq, cf. Hendry (1972) and Dixon (1980). In the case of
the Gompertz curve the point of inflection equals 1{Γ log p´ logpyp0qqq.
Motivated by the inventory control problem in Chapter 2, from now on, we will
rephrase the diffusion problem in terms of the variable x :“ 1 ´ y. Thus, x de-
notes the (fractional) market potential or (fractional) inventory that is still available.
Using the variable x, the system function ψ in the von Bertalanffy model becomes,
θ ě 0, θ ‰ 1, Γ ě 0, 0 ď x ď 1,
ψpxq “ ψvBpxq “ φvBp1 ´ yq “ Γ1 ´ θ
”
p1 ´ xqθ ´ p1 ´ xq
ı
.
Taking up the ideas of Chapter 2, we will also consider time-dependent arrival intensities
μptq. Again, our goal is to determine optimal price and advertising policies over finite
and infinite time horizons such that the profit, cf. (3.2), is maximized. The problem and
the model are described in Section 3.2. In the same section, we present the solution of
the general control problem. In Section 3.3, we analyze the controlled von Bertalanffy
model. Unless otherwise stated the notation is the same as the notation used in Chapter
2. This includes the meaning and possible interpretation of parameters and variables.
3.2 The Model
We consider a monopolist who is selling goods during a time period T , T ą 0; we
allow T to be finite or infinite. The state variable xptq is the inventory at hand at time t,
0 ď t ď T . Alternatively, x can be interpreted as the untapped market share of a durable
good, cf. Section 3.1. From now on, we assume xptq to represent a fraction of a maximum
amount M, i.e., xptq P r0, 1s. The actual market share values are easily obtained by
multiplying the fraction by M. The initial (fractional) market size (inventory capacity)
is given by xp0q “ x0, 0 ă x0 ď 1; it is not subject to the decision of the monopolist. For
instance, the value x0 “ 1 indicates that the full market potential M can be exploited.
Backordering is not allowed, and it is not possible to tap more than the total market,
i.e., xpT q ě 0.10 The two controls are the price pptq and the advertising rate wptq at
10Note, in Helmes et al. (2013) the state variable yptq denotes the untapped market share. Sethi et al.
(2008) let x denote the (fractional) cumulative sales. In order to be consistent with the preceding
notation, cf. Chapter 2, we define x as the remaining fractional market share.
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time t, 0 ď t ď T . Both variables influence the deterministic demand. The demand rate
also depends on the (current) value of x through the additional factor ψpxq; we call ψ
the system function. For x ą 0, we define
λpuqpt, xq :“ λ pt, xptq, uptqq “ λ pt, xptq, pptq, wptqq “ μptqpptq´εwptqδψpxptqq, (3.4)
where ε is the price elasticity and δ denotes the advertising elasticity; we set λpuqpt, 0q “ 0
for all t P r0, T s. We assume 1 ă ε ă ε ă 8 and 0 ď δ ă a ă a, where a is the
advertising cost parameter.11 The function μptq ą 0, the arrival intensity, captures the
basic demand, i.e., time-dependent influences such as seasonal effects, and all effects
determined by the market which are not subject to the decision of the monopolist, cf.
Chapter 2. The system function ψ is assumed to be positive and differentiable on the
open interval p0, x0q; the function ψ1{pε´1q is assumed to be integrable on the open
interval p0, x0q. Note, if ψpxq ” 1, the demand rate λpuqpt, xq does not depend on the
state and is equivalent to λpuqptq, see (2.4). The monopolist has to choose a strategy u
from the set of feasible policies U , see below, such that the ordinary differential equation
(ODE), x0 ą 0,
9xptq “ ´λpuqpt, xq, xp0q “ x0, xpT q ě 0, (3.5)
is satisfied. For any s, 0 ď s ď T , the set of feasible policies is given by
Ups, xq “
$’’’’’’&
’’’’’’%
u
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ
uptq “ ppptq, wptqq , and uptq is a vector-valued piecewise continuous
function on rs, T s, s ď t ď T, such that the solution of (3.5) with
initial condition xpsq “ x and terminal condition x(T) ě 0 is
uniquely determined and all integrals to be encountered in the
sequel exist; moreover, pptq ą 0, wptq ě 0, t ă T
,//////.
//////-
.
By definition, we only consider controls such that the state process is nonnegative. The
decision problem is to choose a control uptq “ ppptq, wptqq P Up0, x0q, 0 ď t ď T , that
maximizes
Jpuq :“ Jpu; 0, T, x0q :“
Tż
0
e´Rptq
”
pptqλpuqpt, xptqq ´ wptqa
ı
dt, (3.6)
where Rptq “ şt0 rpsqds is the cumulative discount rate, cf. Chapter 2. We will call
any such policy an optimal open-loop policy. Compared with the objective function
11In contrast to the dynamic model in Chapter 2 we assume the elasticity parameters δ and ε as well as
the cost parameter a to be constant over time.
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(2.6) of the problem which we considered in Chapter 2, the objective Jpuq involves no
cost terms except the costs of advertising (and discounting); the revenue parts of both
objective functions, price multiplied by demand, are identical. We focus on the influence
of the system function - the market diffusion - and we discard storage and running costs.
Moreover, the initial value x0 is - in contrast to the problem considered in Chapter 2 -
fixed and it is not a decision variable. Thus, the (total) production costs c0x0 are fixed
and can be disregarded as well. Also, we do not consider an additive term ´qptqxptq in
the state equation, i.e., the deterioration rate of the market share is zero, qptq ” 0.
We solve the maximization problem by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
Given an optimal open-loop policy we deduce an optimal feedback control uˆ :“ uˆpt, xq,
0 ď t ď T, 0 ă x ď x0, see below. In Helmes et al. (2013), we first derive the optimal
feedback control by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and then deduce the
optimal control in open-loop form. In practical applications, both control forms, open-
loop and feedback, are important. The open-loop characterization gives the decision
maker a plan how to control the system over time. The feedback form enables the
decision maker to react to deviations and disturbances of the system.
We define the Hamiltonian function, u “ pp, wq, as
Hpt, x, u, κq “ e´Rptq ppλpt, x, p, wq ´ waq ´ κλpt, x, p, wq, (3.7)
where κ P R is called the adjoint variable.12 Let u‹ptq “ pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq P U be a control
that satisfies (3.5) and maximizes (3.6). For the time being, we assume that such an
optimal open-loop policy exists; let x‹ptq denote the trajectory associated with this
optimal control, i.e., the solution of the ODE (3.5) using u‹.13 The necessary conditions
for u‹ and x‹ to be optimal are, see, for example, Chapter 2 in Seierstad and Sydsæter
12In the general optimization literature, the Hamiltonian function is defined more generally as
Hpt, x, u, κq “ κ0e´Rptq ppλpt, x, p, wq ´ waq ´ κλpt, x, p, wq, where κ0 is a constant. Seierstad and
Sydsæter (1987) note on page 86 that in ”... the economic literature dealing with optimal control
theory it is quite common to see, without justification, the assumption ...” κ0 “ 1; they refer to
κ0 “ 0 as abnormal case. Assuming κ0 “ 0 means that the (integrand of the) objective function has
no influence on the solution of the problem.
13Throughout Chapter 3 we will denote the optimal open-loop policy by a ’‹’ superscript. This does not
refer to the results of Chapter 2, where we used a ’˚’ superscript.
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(1987), 0 ď t ď T ,
H pt, x‹ptq, u‹ptq, κptqq ě H pt, x‹ptq, u, κptqq for all u P U, (3.8)
9κptq “ ´BHBx pt, x
‹ptq, u‹ptq, κptqq , (3.9)
κpT qx‹pT q “ 0, (3.10)
κpT q ě 0. (3.11)
Equation (3.9) holds except at the points of discontinuity of u‹ptq. The Hamiltonian
is differentiable with respect to p and w since the demand rate λ is differentiable in p
and w; the derivatives of λ with respect to p and w are identical to those in Chapter 2,
namely Bλp¨q{Bp “ ´ελp¨q{p, and Bλp¨q{Bw “ δλp¨q{w, cf. the proof of Theorem 2.2.1.
The adjoint variable κptq is the per unit change in the objective function (3.6) for a
small change in xptq at time t, i.e., κptq is the shadow price of one additional (inventory
or market share) unit of x at time t. In particular, κp0q is the marginal rate of change
of the objective J with respect to a change in the initial market potential x0.14 An
economic interpretation of the Hamiltonian can be obtained by multiplying (3.7) by dt
and making use of the fact that the state equation (3.5) implies ´λp¨qdt “ 9xdt “ dx;
thus,
Hpt, x, u, κqdt “ e´Rptq ppλpt, x, p, wq ´ waq dt ` κdx. (3.12)
The first term on the right-hand side of (3.12) is the contribution to the objective Jpuq
from time t to t ` dt if the untapped market share is x and the control u is applied in
the (small) interval rt, t`dts. The differential dx “ ´λp¨qdt represents the change in the
untapped market share from time t to t`dt if the control u is applied; it is a nonpositive
value since 9x “ ´λ. Hence, the second term on the right-hand side of (3.12), κdx, is the
(negative) value associated with the change in the market share in the interval rt, t`dts.
It is the opportunity cost of the monopoly for selling today instead of tomorrow. Thus,
Hpt, x, u, κqdt is the net contribution to the objective Jpuq from time t to t ` dt if the
untapped market (share) value is x and the control u is applied: the direct contribution
from the market share gained plus the indirect contribution from lost sales in the future.
All these values are given in terms of time-zero dollars, for instance, κptq is the shadow
price of an additional unit x measured at time 0. To obtain the current value one simply
14Here, it makes sense to think of absolute market potential instead of fractions, so a neat interpretation
can be obtained by multiplying the value x by M.
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has to multiply the expression of interest by eRptq.
Let λ‹ denote the sales rate evaluated along the optimal control u‹ and the associated
optimal path x‹, i.e., λ‹ptq “ λpt, x‹ptq, u‹ptqq. Then, condition (3.8) implies the first
order conditions
BH
Bp pt, x
‹ptq, u‹ptq, κptqq “ e´Rptq pλ‹ptq ´ ελ‹ptqq ` κptqελ
‹ptq
p‹ptq
!“ 0, (3.13)
and, if w‹ptq ą 0,
BH
Bw pt, x
‹ptq, u‹ptq, κptqq “ e´Rptq
ˆ
δp‹ptq λ
‹ptq
w‹ptq ´ aw
‹ptqa´1
˙
´ κptqδ λ
‹ptq
w‹ptq
!“ 0. (3.14)
It follows directly from equation (3.13) that the optimal price must satisfy
p‹ptq “ ε
ε ´ 1e
Rptqκptq. (3.15)
In Chapter 2, the optimal price p˚ is a markup on the cost function cptq. Here, no
costs except the advertising cost are explicitly considered and the optimal price p‹ is a
markup on the opportunity cost represented by the future value of the adjoint variable,
the shadow price of one unit of x at time t. The size of the markup is still uniquely
determined by the value of the price elasticity. Rewriting equation (3.14) we obtain
w‹ptqa “ Δλ‹ptq
´
p‹ptq ´ eRptqκptq
¯ (3.15)“ Δ
ε ´ 1e
Rptqκptqλ‹ptq, (3.16)
where Δ “ δ{a is the advertising efficiency parameter. We assume 0 ď δ ă a, see below;
whenever the limit Δ Ñ 0 is considered, we keep the value of a ą 0 fixed and let δ Ñ 0.
If not otherwise specified, we always assume δ ą 0 and Δ ą 0. It is an immediate
consequence of (3.15) and (3.16) that an optimal pair pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq must satisfy the
dynamic Dorfman-Steiner relation (2.14):
w‹ptqa
p‹ptqλ‹ptq “
Δ
ε
. (3.17)
At each point in time it is optimal to keep the ratio of advertising spending to revenue
equal to the same constant. This relationship is not only true for every t pointwise. Also,
for the optimal control, the quotient of cumulative advertising cost and cumulative rev-
enue is constant. Hence, on any subinterval of r0, T s the cumulative optimal promotional
effort is a fraction of the optimal revenue, specifically,
şT
0 w
‹ptqadt “ Δε
şT
0 p
‹ptqλ‹ptqdt;
recall, 0 ă Δ ă 1 ă ε. Before we display explicit solution expressions of p‹, w‹, and
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other quantities of interest, we define the time-to-go potential Ap0q, the future potential
A, and the diffusion potential B. These potentials will enable us to formulate the so-
lution of our control problem in a convenient way. Note, the parameter restrictions are
identical to those in Chapter 2.
Definition 3.2.1 Let 1 ă ε ă ε, 0 ď δ ă a ă a, Δ “ δ{a, and γ “ ε´Δ1´Δ . Let T ą 0,
and let rptq ě 0 and μptq ą 0 be piecewise continuous functions on r0, T s. Let
ηptq :“ ε ´ ΔΔ
„ˆ
ε ´ 1
ε
˙ε Δ
ε ´ 1μptq
j 1
1´Δ
.
(a) We call Ap0qptq, t P r0, T s,
Ap0qptq :“ Ap0qpt, T q :“
Tż
t
e´γRpsqηpsqds, (3.18)
the time-to-go potential, and Aptq, t P r0, T s,
Aptq :“ Apt, T q :“ eγRptqAp0qpt, T q,
the future potential.
(b) Let the function ψ be differentiable and take only positive values on p0, x0q such
that ψpxq 1ε´1 is integrable on any subinterval p0, xq, 0 ă x ď x0. We define the
diffusion potential as
Bpxq :“ γ
γ ´ 1
xż
0
ψpzq 1ε´1 dz.
(c) Let Vˆ pt, xq denote the value function when x is the untapped market share at time
t, i.e.,
Vˆ pt, xq :“ sup
uPUpt,xq
$&
%eRptq
Tż
t
e´Rpsq pppsqλps, xpsq, upsqq ´ wpsqaq ds
,.
- . (3.19)
We call Vx0ptq the continuation value at time t when the initial value of the untapped
market share is x0 and an optimal control u‹ with associated path x‹ is applied from
time 0 to t, i.e.,
Vx0ptq “ Vˆ pt, x‹ptqq. (3.20)
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Remark 3.2.1 It follows from Definition 3.2.1 that ηptq ą 0 for all t P r0, T s; further-
more,
9Ap0qptq :“ BA
p0q
Bt ptq “ ´e
´γRptqηptq ă 0,
and, by simple algebra,
9Aptq :“ BABt ptq “ Aptq
˜
γrptq ` 9A
p0qptq
Ap0qptq
¸
.
Moreover,
B1pxq :“ BBBx pxq “
γ
γ ´ 1ψpxq
1
ε´1
is positive on p0, x0q. Hence, the inverse function of B exists, and it is strictly increasing.
If μptq ” μ and rptq ” r ą 0, then ηptq ” η, and
piq Ap0qpt, T q “ ηe´γrt 1 ´ e
´γrpT´tq
γr
Ñ
#
ηpT ´ tq, if r Ñ 0,
η
γre
´γrt, if T Ñ 8; (3.21)
piiq Apt, T q “ eγrtAp0qpt, T q Ñ
#
ηpT ´ tq, if r Ñ 0,
η
γr , if T Ñ 8.
(3.22)
With these preparations at hand, we are able to solve the problem of maximizing
Jpuq subject to (3.5). We will first present formulas of the optimal path and the optimal
control, see (3.23) to (3.25); the proof of these formulas is given on the following pages.
Theorem 3.2.1 Assume all conditions that underly Definition 3.2.1 hold. Then, the
optimally controlled process x‹ that satisfies (3.5) evolves according to the formula, 0 ď
t ď T ,
x‹ptq “ B´1
˜
Bpx0q A
p0qpt, T q
Ap0qp0, T q
¸
. (3.23)
The price p‹ and the advertising rate w‹ that maximize (3.6) subject to (3.5) are given
by, 0 ă t ă T ,
p‹ptq “ ε
ε ´ 1
˜
Ap0qp0, T q
Bpx0q
¸ 1
γ
eRptqψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1 , (3.24)
and
w‹ptq “
«
Δ
ε ´ Δ
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qp0, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
ηptqe´pγ´1qRptq
ff 1
a
. (3.25)
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Proof. First, we exploit the necessary optimality condition (3.9) to derive an expression
of the adjoint variable κptq in terms of the optimal path. Then, we make use of the
state equation (3.5) to derive an explicit solution expression for the optimal path x‹.
The optimal policies p‹ and w‹ will be deduced from (3.13) and the Dorfman-Steiner
relation. To verify that u‹ “ pp‹, w‹q is indeed optimal, we construct a function V ‹pt, xq
using the control u‹ and we show that V ‹pt, xq satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation, see below.
Throughout the proof we assume δ is positive, and thus Δ “ δ{a ą 0. The optimal
solution when advertising has no effect, i.e., when δ “ 0, can easily be deduced by
keeping a ą 0 constant and by letting δ converge to zero. In the following, we frequently
write ”p¨q” to indicate a generic argument of a function in order not to overburden the
notation and to concentrate on the important expressions. For the same reason, we
occasionally omit the time index t.
To derive an expression for the adjoint function (co-state trajectory) we will start by
looking at the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to x. By assumption, ψpxq is
differentiable on the open interval p0, x0q, see Definition 3.2.1. Hence, the demand rate
λ is also differentiable (with respect to x) on p0, x0q,
Bλ
Bxpt, x, p, wq “ μptqp
´εwδψ1pxq “ λpt, x, p, wqψ
1pxq
ψpxq ;
recall, ψpxq ą 0 on p0, x0q. Thus, the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to x,
x P p0, x0q, is given by
BH
Bx pt, x, u, κq “
´
e´Rptqp ´ κ
¯
λpt, x, uqψ
1pxq
ψpxq ; (3.26)
if, in addition, ψpxq ą 0 and ψ1pxq ‰ 0 at the initial value x “ x0 and at the value x “ 0,
then (3.26) is well defined on the closed interval r0, x0s. Formula (3.26) will be exploited
below.
A very special (extreme) control is wptq ” 0 for all t P p0, T q (together with an
arbitrary feasible price function). For any such control no sales will take place, and the
state remains in x0. On the other hand, since 9x “ ´λ ď 0, once an x trajectory hits
zero, it remains at 0. Let T1 denote the last point in time when a controlled process
satisfying the state equation (3.5) is in state x0, i.e.,
T1 :“ max tt |xptq “ x0, xptq satisfies (3.5), 0 ď t ď T u .
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Similarly, let T2 denote the first point in time a controlled process is at zero,
T2 :“ min tt |xptq “ 0, xptq satisfies (3.5), 0 ď t ď T u .
If no such value exists, we set T2 “ `8, and the (controlled) trajectory has a strictly pos-
itive value xpT q at time T . The values T1 and T2 are well defined, since, by assumption,
xptq is continuous and equals x0 at time 0.
First, let us assume T2 ď T . Then, by construction, x0 ą xptq ą 0 for all t P
pT1, T2q, and the derivative (3.26) holds for all t P pT1, T2q. Hence, condition (3.9),
9κptq “ ´BHBx pt, x‹ptq, u‹ptq, κptqq , implies that the adjoint function and the optimal path
x‹ satisfy the equations
9κptq “ ´
´
e´Rptqp‹ptq ´ κptq
¯
λ‹ptqψ
1px‹ptqq
ψpx‹ptqq
(3.15)“ ´κptqλ
‹ptq
ε ´ 1
ψ1 px‹ptqq
ψ px‹ptqq (3.27)
on the interval pT1, T2q. Since the state equation (3.5) holds true, the optimal sales rate
satisfies λ‹ptq “ ´ 9x‹ptq. Hence, the factor of κptq, see the second equation of (3.27), can
be rewritten as
´λ
‹ptq
ε ´ 1
ψ1 px‹ptqq
ψ px‹ptqq “
9x‹ptq
ε ´ 1
ψ1 px‹ptqq
ψ px‹ptqq “
B log
´
ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
¯
Bt .
Substituting this last expression for the factor in (3.27), and dividing by κ, we obtain
9κptq
κptq “
B log
´
ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
¯
Bt . (3.28)
Since 9κptq{κptq “ Bplog κptqqBt, integrating both sides of (3.28) from T1 to an arbitrary
t, T1 ă t ă T2, we get
logpκptqq “ log
´
ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
¯
` c1
“ log
´
ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
¯
` log pec1q
“ log
´
ec1ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
¯
.
Thus, applying the exponential function, on the interval pT1, T2q the adjoint function is
given by
κptq “ ec1ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1 . (3.29)
86
3.2 The Model
The function κ is positive on pT1, T2q, since ψ is positive on p0, x0q and x‹ptq P p0, x0q for
t P pT1, T2q. The value of the constant c1 is determined by the terminal conditions (3.10)
and (3.11), see below. According to (3.15) and (3.16), the optimal price satisfies p‹ptq “
ε
ε´1e
Rptqκptq and the optimal advertising rate satisfies w‹ptq “
”
Δ
ε´1e
Rptqκptqλ‹ptq
ı1{a
.
Evaluating the sales rate along pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq and the associated path x‹ptq on pT1, T2q,
we derive an expression for λ‹ptq which depends on the values of the optimal trajectory
x‹. Recall, Δ “ δ{a P p0, 1q, γ “ ε´Δ1´Δ , and γ´1γ “ ε´Δε´1 . Thus,
λ‹ptq “ μptqp‹ptq´εw‹ptqδψ px‹ptqq
“ μptq
ˆ
ε
ε ´ 1e
Rptqκptq
˙´ε ˆ Δ
ε ´ 1e
Rptqκptqλ‹ptq
˙Δ
ψ px‹ptqq
“
ˆ
ε ´ 1
ε
˙ε ˆ Δ
ε ´ 1
˙Δ
μptq
”
eRptqκptq
ı´pε´Δq
ψ px‹ptqqλ‹ptqΔ
“
ˆ
ε ´ 1
ε
˙ε Δ
ε ´ 1
ˆ
ε ´ 1
Δ
˙1´Δ
μptq
”
ec1`Rptqψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
ı´pε´Δq
ψ px‹ptqqλ‹ptqΔ
“
ˆ
Δ
ε ´ Δηptq
˙1´Δ ˆε ´ 1
Δ
˙1´Δ ´
ec1`Rptq
¯´pε´Δq
ψ px‹ptqq1´ ε´Δε´1 λ‹ptqΔ
“
ˆ
γ ´ 1
γ
ηptq
˙1´Δ ´
ec1`Rptq
¯´pε´Δq
ψ px‹ptqq´ 1´Δε´1 λ‹ptqΔ.
Note, λ‹ptq ą 0 and 0 ă Δ ă 1. Dividing by λ‹ptqΔ and taking the 1{p1 ´ Δq-th root
the sales rate associated with u‹ and x‹ equals, T1 ă t ă T2,
λ‹ptq “ γ ´ 1
γ
e´γpc1`Rptqqηptqψ px‹ptqq´ 1ε´1 . (3.30)
Since, see Remark 3.2.1, B1pxq “ γ
γ ´ 1ψpxq
1
ε´1 , and λ‹ptq “ ´ 9x‹ptq, equation (3.30) is
equivalent to
9x‹ptq “ ´e´c1γ e
´γRptqηptq
B1px‹ptqq . (3.31)
Since BBpx
‹ptqq
Bt “ B1px‹ptqq 9x‹ptq and 9Ap0qpt, T2q “ ´e´γRptqηptq, cf. Remark 3.2.1, multi-
plying (3.31) by B1px‹ptqq and integrating both sides of (3.31) with respect to t P rT1, T2s,
we obtain that x‹ satisfies the identity
Bpx‹ptqq “ e´c1γAp0qpt, T2q ` c2;
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the constant c2 will be determined below. By assumption, the function ψ is positive, it
is continuous on p0, x0q, and the inverse of B exists, cf. Remark 3.2.1. Thus, the optimal
path x‹ is given by
x‹ptq “ B´1
´
e´c1γAp0qpt, T2q ` c2
¯
. (3.32)
To determine the values of the constants c1 and c2, observe that Ap0qpT2, T2q “ 0. Since,
by definition, x‹pT2q “ 0, the constant c2 is determined by the equation B´1 pc2q “ 0.
Thus, c2 “ 0. The initial condition x‹pT1q “ x0 implies
x0 “ B´1
´
e´c1γAp0qpT1, T2q ` c2
¯
“ B´1
´
e´c1γAp0qpT1, T2q
¯
.
Solving this equation for c1 yields
c1 “ 1
γ
log
˜
Ap0qpT1, T2q
Bpx0q
¸
. (3.33)
Using the information that c2 is zero and that c1 is given by (3.33), it follows from (3.32)
that the optimal path on rT1, T2s equals
x‹ptq “ B´1
˜
Bpx0q A
p0qpt, T2q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
¸
. (3.34)
From (3.29) and (3.33) we derive that, on the interval pT1, T2q, the adjoint variable is
κptq “
˜
Ap0qpT1, T2q
Bpx0q
¸ 1
γ
ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1 . (3.35)
Formula (3.35) combined with (3.15) implies that an optimal price function is given by
p‹ptq “ ε
ε ´ 1
˜
Ap0qpT1, T2q
Bpx0q
¸ 1
γ
eRptqψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1 . (3.36)
Substituting the right-hand side of (3.33) for c1 in equation (3.30), we obtain the fol-
lowing formula for the optimal sales rate, T1 ă t ă T2,
λ‹ptq “ γ ´ 1
γ
Bpx0q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
e´γRptqηptq
ψ px‹ptqq 1ε´1
“ ´ 9A
p0qpt, T2q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
Bpx0q
B1px‹ptqq . (3.37)
By making use of the Dorfman-Steiner relation, we obtain the following formula for the
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optimal advertising (cost) rate, T1 ă t ă T2,
w‹ptqa “ Δ
ε ´ Δ
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
˙ γ´1
γ
ηptqe´pγ´1qRptq. (3.38)
The formula for the optimal control and the formula for the associated sales rate are
defined on the open interval pT1, T2q, 0 ď T1 ď T2 ď T . We will now show that for the
optimal control T1 “ 0 and T2 “ T . To do so, we compute the value of the objective
function Jpu‹;T1, T2, x0q; in the second line of the following transformations we exploit
the Dorfman-Steiner relation and, afterwards, use (3.38) and Definition 3.2.1:
Jpu‹;T1, T2, x0q “
T2ż
T1
e´Rptq rp‹ptqλ‹ptq ´ w‹ptqas dt
“
T2ż
T1
e´Rptq
” ε
Δw
‹ptqa ´ w‹ptqa
ı
dt
“
T2ż
T1
e´Rptq ε ´ ΔΔ
Δ
ε ´ Δ
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
˙ γ´1
γ
ηptqe´pγ´1qRptqdt
“
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
˙ γ´1
γ
T2ż
T1
e´γRptqηptqdt
“
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qpT1, T2q
˙ γ´1
γ
Ap0qpT1, T2q
“ Ap0qpT1, T2q
1
γ Bpx0q
γ´1
γ .
Since ηptq is positive on the interval r0, T s, the function Ap0qpT1, T2q “
şT2
T1
e´γRptqηptqdt
is decreasing in T1, and it is increasing in T2, 0 ď T1 ď T2 ď T . Hence, Jpu‹;T1, T2, x0q
attains its largest value at T1 “ 0 and T2 “ T .
So far we only analyzed the scenario x‹pT q “ 0, and we showed that among all controls
such that x‹pT2q “ 0 the one where T2 “ T maximizes the objective. However, we also
have to analyze the scenario where the terminal state is strictly positive. If x‹pT q ą 0,
the preceding analysis holds true on the semi-open interval pT1, T s. Note, ψpxq and
ψ1pxq are well defined at x “ x‹pT q ą 0 and, according to (3.29), we can evaluate κptq
at t “ T . Condition (3.10) requires that
x‹pT qκpT q “ x‹pT qec1ψ px‹pT qq 1ε´1 “ 0. (3.39)
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By assumption, x‹pT q, ψpx‹pT qq, and κpT q are positive. These facts contradict (3.39).
Hence, a control such that x‹pT q ą 0 can not be optimal, and the scenario x‹pT q “ 0 is
the only feasible one. Formulas (3.23) to (3.25) of Theorem 3.2.1 follow from equations
(3.34), (3.36), and (3.38) by setting T1 “ 0 and T2 “ T .
Up to now, we only showed that p‹, w‹, and the associated path x‹, cf. (3.23) to (3.25),
satisfy the necessary optimality conditions. To prove that the open-loop control u‹ “ u‹x0
is optimal when maximizing (3.6) with the initial data p0, x0q, we will show the following:
for any pair pt, xq, 0 ă t ă T, x P R, there exists an initial value y0 “ y0pt, xq such
that V ‹pt, xq :“ J `u‹y0 ; t, T, y0pt, xq˘ satisfies a (particular) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation, see below. Moreover, we will verify that the values u‹ptq “ u‹x0ptq coincide
with the argmax values of the right-hand side of that HJB-equation.
To this end, let us assume that the system starting in x0 is in state x‹ptq at time
t P r0, T q and that the control u‹ has been applied. The continuation value V ‹x0ptq, cf.
(3.20), is given by
V ‹x0ptq :“
Tż
t
e´Rpsq pp‹psqλ‹psq ´ w‹psqaq ds
“
Tż
t
e´Rpsq
´ ε
Δw
‹psqa ´ w‹psqa
¯
ds
“
Tż
t
e´Rpsq ε ´ ΔΔ
Δ
ε ´ Δ
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qp0, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
ηpsqe´pγ´1qRpsqds
“
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qp0, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
Tż
t
e´γRpsqηpsqds
“
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qp0, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
Ap0qpt, T q; (3.40)
in the second line we make use of the Dorfman-Steiner relation (3.17). Note, V ‹x0ptq is
given in terms of time zero dollars, and x‹ptq, assumed to be optimal, is given by formula
(3.23). Hence, in (3.40), we can replace Bpx0q by Bpx‹ptqqAp0qp0,T qAp0qpt,T q . Thus,
V ‹x0ptq “
ˆ
Bpx‹ptqq
Ap0qpt, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
Ap0qpt, T q “ Ap0qpt, T q 1γ Bpx‹ptqq γ´1γ . (3.41)
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By a proper choice of the initial value x0, we find our qualified guess of a function
V ‹pt, xq for any pair pt, xq, 0 ď t ď T , 0 ď x ď x0. To be precise, if pt, xq is given,
then choose x0 such that x‹pt;x0q “ x, where x‹pt;x0q is given by (3.23). Observe,
see (3.23), B px‹ptqq Ap0qp0,T q
Ap0qpt,T q “ Bpx0q ðñ x0 “ B´1
´
B px‹ptqq Ap0qp0,T q
Ap0qpt,T q
¯
. Thus,
V ‹pt, xq “ Ap0qpt, T q 1γ Bpxq γ´1γ ; notice that V ‹pt, 0q “ V ‹pT, xq “ 0 for all 0 ď t ď T ,
0 ď x ď x0. Moreover, V ‹ is differentiable in t and x, where
9V ‹pt, xq “ BV
‹
Bt pt, xq “
1
γ
9Ap0qptq
ˆ
Bpxq
Ap0qptq
˙ γ´1
γ
and
V ‹1pt, xq “ BV
‹
Bx pt, xq “
˜
Ap0qptq
Bpxq
¸ 1
γ
ψpxq 1ε´1 . (3.42)
Next, we will show that for all pt, xq, 0 ă t ď T, 0 ă x ď x0, V ‹pt, xq satisfies the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
0 “ 9V ‹pt, xq ` max
uPUpt,xq

H
`
t, x, u, V ‹1pt, xq˘( . (3.43)
For any t and x, 0 ă t ď T, 0 ă x ď x0, let u0 “
`
p0, w0
˘ “ `p0pt, xq, w0pt, xq˘ denote
a control maximizing H
`
t, x, u, V ‹1pt, xq˘ and let λ0 :“ λ0pt, xq be the associated sales
rate. The expressions of p0 and w0 are identical to the right-hand side of p‹ and w‹ with
V ‹1pt, xq instead of κptq, i.e.,
p0pt, xq “ ε
ε ´ 1e
RptqV ‹1pt, xq, (3.44)
and
w0pt, xqa “ Δ
ε ´ 1e
RptqV ‹1pt, xqλ0pt, xq.
Elementary but lengthy calculations show that
w0pt, xqa “ Δ
ε ´ Δηptq
”
eRptqV ‹1pt, xq
ı´pγ´1q
ψpxq 11´Δ . (3.45)
Moreover, u0 satisfies the dynamic Dorfman-Steiner relation, i.e.,
p0pt, xqλ0pt, xq “ εΔw
0pt, xqa ô λ0pt, xq “ εΔ
w0pt, xqa
p0pt, xq . (3.46)
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Using (3.44) and (3.46) the maximized Hamiltonian function H0pt, xq can be written as
H0pt, xq “ H `t, x, u0pt, xq, V ‹1pt, xq˘
“ e´Rptq “p0pt, xqλ0pt, xq ´ w0pt, xqa‰ ´ V ‹1pt, xqλ0pt, xq
“ e´Rptq
” ε
Δw
0pt, xqa ´ w0pt, xqa
ı
´ V ‹1pt, xq εΔ
w0pt, xqa
p0pt, xq
“ ε ´ ΔΔ e
´Rptqw0pt, xqa ´ V ‹1pt, xq εΔ
w0pt, xqa
ε
ε´1eRptqV ‹
1pt, xq
“
ˆ
ε ´ Δ
Δ ´
ε ´ 1
Δ
˙
e´Rptqw0pt, xqa
“ 1 ´ ΔΔ e
´Rptqw0pt, xqa. (3.47)
Next, in (3.47) we replace w0pt, xqa by the right-hand side of (3.45). Finally, if we use
(3.42) and the fact that 9Ap0qptq “ ´e´γRptqηptq, cf. Remark 3.2.1, we obtain
H0pt, xq “ 1 ´ ΔΔ e
´Rptq Δ
ε ´ Δηptq
”
eRptqV ‹1pt, xq
ı´pγ´1q
ψpxq 11´Δ
“ 1 ´ Δ
ε ´ Δe
´γRptqηptq
»
–˜Ap0qptq
Bpxq
¸ 1
γ
ψpxq 1ε´1
fi
fl
´pγ´1q
ψpxq 11´Δ
“ 1
γ
e´γRptqηptq
ˆ
Bpxq
Ap0qptq
˙ γ´1
γ
ψpxq 11´Δ ´ γ´1ε´1
“ ´1
γ
9Ap0qptq
ˆ
Bpxq
Ap0qptq
˙ γ´1
γ
“ ´ 9V ‹pt, xq.
Thus, V ‹pt, xq satisfies the HJB equation (3.43) and hence u‹, cf. (3.24) and (3.25), is
an optimal control. 
In the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 we have derived several useful results that we summarize
in the next paragraphs. The sales rate associated with the optimal control - the optimally
controlled adoption process - is given by (3.37), where T1 “ 0 and T2 “ T . Formula
(3.40) is the continuation value at time t, discounted to time t “ 0, if the untapped
initial market share is x0 and the optimal control u‹ is applied. Thus, the maximal
value of the objective function (3.6) is given by Jpu‹; 0, T, x0q “ V ‹p0, x0q. The optimal
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continuation value Vx0ptq in terms of time t dollars was defined in Definition 3.2.1.
Accordingly, formula (3.50) is easily obtained by multiplying the last line of (3.40) by
the growth factor eRptq.
Corollary 3.2.1 The sales rate λ‹ associated with the optimal control pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq, cf.
Theorem 3.2.1, is given by
λ‹ptq “ λ pt, x‹ptq, u‹ptqq “ ´ 9A
p0qpt, T q
Ap0qp0, T q
Bpx0q
B1px‹ptqq . (3.48)
The optimal value J‹pT, x0q :“ Jpu‹; 0, T, x0q is given by
J‹pT, x0q “
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qp0, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
, (3.49)
and the optimal continuation value by
Vx0ptq “ eRptqAp0qpt, T q
ˆ
Bpx0q
Ap0qp0, T q
˙ γ´1
γ
. (3.50)
An important implication of Theorem 3.2.1 is that the whole market (share) will be
tapped, i.e., x‹pT q “ 0, if T is finite. Moreover, as shown in the proof of Theorem
3.2.1, it is optimal to control the sales process such that the optimal path will hit zero
for the first time at time T .15 This property is a consequence of the special (isoelastic)
demand rate and the fact that prices can be set arbitrarily low. It is possible to gain
large shares of the market in a short time interval by setting appropriate prices. In
particular, if ψpxq tends to zero should x Ñ x0, then the optimal price converges to
zero and the optimal adoption rate should tend to `8; the same holds true if, for
x Ñ 0, the value of ψpxq tends to zero. Both characteristics can be observed in many
applications for particular adoption processes, for example, ψMansfieldpxq “ Γxp1 ´ xq
or ψvB “ Γ1´θ
”
p1 ´ xqθ ´ p1 ´ xq
ı
, cf. Section 3.1 and Section 3.3. Note, the optimal
advertising rate w‹ does only depend on the diffusion potential Bpx0q but does not
depend on the current value of x‹ptq.
In the verification step of the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 we solve the HJB equation
(3.43) for our - now verified - guess. We obtain Vˆ pt, xq, the value function in terms of
time t dollars, by multiplying V ‹pt, xq by eRptq. The control uˆ is the solution to the
maximization problem which is part of (3.43). Therefore, u0 is the optimal control in
feedback form.
15Note, the term Ap0qpt, T q in the expression of the optimal path, cf. (3.23), will only be zero at
t “ T ă 8, see Definition 3.2.1 and parameter restrictions therein.
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Theorem 3.2.2 Assume all conditions that underly Definition 3.2.1 hold. Then, the
value function Vˆ is given by, 0 ď t ă T , 0 ă x ď x0,
Vˆ pt, xq “ Aptq 1γ Bpxq γ´1γ . (3.51)
The optimal price pˆ and the optimal advertising rate wˆ that satisfy (3.19) are given by
pˆpt, xq “ ε
ε ´ 1
ˆ
Aptq
Bpxq
˙ 1
γ
ψpxq 1ε´1 (3.52)
and
wˆpt, xq “
«
Δ
ε ´ Δηptq
ˆ
Bpxq
Aptq
˙ γ´1
γ
ff 1
a
. (3.53)
The sales rate λˆ associated with the optimal feedback policy is given by
λˆpt, xq “ ηptq
Aptq
Bpxq
ψpxq “ ´
9Ap0qptq
Ap0qptq
Bpxq
B1pxq . (3.54)
Proof. By the definition of Apt, T q, cf. Definition 3.2.1,
Apt, T q 1γ “
´
eγRptqAp0qpt, T q
¯ 1
γ “ eRptqAp0qpt, T q 1γ .
Thus, formula (3.51) follows from evaluating Vˆ pt, xq “ eRptqV ‹pt, xq. The optimal price
in feedback form is given by (3.36). Replacing V ‹1pt, xq by the right-hand side of (3.42)
we obtain (3.52). Similarly, the optimal advertising rate wˆ is the result from substituting
V ‹1pt, xq in (3.38). The adoption rate associated with uˆ “ ppˆ, wˆq follows by making use
of the Dorfman-Steiner relation (3.46), λˆpt, xq “ εΔ wˆpt,xq
a
pˆpt,xq and the fact that
ηptq
Aptq “
e´γRptqηptq
e´γRptqAptq “ ´
9Ap0qptq
Ap0qptq ,
cf. Remark 3.2.1. 
Remark 3.2.2 In the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, the value of the policy u0pt, xq is given
in terms of time t dollars, whereas the guess of the value function V ‹pt, xq is given in
terms of time zero dollars; note, the discount factor in the Hamiltonian at time t is
e´Rptq. The quantities Vˆ pt, xq, pˆpt, xq, wˆpt, xq, and λˆpt, xq in Theorem 3.2.2 are given in
terms of the future potential Aptq. The quantities associated with the optimal open-loop
control in Theorem 3.2.1, however, depend on the time-to-go potential Ap0qptq. Since
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Aptq “ eγRptqAp0qptq one can easily switch between both representations.
The solution formulas in both Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are of separable form: the
expressions Ap0q and A only depend on the time (to go) while B and ψ only depend
on the value of the untapped market share. The interest rate and the function μ are
responsible for the dynamics of the advertising rate, see, for instance, equation (3.25): if
rptq ” r, and if μptq ” μ so that ηptq ” η, it is optimal to advertise at a constant rate.
The evolution of the optimal prices over time explicitly depends on the function ψ. The
formula of the optimal feedback policy implies that the optimal price is proportional to
Vˆ 1. Taking the derivative one can easily verify
pˆpt, xq “ ε
ε ´ 1 Vˆ
1pt, xq. (3.55)
The optimal advertising rate wˆ is proportional to 9ˆV and satisfies the equation
wˆpt, xq “
«
Δ
ε ´ Δηptq
Vˆ pt, xq
Aptq
ff 1
a
“
ˆ
Δ
1 ´ Δ
ηptq
9Aptq
9ˆ
V pt, xq
˙ 1
a
. (3.56)
The optimal control in open-loop form and the optimal control in feedback form have
similar properties. The optimal price is a markup on the marginal value of an addi-
tional unit of inventory at time t; the advertising effort follows the arrival intensity μ.
According to equation (2.18) in Chapter 2,
ν˚ptq “ e´Rptq 1 ´ ΔptqΔptq w
˚ptqaptq,
the optimal profit margin is proportional to the advertising spending, where the size of
the proportionality factor is determined by the value of the advertising efficiency Δ. It
is interesting to note that the value of the Hamiltonian (the net contribution in terms
of present value to the objective at time t) is of the same form as ν˚, cf. (3.47). Despite
the differences between the problems considered in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 - a state
dependent demand rate, deteriorating effects, a free or given initial inventory value, and
so on - the present values of the profit rates ν˚ and H0 have very similar characteristics:
both are proportional to the optimal advertising spending multiplied by the factor 1´ΔΔ .
Similarly, we can rewrite the continuation value and the value function at time t in terms
of the advertising effort. Elementary calculations show that
Vx0ptq “ ε ´ ΔΔ
Aptq
ηptq w
‹ptqa (3.57)
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and
Vˆ pt, xq “ ε ´ ΔΔ
Aptq
ηptq wˆpt, xq
a. (3.58)
Written this way, we see that the total value at time t depends on the current advertising
effort w‹ptqa and wˆpt, xqa, and three factors: the first factor ε´ΔΔ can be interpreted as
the weight of the influence of price-advertising-effects. This factor increases in ε and
decreases in Δ. This dependence is somewhat counterintuitive; one would expect the
profit to decrease in the price elasticity ε and to increase in the advertising efficiency
Δ. However, since both parameters show up in the factors η, A, and the advertising
costs, it is not possible to prove general statements about how the values (3.57) and
(3.58) depend on ε and Δ.16 The second factor of the product on the right-hand side
of (3.58) is the ratio of the future potential and the value of the parameter function η.
In the time-homogeneous case (r ” 0 and μptq ” μ), this ratio equals Aptq{η “ T ´ t,
i.e., the second factor equals the time-to-go. Since in this particular setting, cf. (3.24)
and (3.52), the optimal advertising rate is constant, the (net) value of the problem is
given by the time-to-go times current (constant) advertising spending, multiplied by the
factor ε´ΔΔ .
In Chapter 4, we will solve the problem how to choose the cycle length and the initial
inventory assuming the control given in Theorem 3.2.1 is used. With regard to the
analysis that follows in Chapter 4, we like to point out that the value function Vˆ is
a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas function in terms of the potentials A and B. Moreover,
there are special cases when the value function at time zero takes the form Vˆ p0, xq “
const ¨T 1γ x γ´1γ , such that T and x can be directly interpreted as the sales or production
time and the sales or production volume, c.f. Section 4.3.
All formulas and expressions hold true for positive values T . Moreover, we will deduce
the optimal policies and associated values in the time-homogeneous setting if the time
horizon is infinite, i.e., we assume rptq ” r, ηptq ” η, and T Ñ 8. For the open-loop
representation as well as for the feedback form of the optimal policies we will indicate
the most relevant characteristics of the infinite horizon model by a ’8’ subscript. Since
lim
tÑ8 Aptq “
η
γr , cf. Remark 3.2.1, the feedback policies will only depend on the current
state, and not on time.
Corollary 3.2.2 Take Definition 3.2.1, and let rptq ” r ą 0, ηptq ” η. Consider the
infinite horizon problem, i.e., let T Ñ 8 in Definition 3.2.1. Then, the optimal state
16See Helmes et al. (2013), Table 1, for the case where ψ is a power function.
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process evolves according to the formula
x‹8ptq “ B´1
`
e´γrtBpx0q
˘
. (3.59)
The optimal open-loop controls are given by
p‹8ptq “ εε ´ 1
ˆ
γr
η
Bpx0q
˙´ 1
γ
ertψpx‹8ptqq
1
ε´1 , (3.60)
and
w‹8ptq “
«
Δ
1 ´ Δr
ˆ
η
γr
˙ 1
γ
Bpx0q
γ´1
γ e´pγ´1qrt
ff 1
a
. (3.61)
The optimal controls in feedback form are
pˆ8pxq “ ε
ε ´ 1
ˆ
γr
η
Bpxq
˙´ 1
γ
ψpxq 1ε´1 , (3.62)
and
wˆ8pxq “
«
Δ
1 ´ Δr
ˆ
η
γr
˙ 1
γ
Bpxq γ´1γ
ff 1
a
. (3.63)
The sales rates (in open-loop form and in closed-loop form) associated with the optimal
controls are given by
λ‹8ptq “ γr Bpx0qB1px‹ptqq and λˆ8pxq “ γr
Bpxq
B1pxq . (3.64)
The optimal continuation value and the value function are
V8ptq “
ˆ
η
γr
˙ 1
γ
Bpx0q
γ´1
γ e´pγ´1qrt and Vˆ8pxq “
ˆ
η
γr
˙ 1
γ
Bpxq γ´1γ . (3.65)
The infinite horizon problem is of special interest as it (approximately) models the
situation of a product or industry life cycle. Prominent classical examples include, e.g.,
the market of black-white TV and analog photography. The finite horizon problem
reflects the situation when a product is only available for a certain (and predefined)
time and is then superseded by a new model. For example, in the automobile industry
this is the situation when a new model of a particular car is introduced; in the movie
industry, the horizon is the (fixed) time between sequels of a successful film series. In
Chapter 4, we address the problem how to choose the cycle length and the capacity such
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that the present value of the total profit is maximized. Formula (3.65) in Corollary 3.2.2
yields (at least) an upper bound on the value of the (optimal) capacity x if the sales
horizon (cycle length) is very large.
We conclude this section by some remarks concerning the results obtained so far.
The detailed analysis and illustration of the results is given in Section 3.3, where we
consider a particular example of a system function ψ, the von Bertalanffy adoption rate.
We also refer to Helmes et al. (2013) for other examples and particular model settings,
specifically, the analysis of the controlled Bass model.
Remark 3.2.3 Assume all hypotheses which underlie Theorem 3.2.1 and Theorem 3.2.2
hold. The following facts are important.
• Optimal prices are dynamic, except for the special case when ψpxq ” const and
rptq ” 0.
• Optimal discounted prices e´Rptqp‹ptq decrease (increase) over time if ψ increases
(decreases) monotonically in x. If ψ monotonically decreases in x, it is optimal
to increase the nominal prices p‹ptq over time; a market penetration strategy is
optimal.
• The arrival intensity μptq determines the optimal price level via the time-to-go
potential. However, fluctuations of the μ function are not reflected in the dynamic
of the price process.
• It is optimal to set the advertising spending at time t proportional to the value
of ηptq, i.e., fluctuations of the arrival intensity are reflected by the advertising
spending.
• If the arrival intensity μptq is multiplied by a factor α ą 0, the expressions for the
optimal advertising effort, the continuation value and the value function have to
be multiplied by the factor α
1
γ .
• If μptq ” μ and rptq ” 0, positive respectively, then the optimal advertising rate is
constant, decreasing respectively, over time.
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3.3 Controlled von Bertalanffy Models
We now consider the system function ψ to be of the von Bertalanffy type, see (3.3). In
a von Bertalanffy model, the innovation channel (the external influence) is shut down.
Thus, in the uncontrolled von Bertalanffy model, the initial value must be different from
one since otherwise no adoptions occur and the state process remains at its initial value,
cf. Section 3.1. In the controlled von Bertalanffy model, price and advertising decisions
(and the arrival intensity) influence the adoption rate. The solution formula of x‹ for
general ψ functions, cf. Theorem 3.2.2, implies that the optimal process drifts away
from its initial state x0 even though x0 “ 1. The reason for this behavior is that if
x is close to 1 (or 0), ψvBpxq “ φvBp1 ´ yq tends to zero such that the optimal price
tends to 0: in formula (3.24) for the optimal price the term ψpx‹ptqqp1{pε´1qq appears
in the denominator, ε ą 1. Hence, the associated sales rate becomes very large and
tends to `8. Note, if x0 ă 1, the von Bertalanffy system function is strictly positive on
p0, x0s, and the expressions for the optimal control and associated sales rate can also be
evaluated at t “ 0.
The von Bertalanffy model lacks the external influence which has to be compensated
by zero prices if x0 “ 1. It is common practice that the producer of a new product
provides some copies of its product for free to magazines or test buyers to essentially
create such an external influence. An alternative might be to raffle off a handful of items
as part of a promotion campaign taking place before the actual sales period begins.17
Hence, one can think of x0 being relatively close to 1, e.g., x0 “ 0.99, the value 0.99
indicates that still 99 percent of the market needs to be taken. In equation (3.3), the
quantity y is the actual fractional market share. Since we consider the state xptq to
represent the untapped (fractional) market share at time t, the system function of the
von Bertalanffy adoption model is given by, 0 ď x ď 1,
ψpxq “ ψvBpxq “ φvBp1 ´ yq “ Γ1 ´ θ
”
p1 ´ xqθ ´ p1 ´ xq
ı
. (3.66)
Recall, if θ “ 2, the uncontrolled model reduces to the Mansfield model and, in case
θ Ñ 1, ψvB becomes the Gompertz curve ψpxq “ Γ p1´xq logp1{p1´xqq, cf. Section 3.1.
Due to the multiplicative demand structure, the coefficient Γ simply acts as a scaling
factor that can be assigned to the function μ. From this point of view one can interpret
the coefficient Γ as a (modified) response constant. In what follows, we assume Γ ” 1
and capture influences such as the basic demand level or a response constant by the μ
17In the context of Chapter 4, where optimal cycle length and capacity decisions are considered, these
associated cost are captured by the fixed setup cost k.
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function, see below. The second parameter of ψ, θ, captures the imitation behavior of
customers. If the θ value is small, the influence p1 ´ xqθ of the customers who already
adopted the product is relatively strong compared to the case of a large θ value.18 Hence,
from a retailer’s or producer’s point of view a market situation with a small value of θ is
favorable as early adopters attract more buyers, the demand increases, higher prices can
be charged and profits can be realized earlier. Technically, the benefit from a small θ
value can be seen by considering the continuation value Vx0ptq, cf. equation (3.50), which
is an increasing function of the diffusion potential Bpxq “ γ{pγ ´ 1q şx0 ψpzq1{pε´1qdz. It
follows from elementary calculus that the value of ψpxq strictly decreases in θ for every
fixed x P p0, 1q. Hence, the value of the diffusion potential decreases in θ too. Thus,
ceteris paribus, a larger value of θ goes along with a smaller continuation value.
The value of the optimal advertising rate in the open-loop representation also decreases
in θ since this value only depends on the system function via the diffusion potential of
the initial inventory and not on the current level of the inventory, Corollary 3.2.1. Thus,
the faster non-adopters are influenced by adopters, i.e., the larger the θ value, the larger
the benefit from additional promotion.19 The dependence of the optimal price and the
sales rate associated with the optimal control on θ is less obvious. For the optimal
sales rate it is particularly interesting to ask how integrating control variables into the
model influences the structural properties like symmetry and the location of the point of
inflection (compared to the uncontrolled von Bertalanffy model, cf. Section 3.1). In the
following, we consider specific parameter settings to analyze and illustrate characteristics
of the controlled von Bertalanffy model.
First, we assume a finite time horizon (T ă 8), a time-homogeneous arrival intensity
(μ ” const), and no discounting (r “ 0). In this market situation, it is optimal to
advertise at a constant level, see (3.25) and Remark 3.2.3. Panel paq of Figure 3.3 shows
the optimal price paths for different values of θ. If θ “ 0, a price skimming strategy
is optimal throughout the whole sales period: prices start at their highest level and
decrease continuously. This property is not surprising since, in this particular case,
ψpxq “ Γx, and the imitation effect decreases together with the untapped market share
over time.20 Note, in all plots in this section we assume x0 “ 0.99. Since ψvBpx0q ą 0,
18For example, if x “ 1{2 and θ “ 1{10 the value of the expression ψp1{2q “ Γ1{2
”
p1{2q1{10 ´ 1{2
ı
“
Γ
`?
2 ´ 1˘ « 0.41Γ is larger than ψp1{2q “ Γ´1 “p1{2q2 ´ 1{2‰ “ Γ {4 if θ “ 2, the Mansfield model.
Naturally, the effect of a particular θ value depends heavily on the value of x.
19Actually, one could argue contrarily: due to the higher demand if the θ value is small, the promotional
effort can be reduced. In fact, the optimal price policy and the associated sales rates induce that it
is profitable to support the fast adoption by additional adverting spending, cf. below.
20Effectively, in this case the system function represents an external effect of innovation, cf. the Bass
adoption rate if Ω “ 1 and Γ “ 0.
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this assumption implies that the (optimal) control and associated values of interest can
be evaluated at t “ 0. When θ takes a strictly positive value, it is optimal to apply
a price penetration policy at the beginning of the sales period, i.e., the optimal prices
increase monotonically up to some point in time Tp‹ ; from that point on price skimming
is optimal for the rest of the sales period. The value of Tp‹ increases in θ; it equals 0
if θ “ 0 and tends to T if θ becomes large, see Proposition 3.3.1 below. In the model
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Figure 3.3: Controlled von Bertalanffy model: optimal price trajectories (a) and optimal sales
rates (b) as functions of time t P r0, T s for different θ values and a constant μ function;
x0 “ 0.99, T “ 20, μptq “ 25, ε “ 2,Δ “ 0.5, r “ 0, Γ “ 1.
for general ψ functions, cf. Section 3.2, if T is finite and ψ is positive on p0, x0q, an
implication of the optimal control is that the whole market potential will be captured
at time T , i.e., x‹pT q “ 0. In particular, the von Bertalanffy system function fulfills this
property, moreover, ψvBp0q “ 0 and is strictly concave, see the proof of Proposition 3.3.1
below. The optimal price p‹ tends to zero towards the end of the sales period when the
untapped market share values are small. To be precise, the optimal price process is of
the form p‹ptq “ const ¨ ψvB px‹ptqq 1ε´1 , cf. equation (3.24). Thus, the dynamics of p‹ptq
are due to changes in the controlled process x‹ptq. The adoption rates associated with
the optimal controls are depicted in panel (b) of Figure 3.3 for the same θ values as in
panel (a); colors coincide. Recall, since μ is constant and the interest rate is zero the
optimal advertising rate is constant. Thus, the dynamic in the sales process is due to the
dynamic of the price process and the influence of the system function only. Consequently,
the sales rates λ‹ show an inverse behavior compared to the optimal price paths due to
the negative exponent ´ε of the price factor in the sales rate. In the extreme case θ “ 0
the sales rate monotonically increases since it is optimal to use a price skimming strategy
on the interval r0, T q. For nonzero values of θ the plots of the controlled adoption rate
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show a bathtub shape. If θ is small, the bathtub is skewed to the left; if θ is large, it is
skewed to the right. In case θ “ 2, the controlled Mansfield model, the sales rate - and
also the optimal price paths - are almost21 symmetric around Tp‹ « T {2.
One can certainly imagine price paths to follow the behavior as depicted in panel (a)
of Figure 3.3 (especially if θ is small). In the context of a new product or technology,
however, it is less likely to observe an adoption rate as shown above. Increasing sales
rates at the end of the planning horizon are due to declining prices which are set so low
at the end of the sales period to acquire the final market shares. In practice, clearance
sales are often treated separately from the original planning schedule. For such an
application-oriented pricing model in the context of retailing see, for example, Smith
(2009). The controlled von Bertalanffy model is not supposed to explain all empirical
characteristics of sales rates at any point in time, especially not close to the end of the
adoption horizon.22 Also the rapid decline of the sales rate at the beginning if θ is
nonzero, can usually not be expected for a new product. In Figure 3.3, we assume μ to
be constant, a fact which is suitable to illustrate the impact of θ on the quantities of
interest. In general, however, it is natural to assume a dynamic arrival intensity over
a product’s life cycle. Figure 3.4 shows optimal price trajectories and the associated
sales rates for a parametrized class of μ-functions where μ varies over times. Bemmaor
(1994) has proposed to mix special densities to capture a buyer’s propensity to buy and
he derives a density of first purchase times across all potential buyers. We use slightly
modified elements of this class of parametrized density functions as our μ-functions. In
particular, we consider a shifted version of equation p6q in Bemmaor (1994) and assume
μptq “ μ0
˜
μ1 ` μbp1 ` μβqe
´μbpt`μsq`
1 ` μβe´μbpt`μsq
˘2
¸
, (3.67)
where the subscripts b and β correspond to the parameters used by Bemmaor. We
introduce the additional parameters μs (shift), μ1 (minimum demand) and the scaling
parameter μ0 in order to fit the μ function to our needs. Note, in this formulation the
parameter μ0 captures the response constant and general level effects. In Figure 3.4,
we choose the parameter values in such way that the time-to-go potential Ap0qp0q is
approximately equal to the potential of the constant μ scenario considered in Figure 3.3.
In other words: the overall buying interest is similar in both scenarios but differs in the
21Due to the initial value x0 “ 0.99 the symmetry is not perfect.
22A possibility to adopt the model at hand for real applications is to assume a large value of T and to
consider the sales horizon only until some point in time before T . The remaining sales period can
then be modeled separately, e.g., by a clearance pricing model.
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concrete time pattern.23 The pattern of the optimal price process remains the same as in
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Figure 3.4: Controlled von Bertalanffy model: optimal price controls (a) and optimal sales rates
(b) at time t P r0, T s for different θ values if μ follows (3.67); x0 “ 0.99, T “ 20, μ0 “
280, μ1 “ 0.001, μb “ 0.6, μβ “ 4, μs “ ´5, ε “ 2,Δ “ 0.5, r “ 0, Γ “ 1.
the time-homogeneous setting: if θ ą 0, prices increase until Tp‹ (penetration strategy)
and then decrease monotonically (skimming strategy). However, in contrast to the case
where μ is constant, the price drop is more dramatic, especially if θ is small. If θ tends
to zero, optimal prices are more or less constant at the beginning of the sales period and
then show the typical decline.
Similar to the case when μ is constant, the optimal price level decreases in θ - the
less persistent the word of mouth effect is, the more customers have to be convinced
by lower prices. If θ “ 2 (the Mansfield model), the optimal price trajectory is still
(almost) symmetric around Tp‹ . However, compared to the scenario when μ is constant,
the optimal price reaches its peak earlier. Moreover, Tp‹ coincides with the point in time
when the arrival intensity peaks. In the context of adoption processes, the adoption rate
associated with the optimal price and advertising control24, see panel (b) of Figure 3.4,
shows a pattern that looks more familiar than the rates depicted in panel (b) of Figure
3.3. The rate of adoption starts at a relatively low level, and then livens up following
the increase in the arrival rate μptq, and is further amplified by the word of mouth effect.
If θ “ 2, the point of inflection coincides with the point in time where the μ function
peaks (around 7.3). The point of inflection is shifted to the left if θ ą 2, and it is shifted
23We refrain from presenting a plot of the μ function here as its shape essentially follows the sales rate
when θ “ 2 (green line) in panel (b) of Figure 3.4. The μ function takes the value μp0q « 2.8, peaks
at 7.3 where it takes the approximate value of 52.8, and decreases until μpT q « 0.4.
24Recall, the optimal advertising control co-moves with the function μptq, cf. equation (3.25) and the
definition of ηptq in Definition 3.2.1.
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to right if θ ă 2. Whenever θ takes a large value (low word of mouth influence), sales
are pushed by setting lower prices at the beginning since lower prices stimulate early
adoption. If the force of imitation is strong (a small θ value, θ ! 2), higher prices can
be charged. This policy is justified by the fact that many non-adopters want to emulate
the customers that already purchased the product.
Often - especially from a consumer’s point of view - it is of particular interest to know
when prices peak. We show that in the undiscounted case this point in time Tp‹ is unique
and can be characterized in terms of the θ value and the value of the untapped market
share.
Proposition 3.3.1 For a controlled von Bertalanffy model with finite time T , assume
Γ ą 0, θ ě 0, 0 ă x0 ă 1, 0 ď δ ă a, ε ą 1, and rptq ” 0. Then, there exists a unique
point Tp‹ P r0, T s at which the optimal price process (3.24) attains its maximum:
(i) If θ “ 0, then Tp‹ “ 0.
(ii) If θ “ 1, then
(a) if x0 ď p1 ´ 1{eq « 0.63, then Tp‹ “ 0,
(b) if x0 ą p1 ´ 1{eq, then Tp‹ satisfies
x‹ pTp‹q “ 1 ´ 1{e. (3.68)
(iii) If θ ą 0, θ ‰ 1, then
(a) if x0 ď 1 ´ p1{θq 1θ´1 , then Tp‹ “ 0,
(b) if x0 ą 1 ´ p1{θq 1θ´1 , then Tp‹ satisfies
x‹ pTp‹q “ 1 ´ p1{θq 1θ´1 . (3.69)
Proof. In the von Bertalanffy model, if rptq ” Rptq ” 0, it follows from Theorem
3.2.1 that the optimal price process is of the form p‹ptq “ const ¨ ψvB px‹ptqq 1ε´1 . Since
ε ą 1, the function ζ ÞÑ ζ 1ε´1 , ζ ě 0, is strictly increasing. Hence, p‹ptq is maximized if
ψvB px‹ptqq is maximized.
First, we verify case piiiq. Let θ ą 0, θ ‰ 1, and let hpxq :“ ψvBpxq, x P r0, 1s, i.e.,
hpxq “ Γ1 ´ θ
”
p1 ´ xqθ ´ p1 ´ xq
ı
. (3.70)
The function h is continuous on the unit interval and strictly positive on p0, 1q; hp0q “
hp1q “ 0. Moreover, since θ ą 0, the function h is strictly concave on r0, 1q; simply
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compute the second derivative of h: for any x, 0 ď x ă 1,
h2pxq “ ´Γθp1 ´ xqθ´2 ă 0.
Hence, hpxq attains its maximum at a unique point xvB; elementary calculus shows that
xvB “ 1 ´ p1{θq 1θ´1 . (3.71)
On the interval r0, T s, the optimal path x‹ strictly decreases from x‹p0q “ x0 to x‹pT q “
0. Thus, if xvB ě x0, then ψvBpxq attains its maximum at x0 and the optimal price
peaks when x‹ptq “ x0. Hence, Tp‹ “ 0, and this proves statement paq of part piiiq.
If xvB P p0, x0q, then ψvBpxq is maximized at xvB, and p‹ptq is maximized when
x‹ptq “ xvB. Thus, Tp‹ must satisfy x‹ pTp‹q “ xvB, and (3.69) follows.
If θ “ 0 (case piq), then h reduces to hpxq “ Γx, a strictly increasing function. Thus,
ψvB is maximized at the largest feasible value x0 “ x‹p0q. Hence, p‹ptq is maximized at
Tp‹ “ 0, which proves piq.
In order to prove piiq, notice that the function hpxq, x fixed, converges to the Gompertz
function h1pxq “ Γ p1 ´ xq logp1{p1 ´ xqq, 0 ď x ă 1, if θ Ñ 1. As a function of x,
elementary calculus shows that h1 is strictly concave on the unit interval and attains
its maximum value at xvB1 “ 1 ´ 1{e « 0.63. Again, if x0 ą xvB1, the function ψvB
attains its maximum in the interior of the interval r0, x0s at xvB1, and p‹ is maximized
at Tp‹ , where Tp‹ satisfies x‹ pTp‹q “ xvB1. If x0 ď xvB1, the function h1pxq is strictly
increasing on the interval r0, x0s and h1 attains its maximum value at x0. Hence, ψvB
attains its maximum at x‹p0q “ x0. Thus, the maximum of p‹ is attained at Tp‹ “ 0. 
An implication of Proposition 3.3.1 is the following one: if x0 is small relative to
the expression on the right-hand side of piiiqpaq, a price skimming strategy is optimal
throughout the sales period. Price skimming is also optimal if the word of mouth effect
depends linearly on the value of the untapped market share (θ “ 0); this result can also
be found in Section 4 of Helmes et al. (2013) for the case ψpxq “ xb and b “ 1. Apart
from these special cases, the controlled von Bertalanffy model entails that it is optimal
to start with a price penetration strategy; once the price peaks it is optimal to use a price
skimming strategy. Note, the optimal price at time t does not depend on the specific
value of μptq but only on the time-to-go potential Ap0qp0, T q. Even if the arrival rate is
assumed to oscillate, for example due to seasonal patterns, the first-penetrate-then-skim
pricing strategy is optimal in the controlled von Bertalanffy model. The value of Tp‹ is
determined by equations (3.68) and (3.69) and thus naturally depends on all parameters
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that influence the controlled adoption process. However, the value of the untapped
market share at time Tp‹ is uniquely characterized by the value of θ. Assuming x0 “ 1
and θ “ 2, then the optimal price trajectory attains its maximal value when exactly one
half of the total market potential has been captured. If θ ă 2, then less than half of
the market share has been acquired when prices reach their maximum. If θ ą 2, more
than fifty percent of the total market potential have been tapped if the prices peak.
If θ is very large, then a penetration strategy is optimal for most of the sales horizon.
For instance, if θ “ 20, then x‹ pTp‹q « 0.15, i.e., optimal prices reach the peak after
approximately 85 percent of the total market has been captured.
In general, the characteristics of the function ψ infuse the price and the adoption
rate of the model. That is why the controlled Bass model is not able to fit situations
where prices peak after more than half of the market share has been captured.25 In
contrast, the class of von Bertalanffy models is able to fit more general price processes
and sales processes. This feature is particularly important when (theoretical) models are
fitted to empirical data. In applications, the specification of the model parameters is the
ultimate challenge. For a specific class of products there is often a general agreement on
the values Γ and θ based on intuition and/or experience. Very important but especially
difficult is to estimate the function μ. The analysis is further complicated by the fact
that reliable estimates of the elasticities (δ and thus Δ, and ε) are difficult to obtain.
In practical applications, the management will find it useful to first assume one or more
specific scenarios and then to update the model and its parameters by more reliable data
and estimates which become available over time.26
25An analysis along the lines of Proposition 3.3.1 for hpxq “ ψBass “ Ω ` Γxp1 ´ xq, Ω,Γ ą 0, shows
that in the controlled Bass model the corresponding Tp‹ value satisfies x‹pTp‹ q “ 0.5`Ω{p2Γ q ą 0.5.
26In this context, one can also make use of the feedback controls, cf. Theorem 3.2.2, or adjust values
such as x0 and parameters accordingly.
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4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we consider one-cycle control problems with a given sales
period of length T . However, inventory management is a matter of recurring decisions.
A very basic - but probably the most famous - approach to inventory control is the
economic order quantity (EOQ) method which, presumably, was first analyzed by Harris
(1913). Given an (exogenous) constant demand rate λ the decision maker has to choose
an inventory capacity (or lot size) x0 ą 0. Having chosen x0 and given λ, the inventory
will deplete over a cycle of length τ “ x0{λ. Independent of the size of x0, an order cost
k ą 0 has to be paid once per cycle; holding costs accrue at a constant rate  per unit
and unit of time. The objective of the decision maker is to choose an inventory level x0
such that the average cost (per time unit) is minimized.1 The resulting EOQ xHW is
given by
xHW “
c
2k

λ.
The corresponding optimal cycle length equals τHW “ xHW {λ “
a
2k{pλq, and the
minimized cost per time unit amounts to CHW “
?
2kλ. Since also Wilson (1934)
has his merits in the development and analysis of this model, this model is sometimes
called the Harris-Wilson EOQ or Harris-Wilson model, and this explains the 1HW 1
subscript.2 Although the assumptions of the Harris-Wilson setting are rarely met in
reality, the results are widely used in practice. Reasons are that the formulas are easy
to compute and to implement, and that the results show a remarkable robustness with
respect to parameter misspecifications and uncertainties. The robustness property is
due to the square root function in all the expressions. We will seize this idea of a simple
but robust formula in Section 4.3.3 and derive an endogenized Harris-Wilson formula
1Naturally, instead of searching for the best value of x0, one can search for the optimal cycle length.
If τ0 is the optimal cycle length, then the optimal lot size equals x0 “ λτ0. Both approaches are
equivalent.
2Independent of Harris and Wilson, Andler (1929) developed this basic method of inventory man-
agement in the context of production and optimal batch sizes, see Krieg (2005) for a historic and
economic classification of the contribution by Andler.
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that - in contrast to the classic EOQ model where the constant demand rate is given -
endogenizes the demand rate.
Starting from the beginning of the last century many modifications and extensions
of the basic model have been discussed in the (inventory) literature: single- and multi-
echelon systems, deterministic and stochastic demand models, continuous and periodic
review systems, continuous and integer lot sizes, independent and coordinated replenish-
ments, the implication of leadtimes, backorders, discounts, perishability, and many other
aspects. The textbooks by Axsäter (2006) and Snyder and Shen (2011) give detailed
reviews of the current state of inventory control. The authors describe many theoretical
models, and suggest practical methods and heuristics. Classical textbook references in
inventory control are, for instance, Silver et al. (1998) and Zipkin (2000).
Usually, optimal inventory control is concerned about minimizing costs assuming that
the (deterministic or stochastic) demand is exogenously given. But as Axsäter (2006)
nicely points out in his introduction, pp. 1, inventories ”... cannot be decoupled from
other functions, for example purchasing, production, and marketing. As a matter of
fact, the objective of inventory control is often to balance conflicting goals. One goal
is, of course, to keep stock levels down to make cash available for other purposes. The
purchasing manager may wish to order other large batches to get volume discounts.
The production manager similarly wants long production runs to avoid time-consuming
setups. He also prefers to have a large raw material inventory to avoid stops in production
due to missing materials. The marketing manager would like to have a high stock of
finished goods to be able to provide customers a high service level.” Naturally, the
optimal batch size or inventory level depends on the demand rate. But if the monopolist
is in the position to choose the prices which influence the demand, too, then decisions
of setting optimal prices and choosing an optimal batch size interact. If marketing
and production aspects enter the decision process, the complexity of the optimization
problem increases further. As soon as pricing is involved, one is typically interested in
maximizing profits rather than minimizing costs which distinguishes the pure inventory
management problems from revenue and supply chain management in general.
In management science, simultaneous pricing and inventory decision making plays an
important role from the 1950s on. Whitin (1955) was among the first who incorporated
pricing decisions into an inventory problem and pioneered this field of research. Review-
ing all the results related to joint pricing-inventory would go beyond the scope of this
work. We thus reference only the research that is closely related to our approach and
refer to review articles by Eliashberg and Steinberg (1991), Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
(2003), Chan et al. (2004), Yano and M. (2004), or Chen and Simchi-Levi (2012) for an
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overview of the last decades on this research area.
The work by Pekelman (1974) laid the foundation for many papers on pricing and
inventory decision making using control theory. Pekelman applies control theory tech-
niques in order to simultaneously determine time-dependent price and production rates
over a continuous finite time horizon. He assumes a linear time- and price-dependent
demand rate and a strictly convex production cost function. The state of the system is
the inventory level which is assumed to be nonnegative and is continuously refilled via a
production process with adjustable rate. He characterizes the optimal price-production
decision and shows that it depends on the sum of the adjoint variable related to the
inventory process and the Lagrange multiplier associated with the state constraint, cf.
the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 in the previous chapter. Feichtinger and Hartl (1985) extend
the model by Pekelman to the nonlinear demand case and to account for shortage costs.
Li (1988) considers a stochastic setting, where the cumulative demand and the cumula-
tive production are governed by two Poisson counting processes with random intensities
parameterized by production capacity and price respectively. The textbook by Sethi and
Thompson (2000) includes a comprehensive survey on pricing-inventory models solved
by control theory techniques up to the late 20th century.
Cohen (1977) is one of the first researchers who incorporates a deterioration effect
in the joint pricing and inventory decision making process. He considers a modified
EOQ model3 with constant inventory, production, and setup costs. The deterministic
sales rate is a function of price; in addition to sales, the inventory decays at a constant
exponential rate. The objective is to maximize the average profit per time unit by
choosing a stationary price and a (periodic) cycle length. The inventory level at the
beginning of each cycle, the initial inventory, is then implicitly defined by the associated
state process and the cycle length - an assumption that is similar to our assumption
in Chapter 2 and that enabled us to formulate the problem in terms of a cost function
cptq, cf. (2.7) and comments there. Cohen characterizes the optimal solution in form
of necessary and sufficient conditions and illustrates his results for the case of a linear
demand function. In a second step, he extends the models by backlogging and deduces
economic implications.
Rajan et al. (1992) generalize the model of Cohen (1977) by introducing dynamic
pricing; in addition, they allow for time-dependent demand rates and deterioration rates.
They consider the holding costs to be constant over time and disregard any discounting
effects. This is a special case of our general dynamic advertising and dynamic pricing
3Here and subsequently, the term modified EOQ model indicates that the objective is to maximize the
average (net or total) profit per unit of time.
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model introduced in Chapter 2 when δptq “ 0, ptq “ , and rptq “ 0. Rajan et al.
(1992) first solve the dynamic pricing problem pointwise for every t P r0, T s to obtain
the optimal profit margin νRptq, cf. Proposition 2.2.2; recall, νRptq does not depend on
the cycle length T . In a second step, the objective is then to maximize
1
T
ˆż T
0
νRptqdt ´ k
˙
(4.1)
with respect to the cycle length T ą 0 in order to obtain an optimal cycle length
T ˚. Rajan and co-authors impose restrictions on the (optimal) profit function νR that
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of T ˚ ą 0. We generalize the inventory model of
Rajan et al. (1992) by incorporating dynamic advertising decisions and time-dependent
holding costs as well as allowing for discounting.
While the coordination of pricing and inventory decisions is actually a vibrant research
area for more than sixty years, the combination of advertising, pricing, and inventory
considerations is a relatively neglected field of research. Urban (1992) is one of the first
authors who combines pricing and advertising in the classical lot size problem. The
production costs are assumed to be a linear function of the production time and Urban
considers a time-homogeneous (μptq ” μ) version of the demand function (2.4). The
goal is to simultaneously determine a (fixed) price, a constant advertising expenditure
rate, and a lot size that maximize the average profit per time unit. The optimal price is
determined by a constant markup on the production costs; the production time, i.e., the
cycle length, is implicitly defined by the lot size. Urban considers constant holding and
setup costs and incorporates shortages and the possibility of defective items. He makes
use of separable programming techniques4 to simultaneously determine all quantities
of interest. For special cases, e.g., constant production costs and particular demand
patterns, closed-form solutions are derived. Lee and Kim (1993) consider the price to be
fixed but allow the unit production cost to be a power form expression of the demand.
They consider a model where the three quantities of interest (price, advertising effort,
and capacity) are determined simultaneously; Lee and Kim call this the full integration
model. In what they call partial integration model, they separate the pricing-marketing
decision from the lot size problem. The authors make use of geometric programming
to solve the nonlinear problems.5 Lee and Kim use marginal analysis to compare the
4By making several substitutions Urban modifies the objective function to be a separable function of
the decision variables and then determines the range of values that the variables can realize, see
Appendix A in the original reference.
5For a classic textbook on geometric programming see, for example, Duffin et al. (1967), and see Lee
(1993) for a geometric programming algorithm in the context of pricing and inventory considerations.
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results of both models, the full integration model and the partial integration model,
with respect to managerial implications. Subsequent works consider various extensions
and modifications. For example, Ulusoy and Yazgac (1995) extend the model of Urban
(1992) by taking multi-product and multi-period aspects into account; Mondal et al.
(2007) incorporate transportation costs (if the inventory is replenished); S. J. Sadjadi
and Yousefli (2010) consider the demand as a function of price and marketing expenditure
with fuzzy6 parameters. Shah et al. (2013) extend the model of S. J. Sadjadi and Yousefli
(2010) by considering non-instantaneous deterioration effects in the inventory and time-
dependent holding costs.
Although all of these articles consider particular features and challenges of inventory
management, to our knowledge, the relationship between dynamic pricing, dynamic
advertising and capacity decision models has not been fully analyzed so far. Moreover, we
will allow the interest rate to influence future profits. The vast majority of the literature
on (multi-period) inventory control disregards inflation effects, although discounting has
always been an essential ingredient in revenue management. In their article Recent trends
in modeling of deteriorating inventory, Goyal and Giri (2001) note on page 11 that the ”...
basic assumption in the classical EOQ model is that all the cost components associated
with the inventory system remain constant over time. Before 1970, the effect of inflation
was not considered for analyzing inventory systems perhaps because of the belief that
inflation would not influence the inventory policy to any significant degree. However, the
situation changed radically in the 1970s when the actual inflation rate of the Western
countries shot up to be in the range 8 ´ 20% and as a matter of fact the usual EOQ
solution required necessary modifications.” Goyal and Giri credit Buzacott (1975) to be
the first to account for such modifications; further contributions are assigned to Bose
et al. (1995), Su et al. (1996), and Sarker et al. (2000) to name just a few examples.7
Note, all these papers are only related to inventory and supply chain management and
include no pricing decisions nor marketing considerations.
For the one-cycle control problems, so far, we only considered the costs of advertising
and, in Chapter 2, the costs that are associated with the sale of a unit, the purchasing
and the inventory costs. From now on, we will also consider the (fixed) setup or order
cost. The parameter k ą 0 specifies this cost that occurs once per cycle. In practical
applications, the setup costs can refer to many aspects: the rent of the sales area and of
the storage area, (fixed) labor costs, insurance and maintenance costs of a shop or of a
vehicle fleet, franchise fees, etc. All these costs arise from running the business and are
6See S. J. Sadjadi and Yousefli (2010) and references therein for their definition of fuzzy parameters in
the context of pricing and marketing planning models.
7See Chapter 9 in Goyal and Giri (2001).
111
4 Maximizing Long-Term Profit
independent of the number of goods produced, purchased, stored, or sold: whether one
item or one thousand items are sold, the rent has to be paid. Throughout this chapter,
a capacity of zero is equivalent to running no business: no expenses are incurred - in
particular no order cost k - and sales are nil. Since the profit from the no business
strategy is zero, it is an option the decision maker has if market conditions are bad, e.g.,
if the sales potential is too small to cover the fixed cost k, see below.
We let τ ą 0 be the variable cycle length. Instead of a fixed selling horizon T , the
monopolist now faces the problem of choosing the length of N cycles; N is a positive
integer or symbolizes infinity. We consider the cases of maximizing the discounted N -
period profit (N finite or infinite), and the maximization of the average profit per time
unit (N infinite).8 While the classical approach in inventory management is to minimize
the average cost per time unit (or to maximize the average profit per time unit if price
considerations are involved), we also consider the problem of maximizing the present
value of N inventory cycles when N is a finite integer. This allows us to deal with
applications where the monopolist faces a fixed number of order decisions, e.g., the
marketing of a film series, the retailing of a car series, or the publication of the new
version of a book or magazine. Although the concrete number of sequels of a series
or movies is seldom predefined (and will often depend on the success of the last model
or episode), one can often observe that the time between two editions of a series is
constant. For example, one of the best selling series in the history of computer games,
the Civilization series, appears with a new title every five years starting from 1991.9
To give a second example from the entertainment industry, between 1977 and 1989 the
successful film series James Bond appeared with a new episode every two years. But how
was this time distance, the cycle length in our terms, chosen? The following framework
shall help to analyze this kind of problems; in practical applications, the number N may
serve as an initial planning horizon that will be adjusted later.
The notation is consistent with the previous chapters. The following assumptions will
be imposed throughout Chapter 4.
Condition 4.1.1
1. The price elasticity, the advertising elasticity, the advertising cost coefficient, and
the interest rate are constant: εptq ” ε ą 1, δptq ” δ ě 0, aptq ” a ą δ, rptq ” r ě
0, t ě 0.
8Generally, we associate the average profit with no discounting. Since in many cases the subsequent
analysis remains valid with a positive discount rate, we frequently allow r ą 0 for the average profit
problem, see below.
9There has been a shift between Civilization III and Civilization IV which have been published in 2001
and 2005, respectively. Civilization V has been published in 2010.
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2. Let μ˜ptq ą 0, ˜ptq ě 0, and q˜ptq ě 0, t ě 0, be functions which are bounded from
above. Let τ ą 0 be arbitrary but fixed. For all i P N let iτ :“ riτ, pi ` 1qτq. We
define μ, , and q to be periodic functions of (variable) period length τ , i.e.,
μptq “
8ÿ
i“0
μ˜pt ´ iτq1iτ ptq, (4.2)
qptq “
8ÿ
i“0
q˜pt ´ iτq1iτ ptq, (4.3)
ptq “
8ÿ
i“0
˜pt ´ iτq1iτ ptq. (4.4)
If τ “ 8, let μptq ” μ˜ptq, qptq ” q˜ptq, and ptq ” ˜ptq for all t ě 0.
Across cycles, customers are supposed to behave similarly within each cycle; so do the
running costs and the depreciation rate.10 Whenever we consider the N -cycle problem,
we assume an identical length for each cycle since the values of the parameters do not
change from cycle to cycle. If the parameters are not periodic functions (that depend
on the cycle length), an optimal fixed cycle pattern might not exist. This is due to the
fact that it might be better to vary the length of different cycles.
In Section 4.2, we assume the monopolist to apply the optimal pricing-advertising
scheme derived in Section 2.2. If so, then profits accumulate at rate ν˚ ą 0, cf. The-
orem 2.2.1. Since the (optimal) profit margin does not depend on the time-to-go, it is
independent of the cycle length. Thus, we consider the two-dimensional optimization
problem of determining a pair consisting of a cycle length and a capacity value that
maximizes the present value of N cycles (see Section 4.2.1), or the average profit per
time unit (see Section 4.2.2) assuming that the profit maximizing (price and advertis-
ing) control is applied throughout the cycle. One key property in Chapter 2 was that
the optimal capacity is implicitly given in terms of the (optimal) sales rate. Thus, we
can simplify the two-dimensional optimization problem by first solving for the optimal
cycle length; the optimal capacity is then given by (2.7). This way, we reduce the two-
dimensional problem to a one-dimensional one. As an alternative, we could first consider
the one-dimensional optimization problem with respect to the capacity variable. The
optimal cycle length is then implicitly determined. From a practical point of view it
seems preferable to first analyze the capacity problem. Usually, entrepreneurs think in
terms of (total) volumes of sales and not in terms of lengths of sales periods. However,
10Basically, one can also assume the elasticities and even the discount rate to be periodic functions. We
abstain from doing so in order not to overburden the notation and to concentrate on - in our view -
the really important aspects.
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to be consistent with Chapter 2 we choose the cycle length as the quantity of interest.
The model considered in Chapter 2 does not allow for an inventory-dependent demand
rate. Therefore, in Section 4.2, we assume that ψpxq ” 1. In contrast, the new-product
adoption model in Chapter 3 takes the dependence on the state of the system into
account. Thus, in Section 4.3, we assume that the optimal control derived in Chapter
3 is applied throughout the cycle. In Chapter 3, the only costs considered are the costs
of advertising. The optimal control, see Theorem 3.2.1, maximizes the net present value
of the total revenue (minus advertising costs) for a given period and a given capacity;
the maximized revenue equals the value function Vˆ p0, x0q. In Section 4.3, we evaluate
the total inventory costs associated with the revenue maximizing control. The total
production costs are of the form unit cost times the capacity, and a setup cost k ą 0
is also considered. The objective is to find an optimal pair, consisting of cycle length
and capacity, that maximizes the present value of N cycles (see Section 4.3.1), or to find
a pair that maximizes the average profit per time unit (see Section 4.3.2). In both of
these sections, we also consider the one-dimensional subproblems when piq the capacity
is fixed and we maximize with respect to the cycle length and when piiq the cycle length
is fixed and we maximize with respect to the capacity. In practical applications, case
piq occurs whenever the total capacity is predefined, e.g., the total number of seats in a
concert hall, the number of goods in a retailing store, or the deposit of a natural resource.
Then, the (stylized) problem is to determine the optimal cycle length, e.g., the optimal
interval between performances of an artist, the selling period for the capacity given,
or the extraction time and development of a new resource. In case piiq, the decision
maker has to choose the (optimal) capacity while the cycle length is predefined, e.g., the
capacity of a stadium for which a football match is scheduled every two weeks or the
capacity of an airplane commuting between Berlin and London.11
Naturally, since only the advertising costs are considered in the determination of the
revenue maximizing controls the solution to the problem in Section 4.3 will be subopti-
mal compared to the solution derived in Section 4.2 (in the case ψpxq ” 1). Nevertheless,
in many applied cases the results of Section 4.3 will lead to good decision rules. Due
to the complexity of the expressions involved the optimal values can generally only be
determined numerically. However, in a very special case, we suggest an endogenized
Harris-Wilson formula for the optimal cycle length and the optimal capacity, cf. Propo-
sition 4.3.8.
11Although in airline ticketing problems the state variable is an integer, a continuous variable is a good
approximation.
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A key result of Theorem 2.2.1 in Chapter 2 is the property that the (optimal) profit
margin ν˚ only depends on the current time t, but does not depend on the length of the
sales horizon T . Instead of a fixed and exogenously given T , we now consider the cycle
length to be a decision variable; we emphasize this fact by letting τ denote the variable
cycle length. Thus,
π1˚ pτq “
τż
0
ν˚ptqdt (4.5)
is the maximal present value of an inventory cycle of length τ , see Corollary 2.2.1. Since
ν˚ptq is positive for all t ě 0, cf. Theorem 2.2.1, π1˚ pτq strictly increases in τ . The
integral π1˚ pτq, however, may be bounded as a function of τ should ν˚ptq converge to
zero if t Ñ 8. A crucial assumption that underlies all models and all parameter settings
to be considered in Chapter 4 is the following one: the market conditions allow for a
cycle profit that defrays at least the fixed cost k. Throughout Chapters 2 and 3 the
order cost k has not been considered since it has no influence on the optimal control.12
In this chapter, however, we define the minimum cycle length T0 :“ T0pkq as the first
hitting time
T0 :“ inf
"
T
ˇˇˇ
ˇ
ż T
0
ν˚ptqdt ě k, T ě 0
*
, (4.6)
where T0 is set to `8 if
ş8
0 ν
˚ptqdt ă k. If T0 is infinite, the profit margin is too small
to make up for the fixed cycle cost, and it is optimal not to run the business. Naturally,
a cycle length chosen by the decision maker must satisfy τ ě T0 as otherwise the profit
(of one cycle) will be negative. Recall, the capacity is implicitly given by the choice
of τ and sales rate λ˚ associated with the profit maximizing control, cf. (2.7). Hence,
the quantities of interest will only depend on the variable cycle length τ , and we face a
one-dimensional optimization problem, cf. Section 4.1.
In the next subsection, we will maximize the net present value of the sum of profits
of N (identical) periods. To this end, in Proposition 4.2.1, we define auxiliary functions
that facilitate our further analysis. We derive conditions that guarantee the existence
of an optimal cycle length when N is finite (Theorem 4.2.1) and N is infinite (Theo-
rem 4.2.3) and we characterize the optimal cycle length in terms of the solution of a
nonlinear equation. We analyze and illustrate these results by an example and derive
structural properties of the optimal solution (Corollary 4.2.1). In Subsection 4.2.2, we
12In Chapter 2, the fixed cost implies a lower bound on the parameter T as the profit rate has been
maximized pointwise. In Chapter 3, no costs but the advertising costs were considered.
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consider the maximization of the average profit per time unit - the classical objective in
inventory management. Similar to Subsection 4.2.1, we derive conditions that guarantee
the existence of an average-optimal cycle length (Theorem 4.2.3) and analyze structural
properties; in particular, we examine how advertising effects the optimal cycle length
and the optimal average profit (Theorem 4.2.4); see also Corollary 2.2.3.
4.2.1 Maximizing the Present Value of N Cycles
The N -stage problem of a monopolist is to determine optimal cycle lengths τi, i “
1, . . . , N , her objective is to maximize the net present value of the total profit. Within
each cycle the control is chosen (optimally) according to Theorem 2.2.1. Thus, the
expression to be maximized is given by
π1˚ pτ1q´k`e´Rpτ1qpπ1˚ pτ2q´kq`e´Rpτ1`τ2qpπ1˚ pτ3q´kq` . . .`e´Rp
řN´1
i“1 τiqpπ1˚ pτN q´kq,
where π1˚ pτq “
şτ
0 ν
˚ptqdt is the optimal net profit of a cycle of length τ excluding the
setup cost k. Since the parameter functions show the identical behavior starting from the
beginning of each new cycle, cf. Condition 4.1.1, we assume the optimal cycle lengths
to be identical for each cycle, i.e., τ1 “ τ2 “ . . . “ τN . Then, the expression to be
maximized with respect to τ ą 0 becomes
pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq
N´1ÿ
i“0
e´Rpiτq.
Since we assume a constant interest rate, cf. Condition 4.1.1, the sum of discounting
factors can be represented by the common geometric series formula.13 Next, we define
a function Υ that depends on this geometric series formula and its derivatives, and we
verify properties of Υ.
Proposition 4.2.1 Let r, T ą 0 and let N be a positive integer.
1. Let SN pT q denote the present value of an annuity of size one which is paid from
today until period N ´ 1 and which is periodically discounted by e´rT , i.e.,
SN pT q “ SN pT ; rq :“
N´1ÿ
i“0
e´irT “ 1 ´ e
´NrT
1 ´ e´rT . (4.7)
13We assume that rptq is constant. Hence, the cumulative discount factor Rpτq equals rτ . However,
the problem can be analyzed for any periodic discount function. This is also true for the elasticities,
which are assumed to be constant in Condition 4.1.1.
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Let 9SN , :SN resp., N ě 2, denote the first, second resp., derivative of SN with
respect to T , i.e.,
9SN pT q :“ dSN
dT
pT q “ ´r
N´1ÿ
i“1
i e´irT “ ´rSN pT q
erT ´ 1
ˆ
1 ´ N e
rT ´ 1
eNrT ´ 1
˙
, (4.8)
and
:SN pT q :“ d
2SN
dT 2
pNq “ r2
N´1ÿ
i“1
i2e´irT (4.9)
“ r2SN pT q
`
1 ` erT ˘ `eNrT ´ 1˘ ´ N `erT ´ 1˘ “N `erT ´ 1˘ ` 2‰
perT ´ 1q2 peNrT ´ 1q .
Then, SN pT q ą 1, SN pT q ă N , 9SN pT q ă 0, and :SN pT q ą 0, i.e., SN pT q is a
(strictly) monotonically decreasing and (strictly) convex function that is bounded
from below by the value one and bounded from above by the value N .
2. Let SpT q denote the present value of a perpetual annuity of size one, i.e.,
SpT q “ SpT ; rq :“
8ÿ
i“0
e´irT “ lim
nÑ8 SnpT q “
1
1 ´ e´rT . (4.10)
Let 9S and :S denote the first and second derivative of S with respect to T , respec-
tively, i.e.,
9SpT q :“ dS
dT
pT q “ ´r
8ÿ
i“1
i e´irT “ ´ r SpT q
erT ´ 1 , (4.11)
and
:SpT q :“ d
2S
dT 2
pT q “ r2
8ÿ
i“1
i2e´irT “ r2 e
rT ` 1
perT ´ 1q2 SpT q. (4.12)
Then, SpT q ą 1, 9SpT q ă 0, and :SpT q ą 0, i.e., SpT q inherits the structural
properties of SN pT q.
3. Let N ě 2. We define, ΥN pT q “ ΥN pT ; rq,
ΥN pT q :“
:SN pT q
9SN pT q
´ 9SN pT q
SN pT q “ ´
2repN`1qrT
“
coshpNrT q ´ 1 ´ N2 pcoshprT q ´ 1q‰
perT ´ 1q peNrT ´ 1q reNrT ´ 1 ´ N perT ´ 1qs ,
(4.13)
and
ΥpT q :“ lim
nÑ8 ΥnpT q “ ´
r
1 ´ e´rT “ ´rSpT q. (4.14)
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Then,
a) ΥN pT q and ΥpT q are negative numbers,
b) ΥN pT q ą ΥN`1pT q,
c) ´ r1 ` e´rT ě ΥN pT q ą ´
r
1 ´ e´rT ,
d) limTÑ8 ΥN pT q “ ´r,
e) limrÑ0 ΥN pT q “ limrÑ0 ΥN pT ; rq “ 0.
Proof. The formula for SN pT q, SpT q respectively, is the well-known formula of a finite,
infinite respectively, geometric series; the formulas of both derivatives are obvious. To
see that the first derivatives are negative and that the second derivatives are positive
use the representation of 9SN pT q as a finite, see (4.8), and the representation (4.11) as
an infinite series as well as (4.9) and (4.12). Apparently, limTÑ8 SN pT q “ 1, and, by
l’Hôpital’s rule, limTÑ0 SN pT q “ limTÑ0 1´e´NrT1´e´rT “ limTÑ0 Nre
´NrT
re´rT “ N . Thus, SN is
bounded by 1 and N .
The derivation of the formula for ΥN pT q requires more effort. After some lengthy but
elementary calculations, or with the help of a proper software package14, one can see
that
:SN pT q
9SN pT q
´ 9SN pT q
SN pT q “ ´
repN`1qrT
“
eNrT ` e´NrT ´ N2 `erT ` e´rT ˘q ` 2 `N2 ´ 1˘‰
perT ´ 1q peNrT ´ 1q reNrT ´ 1 ´ N perT ´ 1qs .
Using the definition of the cosh function, coshpxq :“ 12 pex ` e´xq, one obtains expression
(4.13). Formula (4.14), the limiting case of (4.13) if N Ñ 8, is best proved by exploiting
the derivatives 9S and :S. Next, we prove the statements paq ´ peq.
paq Evidently, ΥpT q ă 0. In order to show that ΥN pT q ă 0, we make use of the
power series representation of the exponential function, ex “ ř8i“0 xii! , and the series
representation of the cosh function, coshpxq “ ř8i“0 x2ip2iq! . The numerator of ΥN pT q is
14We have used Mathematica 9 by Wolfram Research, Inc. (2012).
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positive since repN`1qrT ą 0 and
coshpNrT q ´ 1 ´ N2 pcoshprT q ´ 1q “
˜
1 ` pNrT q
2
2 `
8ÿ
i“2
pNrT q2i
p2iq!
¸
´ 1
´ N2
«˜
1 ` prT q
2
2 `
8ÿ
i“2
prT q2i
p2iq!
¸
´ 1
ff
“
8ÿ
i“2
pNrT q2i
p2iq! ´ N
2
8ÿ
i“2
prT q2i
p2iq!
“
8ÿ
i“2
`
N2i ´ N2˘ prT q2ip2iq!
ą 0.
Similarly, the denominator of ΥN pT q is positive since
`
erT ´ 1˘ `eNrT ´ 1˘ ą 0 and
eNrT ´ 1 ´ N `erT ´ 1˘ “
˜
1 ` NrT `
8ÿ
i“2
pNrT qi
i!
¸
´ 1
´ N
«˜
1 ` rT `
8ÿ
i“2
prT qi
i!
¸
´ 1
ff
“
8ÿ
i“2
pNrT qi
i! ´ N
8ÿ
i“2
prT qi
i!
“
8ÿ
i“2
`
N i ´ N˘ prT qi
i!
ą 0.
Hence, ΥN pT q ă 0; note the minus sign in (4.13).
pbq To see that ΥN pT q is monotone increasing in N , we rewrite ΥN pT q using the power
series expressions of the numerator and the denominator, see above. Obviously,
ΥN pT q “ ´ 2re
pN`1qrT
perT ´ 1q peNrT ´ 1q
ř8
i“2
`
N2i ´ N2˘ prT q2ip2iq!ř8
i“2 pN i ´ Nq prT q
i
i!
“ ´ 2r1 ´ e´rT
1
1 ´ e´NrT
N2
ř8
i“2
`
N2pi´1q ´ 1˘ prT q2ip2iq!
N
ř8
i“2 pN i´1 ´ 1q prT q
i
i!
“ ´ 2r1 ´ e´rT
N
1 ´ e´NrT
ř8
i“2
`
N2pi´1q ´ 1˘ prT q2ip2iq!ř8
i“2 pN i´1 ´ 1q prT q
i
i!
.
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The first factor of this product does not depend on N . The second factor and the third
factor are increasing in N if N ě 2. Hence, ΥN pT q decreases in N - note the minus sign
- which proves pbq.15
pcq follows directly from the fact that ΥN is monotone increasing in N , see pbq, and
the evaluation of the formulas for Υ2 and limnÑ8 ΥnpT q. The latter is equivalent to
ΥpT q “ ´ r1´e´rT , cf. (4.14). That Υ2 “ ´ r1`e´rT follows by lengthy but basic algebra.
pdq The upper and the lower bounds of ΥN pT q converge to ´r when T goes to infinity.
Thus, limTÑ8 ΥN pT q “ ´r.
peq To show that limrÑ0 ΥN pT ; rq “ 0, we use the representation of the derivatives of
SN as geometric sums, cf. (4.7), (4.8), and (4.9). Since the fractions
:SN pT ; rq
9SN pT ; rq
“ r
2 řN´1
i“1 i2e´irT
´r řN´1i“1 i e´irT “ ´r
řN´1
i“1 i2e´irTřN´1
i“1 i e´irT
and
9SN pT ; rq
SN pT ; rq “
´r řN´1i“1 i e´irTřN´1
i“0 e´irT
both converge to zero if r Ñ 0, the difference ΥN pT ; rq “ :SN pT ;rq
9SN pT ;rq ´
9SN pT ;rq
SN pT ;rq converges to
zero if r Ñ 0. 
Figure 4.1 depicts SN pT q as functions of T (panel (a)) and the function ΥN pT q (panel
(b)) for different values of N ; r “ 0.1. The functions SN pT q strictly decrease in N as
well as in T . The behavior of the functions ΥN pT q is more complex. For example, if
N “ 2, Υ2pT q strictly decreases in T . The function ΥpT q, however, strictly increases
in T . In general, ΥN pT q, N sufficiently large, decreases for small values of T , and is
increasing if T is large. We will use the function ΥN to formulate conditions for the
uniqueness of the optimal cycle length, see below. In particular, we will impose the
condition that the logarithmic derivatives of the profit margins are bounded from above
by ΥN pT q, respectively ΥpT q.
We consider the following decision problem: choose the cycle length τ ě 0 such that
the present value of the N -period profit πN , N ě 1,
πN pτq “ pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq
N´1ÿ
i“0
e´irτ “ pπ1˚ pτq ´ kqSN pτq, (4.15)
15Note, that ΥN pT q decreases for all real values N ą 1 and not only integer values as assumed in
Proposition 4.2.1.
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Figure 4.1: The functions SN pT q (panel (a)) and ΥN pT q (panel (b)) for different values of N ;
r ” 0.1.
is maximized. The present value of the N -period profit is the product of the payoff per
period, π1˚ pτq ´ k, and SN pτq; for any τ , this second factor SN pτq is larger than one if
N ą 1, cf. part piq of Proposition 4.2.1. If N ” 1, the objective is to simply maximize
(with respect to τ) the one-cycle profit. Since the profit rate ν˚ is strictly positive, this
problem is unbounded: π1˚ pτq strictly increases in τ and S1pτq ” 1, see below. We set
πN p0q :“ 0. If T0 - the minimum cycle length according to (4.6) - is infinite, it is not
possible to find a positive value τ such that the total profit will be positive. We therefore
interpret the value τ “ 0 as no market-entry, a decision which incurs neither gains nor
losses. Note, we do not assume the cycle length to be bounded. The decision maker has
to choose a sequence of (equidistant) time intervals16, but there is no overall time limit
in which these events have to occur.
We also consider the infinite cycle problem which is to maximize
π8pτq “ pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq
8ÿ
i“0
e´irτ “ pπ1˚ pτq ´ kqSpτq (4.16)
with respect to τ ě 0; we set π8p0q :“ 0. Both functions, πN pτq and π8pτq, are the
product of two terms: one increases in τ and the other one decreases in τ . Thus, the
monopolist has to find a trade-off between increasing the one-cycle profit by choosing τ
large and waiting too long. When only looking at the factor π1˚ pτq´k, it is profitable to
choose a large value of τ .17 On the other hand, waiting is penalized by the factor SN pτq,
16For example, the number of years that pass until a new car model is launched or the interval between
the next N entertainment shows of an artist in a city.
17The profit of one cycle, π˚1 pτq, strictly increases in τ since dπ˚1 pτq{dτ “ ν˚pτq ą 0, cf. Theorem 2.2.1
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respectively Spτq; the values of SN pτq and Spτq decrease monotonically in τ towards one,
cf. Proposition 4.2.1. For N ě 1 the largest value that can be attained by the function
SN pτq equals N ; recall, limτÑ0 SN pτq “ N . The time value of the periodical payments
and the profit per period, the annuity, are nonlinear expressions of τ , and the product
is also a nonlinear function. Thus, (4.15) and (4.16) are nonlinear objective functions.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let Condition 4.1.1 and the assumptions of Proposition 4.2.1 hold. Let
ν˚ be defined as in Theorem 2.2.1. Let N ą 1, and assume:
(i) The first hitting time T0, see (4.6), exists and is finite.
(ii) limtÑ8 ertν˚ptq “ 0.
Then,
(a) there exists an optimal cycle length τN˚ , T0 ă τN˚ ă 8, that maximizes (4.15).
Moreover, if the assumptions piq, piiq, and
(iii) μptq is a differentiable function on the open interval pT0,8q and, for all τ ą T0,
9ν˚pτq
ν˚pτq “ ´
„
r ` 11 ´ Δ
ˆ
pε ´ 1q 9cpτq
cpτq ´
9μpτq
μpτq
˙j
ă ΥN pτq (4.17)
are satisfied, then,
(b) the optimal cycle length τN˚ is unique; τN˚ is the (unique) solution of the equation
π1˚ pτq ´ k “ ´SN pτq9SN pτq
ν˚pτq. (4.18)
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is to show that the function πN pτq is continuous on
the semi-open interval rT0,`8q, it is positive on pT0,`8q, and it is decreasing for large
values of τ . Consequently, there exists a finite value τN˚ ą T0 that maximizes πN pτq.
paq The function π1˚ pτq is the integral of the piecewise continuous function ν˚, cf.
Theorem 2.2.1. Hence, π1˚ pτq is continuous, and except at a possibly finite number of
points, it is also differentiable. The function SN pτq is continuous and differentiable in τ ,
cf. Proposition 4.2.1. Thus, the function πN pτq is also continuous and differentiable in
τ . Since SN pτq ą 1 for all τ ą 0, assumption piq ensures that the net profit of any cycle
of length τ ą T0 is positive. Hence, πN pτq is positive on the open interval pT0,8q.
in Section 2.2.
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At all points where πN pτq is differentiable18, the first derivative of πN pτq is given by,
τ large,
dπN
dτ
pτq “ 9SN pτq pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq ` SN pτqν˚pτq
“ 9SN pτq
„
π1˚ pτq ´ k ` SN pτq9SN pτq
ν˚pτq
j
. (4.19)
The first factor of the product (4.19), 9SN pτq, is strictly smaller than zero, cf. Proposition
4.2.1. The term π1˚ pτq ´ k is positive due to assumption piq and strictly increases in τ
since ν˚ptq, the integrand of π1˚ pτq, is positive. Since the expression for ν˚ptq contains
the factor e´rt, cf. equation (2.18), assumption piiq implies that also ν˚ptq converges to
zero. Thus, limτÑ8 perτ ´ 1q ν˚pτq “ 0. Hence,
lim
τÑ8
ˆ
SN pτq
9SN pτq
ν˚pτq
˙
“ lim
τÑ8
¨
˝´ erτ ´ 1
r
´
1 ´ N erτ ´1
eNrτ ´1
¯ν˚pτq
˛
‚
“ ´1
r
lim
τÑ8
˜
1
1 ´ N erτ ´1
eNrτ ´1
¸
lim
τÑ8 ppe
rτ ´ 1q ν˚pτqq
“ ´1
r
¨ 1 ¨ lim
τÑ8
` perτ ´ 1q ν˚pτq˘
“ 0,
and the second factor in (4.19) is strictly positive for large values τ . Therefore, the first
derivative of πN pτq is negative for large values τ , and the function πN pτq is decreasing
if τ is large. Together, these facts imply paq.
In order to prove claim pbq, note, that ν˚ptq is differentiable on pT0,8q since, by
assumption, μptq is differentiable on pT0,8q. The first order condition πNdτ pτq “ 0 can
be rewritten as equation (4.18). Since a maximum exists on an open interval there is
at least one solution to equation (4.18). The left-hand side of equation (4.18) strictly
increases in τ and takes the value zero at T0. The right-hand side of equation (4.18)
takes a positive value at T0 - both, the term ´SN pτq{ 9SN pτq and the function ν˚pτq, are
positive, cf. Proposition 4.2.1 and Theorem 2.2.1 - and strictly decreases on pT0,8q. To
18We want to show that πN pτq strictly decreases for large τ values. Since, by assumption, πN pτq is
continuous, we can neglect the finitely many points where πN pτq is not differentiable.
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see the latter fact, note, that the derivative19 of the right-hand side of equation (4.18),
d
´
´SN pτq
9SN pτqν
˚pτq
¯
dτ
“ ´
«
9SN pτq2 ´ SN pτq :SN pτq
9SN pτq
ν˚pτq ` SN pτq9SN pτq
9ν˚pτq
ff
“ ´SN pτq9SN pτq
ν˚pτq
«
9SN pτq
SN pτq ´
:SN pτq
9SN pτq
` 9ν
˚pτq
ν˚pτq
ff
“ ´SN pτq9SN pτq
ν˚pτq
„
9ν˚pτq
ν˚pτq ´ ΥN pτq
j
is negative on pT0,8q due to condition (4.17). Thus, the right-hand side of (4.18)
decreases on pT0,8q, recall 9SN pτq ă 0. The solution of (4.18) is unique and so is the
maximum of πN pτq. 
Remark 4.2.1 Although we refer to the optimal profit rate ν˚, cf. Chapter 2, any
(positive) profit rate satisfying the assumptions in Theorem 4.2.1 will ensure the existence
and uniqueness of an optimal cycle length. In particular, the results of Theorem 4.2.1
also cover the partially static cases where the profit rate is given by ν¯ and ν˜, respectively.
Theorem 4.2.1 also applies to the case when the profit rate is externally given and is not
subject to the decision of the inventory manager.
The market-entry condition piq in Theorem 4.2.1 ensures that a monopolist is able
to choose a cycle length with no losses. Technically speaking, assumption piq implies a
lower bound on the (optimal) cycle length. Assumption piiq ensures that the optimal
cycle length is finite. It is not profitable for the monopolist to wait too long before
starting a new cycle. Hence, assumption piiq can be seen as a cycle-exit condition. In
our case, the optimal profit rate ν˚ is given in terms of the present value, cf. equations
(2.10) and (2.18). If elasticities are constant, the profit rate (in simplified terms) is given
by
ν˚ptq “ const ¨ e´rt
ˆ
μptq
cptqε´1
˙ 1
1´Δ δą0“ const ¨ e´rtw˚ptqa. (4.20)
Hence, condition piiq implies that w˚ptqa, or, equivalently, the expression
´
μptq
cptqε´1
¯ 1
1´Δ ,
converges to zero if t Ñ `8, i.e., the market conditions are not in favor of advertising
efforts in the long run.20 To be precise, assumption piiq is a restriction on the ratio of
the arrival intensity μptq and the cost function cptq (to the power of ε ´ 1). Since cptq is
19Since, by assumption, μptq is differentiable on pT0, 8q, ν˚ptq is differentiable on pT0, 8q.
20Note, that in condition piiq the profit rate ν˚ is multiplied by the factor e´rt.
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monotonically increasing, cf. equations (2.8) and (2.9), if μ is constant, assumption piiq
is satisfied.
The condition for the uniqueness of the optimal cycle length, cf. piiiq, imposes even
stronger restrictions on the parameter functions. Asking the log-derivative of the (opti-
mal) profit rate at time τ to be smaller than the value ΥN pτq for all τ ą T0, requires,
since ΥN pτq ă 0, a decreasing profit rate on the open interval pT0,`8q.
Theorem 4.2.2 Let Condition 4.1.1 and all assumptions of Proposition 4.2.1 hold. Let
ν˚ be defined as in Theorem 2.2.1. Let N :“ `8, and assume:
(i) The first hitting time T0, see (4.6), exists and is finite.
(ii) limtÑ8 ertν˚ptq “ 0.
Then,
(a) there exists an optimal cycle length τ˚, T0 ă τ˚ ă 8, that maximizes (4.16).
Moreover, if the assumptions piq, piiq, and
(iii) μptq is a differentiable function on the open interval pT0,8q and, for all τ ą T0,
9ν˚pτq
ν˚pτq “ ´
„
r ` 11 ´ Δ
ˆ
pε ´ 1q 9cpτq
cpτq ´
9μpτq
μpτq
˙j
ă ´r (4.21)
are satisfied, then,
(b) the optimal cycle length τ˚ is unique; τ˚ is the (unique) solution of the equation
π1˚ pτq ´ k “ 1r pe
rτ ´ 1q ν˚pτq. (4.22)
Proof. The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. We show that
the function π8pτq is continuous on the semi-open interval rT0,`8q, it is positive on
pT0,`8q, and it is decreasing for large values of τ . Consequently, there exists a finite
value τ˚ ą T0 that maximizes (4.16).
paq Since Spτq is differentiable, the function π8pτq is continuous and except at a
possibly finite number of points also differentiable, cf. the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. The
first derivative of π8pτq is given by
9π8pτq “ π8
dτ
pτq “ 9Spτq pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq ` Spτqν˚pτq
“ 9Spτq
„
π1˚ pτq ´ k ` Spτq9Spτqν
˚pτq
j
;
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the term Spτq
9Spτq equals
erτ ´1
r , cf. Proposition 4.2.1. The term
Spτq
9Spτqν
˚pτq converges to zero
if τ tends to infinity due to condition piiq. Since π1˚ pτq ´ k ą 0 (assumption piq) and
9Spτq ă 0, the first derivative of π8pτq is negative if τ gets large. Hence, the objective
function π8pτq decreases if τ becomes large, and attains its maximum at a finite value
τ˚ ą T0.
In order to prove pbq, first notice that equation (4.22) is equivalent to the first order
condition dπpτq{dτ “ 0. Since a maximum exists on an open interval there is at least
one solution to equation (4.22). We will show that, assuming piiiq, every stationary
point τ˚ satisfies the second order condition of a (local) maximum: d2π8
dτ2 pτ˚q ă 0. Since
π8pτq is continuous this observation implies that τ˚ has to be unique as otherwise there
must exist a local minimum between any two local maxima.
According to piiiq, we assume that μptq is differentiable on rT0,`8q, and the derivative
9ν˚ exists. The second derivative of π8 evaluated at τ˚ ą T0 is given by, cf. Proposition
4.2.1,
d2π8
dτ2
pτ˚q “ :Spτ˚q pπ1˚ pτ˚q ´ kq ` 2 9Spτ˚q ` Spτ˚q 9ν˚pτ˚q
“ :Spτ˚q
ˆ
´Spτ
˚q
9Spτ˚qν
˚pτ˚q
˙
` 2 9Spτ˚q ` Spτ˚q 9ν˚pτ˚q
“ Spτ˚qν˚pτ˚q
˜
´ :Spτ
˚q
9Spτ˚q ` 2
9Spτ˚q
Spτ˚q `
9ν˚pτ˚q
ν˚pτ˚q
¸
“ Spτ˚qν˚pτ˚q
˜
r
erτ
˚ ` 1
erτ˚ ´ 1 ´ r
2
erτ˚ ´ 1 `
9ν˚pτ˚q
ν˚pτ˚q
¸
“ Spτ˚qν˚pτ˚q
ˆ
r ` 9ν
˚pτ˚q
ν˚pτ˚q
˙
,
where we make use of the first order condition in the second line. Thus, assuming (4.21),
the second derivative at every stationary point is negative. Hence, there exists only one
solution τ˚ of (4.22). 
Whether or not an optimal cycle length exists does not depend on the number of
cycles considered, since conditions piq and piiq of Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.2 are
identical. Assumption piiiq of Theorem 4.2.2, however, is different from assumption piiiq
of Theorem 4.2.1: since ´r ą ´rSpT q “ limNÑ8 ΥN pτq, the right-hand sides of both
assumptions are not equivalent.
The following example illustrates the foregoing theorems. We consider a situation
without holding costs, and where the deterioration rate equals zero. Even in this seem-
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ingly trivial constellation - only the constant unit and setup costs have to be considered
- verifying assumptions piq to piiiq turns out to be nontrivial.
Example 4.2.1 Let ptq “ qptq ” 0, and r, c0 ą 0, i.e., cptq “ c0ert. Let a, δ, and ε be
given. Recall, γ “ ε´Δ1´Δ ą ε ą 1 and Δ “ δ{a. Then, the profit rate ν˚ according to
(2.18) is given by
ν˚ptq “ cν˚e´γrtμptq 11´Δ , (4.23)
where cν˚ ” 1´ΔΔ
”
Δ
ε´1
`
ε´1
ε
˘εı 11´Δ
c
´pγ´1q
0 .
If μptq is equal to a constant μ which satisfies
γr
cν˚
kμ´
1
1´Δ ă 1, (4.24)
then, a finite value of the minimum cycle length T0 exists. This value is given by
T0 “ ´ 1
γr
log
ˆ
1 ´ γr
cν˚
kμ´
1
1´Δ
˙
. (4.25)
Moreover, if μ satisfies (4.24), there exist optimal cycle length values τN˚ and τ˚.
In general, to check assumption piq - the market-entry condition - it suffices to identify
at least one value τ such that π1pτq ą k. To do so, one can numerically evaluate the
integral π1pτq “
şτ
0 ν
˚ptqdt for large values of τ . In Example 4.2.1, if the arrival rate μ
is constant and satisfies (4.24), we find the closed form expression (4.25) of the value T0
depending on the parameter values of the model.21 In this special case, (4.25) can also be
used to analyze the dependence of the minimum cycle length on the model parameters.
Condition piiq of both Theorems 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 - the cycle-exit condition - requires
ν˚, see (4.23), to satisfy
lim
tÑ8 e
rtν˚ptq “ cν˚ lim
tÑ8 e
´pγ´1qrtμptq 11´Δ “ 0. (4.26)
Since γ ą 1, (4.26) holds true whenever μ is bounded from above, or if μ is any polyno-
mial function. Moreover, μ is allowed to increase or fluctuate as long as μptq1{p1´Δq is
dominated by the term e´pγ´1qrt when t Ñ `8. In particular, (4.26) holds true if the
arrival rate μ is constant and r ą 0. Since both conditions, the market-entry and the
cycle-exit condition, are satisfied, there exist optimal cycle length values τN˚ and τ˚.
21Elementary calculations yield the equation (4.25) as the solution of
şT0
0 ν
˚ptqdt “ k, whereşT0
0 ν
˚ptqdt “ cν˚μ
1
1´Δ
şT0
0 e
´γrtdt “ cν˚μ
1
1´Δ 1
γr
`
1 ´ e´γrT0˘. Note, for instance, if k is too large so
that (4.24) is not satisfied, no finite T0 exists.
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To check assumption piiiq of Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.2, we compute the log-
arithmic derivative of ν˚:
9ν˚pτq
ν˚pτq “
1
1 ´ Δ
9μpτq
μpτq ´ γr. (4.27)
Recall, for all τ ą T0, the logarithmic derivative of ν˚ must be smaller than ΥN pτq in the
case of a finite cycle problem and smaller than ´r if N is infinite. Obviously, if N “ 8
and μptq is nonincreasing, then 9ν˚pτqν˚pτq ď ´γr ă ´r. Moreover, whenever μ satisfies
9μptq
μptq “
d logμptq
dt
ă pε ´ 1qr (4.28)
for all t ą T0, there is a unique τ˚. For instance, the inequality (4.28) is satisfied if
μptq “ μ0 ¨ e ε´12 rt, μ0 ą 0. Condition (4.28), however, is violated, if μ is a linear function
in time and T0 is too small, e.g., μptq “ μ0 ` μ1t, μ0, μ1 ą 0, and T0 ă 1pε´1qr ´ μ0μ1 .
Next, we delve into Example 4.2.1 by considering a numerical example and different
scenarios for the μ function.
Example 4.2.1 (continued) Let r “ 0.1, c0 “ 1,  “ q “ 0, ε “ 2, a “ 2, δ “ 1, and
k “ 20. These values imply Δ “ 0.5 and γ “ 3. Then, the constant cν˚, see (4.23),
becomes 1{64 and cptq equals e0.1t. We consider four different μ functions pIq to pIV q,
see the second column in Table 4.1. The associated (optimal) profit margins, cf. (4.23),
are given in the third column.
scenario arrival intensity profit margin
pIq μptq “ μI ” 25 ν˚ptq « 9.77e´0.3t
pIIq μptq “ μII “ 1.1μI ” 27.5 ν˚ptq « 11.82e´0.3t
pIIIq μptq “ μI p1 ` 0.5 sinptqq ν˚ptq « 9.77p1 ` 0.5 sinptqq2e´0.3t
pIV q μptq “ μI epγ´1.5qrt1`pγ´2qrt “ 25 e
0.15t
1`0.1t ν
˚ptq « 9.77p1`0.1tq2
Table 4.1: The μ function for each scenario (2nd column) and the associated (approximate) profit
margin according to (4.23). Other parameter values are r “ 0.1, c0 “ 1,  “ q “ 0,
ε “ 2, a “ 2, δ “ 1, and k “ 20.
In scenarios pIq and pIIq, the arrival rates are constant pμII ą μIq. The cases pIIIq
and pIV q illustrate a time-inhomogeneous customer behavior. Scenario pIIIq represents
a stylized (perfect) seasonal pattern; the demand oscillates (with frequency 12π ) between
the values 12.5 and 37.5. In scenario pIV q, more and more customers arrive over time.
The arrival rate is an exponential function damped by a linear time dependent expression.
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Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 depicts the different scenarios on the time interval r0, 15s. In the
following, we will investigate each scenario and concentrate on the existence of an optimal
cycle length in the special cases when the number of cycles is three or infinity, i.e., N “ 3
or N “ `8.
The cost function cptq is of the simple exponential type cptq “ e0.1t. If μptq is also a
(rather) simple expression, for example a constant, one is able to explicitly compute the
integral of ν˚ptq - the one-cycle profit (depending on τ ą 0). In scenario pIq, for instance,
π1˚ pτq “ 3125{96
`
1 ´ e´3τ{10˘ ´ 20, and the root of this expression, the minimum cycle
length T0, can be easily computed, cf. (4.25). The second column of Table 4.2 gives the
corresponding T0 values (with a two digit precision) for each scenario. Assumption piq
is thus satisfied for all four scenarios: in any of the particular market environments it is
profitable to enter the market.
The cycle-exit condition piiq requires the expression ertν˚ptq to converge to zero. This
condition is satisfied in scenarios pIq, pIIq, and pIIIq. In scenario pIV q, no finite optimal
cycle length τN˚ , N finite or infinite, exists. The reason is that ertν˚ptq « 9.77 e0.1tp1`0.1tq2 ,
and this function tends to infinity if t Ñ 8. Panel (b) of Figure 4.2 shows the graphs of
the total profit functions πN pτq for all four scenarios if N “ 3; panel (c) of Figure 4.2
shows the graphs of the total profit functions if N “ 8. In both windows, the plots of
both profit functions for scenario pIV q indicate that the profit functions strictly increase
in τ , i.e., it is profitable to stay in the market forever. Moreover, the graphs of panel pbq
and pcq suggest that only in scenarios pIq and pIIq the optimal cycle length is unique.
One easily verifies that condition (4.18) is indeed satisfied for all τ ą 0 if the arrival
intensity is constant:
9ν˚pτq
ν˚pτq
pI,IIq“ ´γr “ ´3r “ ´3r2 ` 3e
rτ ` 3e2rτ ` e3rτ
2 ` 3erτ ` 3e2rτ ` e3rτ “ ´r
6 ` 9erτ ` 9e2rτ ` 3e3rτ
2 ` 3erτ ` 3e2rτ ` e3rτ
ă ´r e
rτ ` 4e2rτ ` e3rτ
2 ` 3erτ ` 3e2rτ ` e3rτ “ ´r
2e2rτ p2 ` coshprτqq
p2 ` erτ qp1 ` erτ ` e2rτ q “ Υ3pτq.
Since γ ą 1, also inequality (4.21), 9ν˚pτqν˚pτq ă ´r, is satisfied. Thus, τ˚ is unique.22 In
scenario pIIIq, the condition for uniqueness fails to be satisfied. However, the graph of
the profit functions in Figure 4.2 suggests that unique values τ3˚ and τ˚ exist. These
values can actually be determined numerically. For the scenarios pIq to pIV q, Table 4.2
22Note, that the uniqueness of τ˚N and τ˚ for scenario pIq and pIIq does not depend on the specific
values a, δ, and ε, since γ is always bigger than one.
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Figure 4.2: The 3-cycle profit π3pτq, panel (b), and the infinite-cycle profit π8pτq, panel (c), as
functions of τ for the different μ scenarios pIq ´ pIV q, panel (a). Panel (d) shows the
inventory process of one optimally controlled cycle for N “ 3 for scenarios pIq´pIIIq,
cf. Table 4.2. All plots assume r “ 0.1, c0 “ 1,  “ q “ 0, ε “ 2, a “ 2, δ “ 1, and
k “ 20.
displays the optimal cycle length, the associated (optimal) capacity, cf. (2.7),
xN˚ “
τ˚Nż
0
λ˚ptqdt,
and the optimal profit values (for N “ 3 and N “ `8). The numbers in Table 4.2 and
the plots of Figure 4.2 suggest that the optimal cycle length becomes smaller if μ gets
larger, cf. scenario pIq and pIIq, but also scenario pIIIq, where the arrival rate lies above
its average value μI at the beginning.23 The fourth and the seventh column of Table 4.2
show the capacity (or initial inventory) associated with the optimal control and optimal
23Recall, in scenario pIIIq, the function μptq oscillates around its mean value μI “ 25.
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N “ 3 N Ñ 8
scenario T0 τ3˚ x3˚ π3pτ3˚ q τ˚ x8˚ π8pτ8q
pIq 3.18 10.19 62.04 16.44 8.60 60.17 17.48
pIIq 2.36 9.05 73.55 26.31 7.04 69.23 28.93
pIIIq 1.51 8.85 86.76 37.02 3.10 69.17 54.71
pIV q 2.83 `8 195.31 77.66 `8 195.31 77.66
Table 4.2: Minimum cycle lengths, optimal cycle lengths, and capacities and total profits associ-
ated with the optimal cycle lengths for the scenarios pIq ´ pIV q; parameter values are
r “ 0.1, c0 “ 1,  “ q “ 0, ε “ 2, a “ 2, δ “ 1, and k “ 20.
cycle length. For scenarios pIq to pIIIq and N “ 3, the optimal cycle length decreases
while the associated capacity increases. Expressed in everyday language, in those cases
more goods are sold within a shorter time span. This effect can also be observed when
N “ `8. If N “ 3, panel (d) of Figure 4.2 shows the optimally controlled inventory
processes over one cycle.
Finally, we take a second look at scenario pIV q. In the case of scenario pIV q, condition
piiq of Theorem 4.2.1 is not satisfied, thus, it is profitable to extend the sales horizon
until infinity (τN˚ “ `8). In this case, the benefit from waiting is larger than the loss of
waiting. The profit rate ν˚ptq « 9.77p1`0.1tq2 decreases over time and converges to zero at a
quadratic rate. Hence, the value of the integral
ş8
0 ν
˚ptqdt is bounded from above, and
a limit for the net present value of the (optimal) total profit exists. Table 4.2 gives the
corresponding values of π3pτ3˚ q and π8pτ˚q for the cases N “ 3 and N “ 8.
Example 4.2.1 indicates that even in a seemingly simple setting - only unit costs are
considered and neither inventory costs nor depreciation effects are taken into account -
checking the assumptions of Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.2 can be tricky, cf. scenario
pIIIq. For any particular parameter setting, these assumptions have to be analyzed
individually. However, we characterize classes of settings that may help to facilitate this
analysis. The first part of the following Corollary presents an explicit solution formula
for the minimum cycle length T0 for a specific class of parameter settings (part paq), cf.
(4.25). Furthermore, for special cases (N “ 2 and N “ 8) assumption piiiq of Theorem
4.2.1, respectively Theorem 4.2.2, simplifies, see part pbq. The second part of Corollary
4.2.1 is a list of structural properties of the optimal cycle length and of the optimal
capacity as functions of the number of cycles N and the fixed order cost k.
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Corollary 4.2.1 Let Assumption 4.1.1 and Proposition 4.2.1 hold true, and let ν˚ be
given by Theorem 2.2.1.
1. a) Let qptq “ ptq “ 0, μptq ” μ and ν˚ptq “ cT0
´
μ
cε´10
¯ 1
1´Δ
e´γrt, where cT0 “
cλ
γ´1 “ 1´ΔΔ
”
Δ
ε´1
`
ε´1
ε
˘εı 11´Δ . If k ă cT0γr ´ μcε´10
¯ 1
1´Δ , then a finite minimum
cycle length T0 exists:
T0 “ ´ 1
γr
log
¨
˝1 ´ γr
cT0
ˆ
cε´10
μ
˙ 1
1´Δ
k
˛
‚. (4.29)
b) Let qptq, ptq ě 0 be continuous functions and let T0 be finite. Let ρ ă pε´1qr
be arbitrary but fixed. If
9μptq
μptq ă ρ for all t ą T0, (4.30)
and if N “ 2 or N “ 8, then a unique cycle length exists that maximizes
πN pτq.
2. Let all assumptions of Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.2 hold true. Then,
a) the optimal cycle length decreases in N ą 1, i.e., τN˚ ą τN˚`1 ą τ8,
b) the optimal capacity xN˚ :“
şτ˚N
0 λ
˚ptqdt decreases in N ,
c) the optimal cycle length and the optimal capacity both decrease in k.
Proof. 1.paq If ν˚ptq “ cT0
´
μ
cε´10
¯ 1
1´Δ
e´γrt, then the profit of one cycle is given by
π1˚ pτq “
ż τ
0
ν˚ptqdt “ cT0
ˆ
μ
cε´10
˙ 1
1´Δ 1
γr
`
1 ´ e´γrτ˘ .
If k ă cT0γr
´
μ
cε´10
¯ 1
1´Δ , then the equation π1˚ pτq “ k has a unique solution since the
term p1 ´ e´γrT q monotonically increases in T ě 0. Elementary calculations yield the
expression (4.29) of the solution value.
pbq Since a finite T0 exists, the market entry condition piq, see Theorem 4.2.1 and the
subsequent discussion, is satisfied. The derivative of the cost function cptq is given by
9cptq “ pqptq ` rq cptq ` ptq, cf. (2.9). If qptq, ptq ě 0 and r ą 0, then cptq is positive and
9cptq
cptq “ qptq ` r ` ptqcptq ě r, t ě 0, follows. Since μ satisfies condition (4.30), we get for any
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τ ě T0,
9ν˚pτq
ν˚pτq “ ´
„
r ` 11 ´ Δ
ˆ
pε ´ 1q 9cpτq
cpτq ´
9μpτq
μpτq
˙j
ď ´
„
r ` 11 ´ Δ
ˆ
pε ´ 1qr ´ d logμpτq
dτ
˙j
ă ´
„
r ` 11 ´ Δ
`pε ´ 1qr ´ ρ˘j
ă ´
„
r ` 11 ´ Δ
`pε ´ 1qr ´ pε ´ 1qr˘j
“ ´r.
Hence, the sufficient condition (4.21) is satisfied. Since Υ2pτq “ ´ r1`e´rτ ą ´r, condi-
tion (4.17) is also satisfied. We still have to show that based on the given assumptions
condition piiq, namely limtÑ8 ertν˚ptq “ 0, is satisfied. Using Gronwall’s lemma, condi-
tion (4.30) implies that μptq is bounded from above, i.e., μptq ă μp0qeρt for all t ě T0.
Since 9cptqcptq ě r, t ě 0, the cost function is bounded from below, cptq ě cp0qert “ c0ert.
Hence, t ě T0,
ertν˚ptq “ ertcT0e´rt
ˆ
μptq
cptqε´1
˙ 1
1´Δ
“ cT0
ˆ
μptq
cptqε´1
˙ 1
1´Δ
ď cT0
ˆ
μptq
pc0ertqε´1
˙ 1
1´Δ
ă cT0
ˆ
μp0qeρt
pc0ertqε´1
˙ 1
1´Δ
“ cT0
ˆ
μp0q
cε´10
˙ 1
1´Δ
e
pρ´pε´1qrq
1´Δ t.
Since ρ ă pε´1qr, the expression in the last line converges to zero. Thus, all assumptions
of Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.2 are satisfied and a unique optimal cycle length
exists.
2. Before we prove claims paq, pbq, and pcq, we collect facts about both sides of equation
(4.18). Since the assumptions of Theorem 4.2.1 are satisfied, for each N ą 1, a unique
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and finite value τN˚ ą T0 exists, i.e., the equation (4.18),
π1˚ pτq ´ k “ ´SN pτq9SN pτq
ν˚pτq,
has a unique solution τN˚ . In particular, we are going to exploit the facts that the left-
hand side of (4.18) is strictly monotone increasing in τ and that the right-hand side of
(4.18) is strictly monotone decreasing in τ ą T0 and in N ą 1 (separately).
The left-hand side of equation (4.18) strictly increases in τ , since π1˚ pτq is the integral
of the positive function ν˚. In the proof of Theorem 4.2.1, we showed that the right-hand
side of (4.18) is strictly monotone decreasing in τ ą T0 under assumption piiiq. To show
that the right-hand side of (4.18) decreases in N we have to show that the term
´SN pτq9SN pτq
“ e
rτ ´ 1
r
´
1 ´ perτ ´ 1q N
eNrτ ´1
¯ (4.31)
decreases in N ; note, ν˚ does not depend on the number of cycles. Since the expression
N
eNrτ ´1 in the denominator decreases in N ą 124, the denominator increases in N and
thus (4.31) is decreasing in N , i.e., ´SN pτq
9SN pτqν
˚pτq ą ´SN`1pτq
9SN`1pτqν
˚pτq for all N ą 1 follows.
With these preparations we are able to prove 2.paq.
paq We show that τN˚ ď τN˚`1 leads to a contradiction. To this end, assume τN˚ ď τN˚`1.
Then, exploiting the properties of (4.18),
π1˚ pτN˚ q ´ k ď π1˚ pτN˚`1q ´ k “ ´
SN`1pτN˚`1q
9SN`1pτN˚`1q
ν˚pτN˚`1q ď ´SN`1pτN˚ q9SN`1pτN˚ q
ν˚pτN˚ q
ă ´SN pτN˚ q9SN pτN˚ q
ν˚pτN˚ q “ π1˚ pτN˚ q ´ k,
which obviously is a contradiction. Hence, τN˚ ą τN˚`1. Since this strict inequality is true
for all N ą 1, we get τN˚ ą τN˚`1 ą limNÑ8 τN˚ “ τ8. Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 illustrates
the proof of statement 2.paq.
pbq The (optimal) sales rate λ˚ ą 0 does not depend on the cycle length and not on
the number of cycles, cf. Theorem (2.2.1). The capacity associated with the optimal
cycle length τN˚ is given by xN˚ :“
şτ˚N
0 λ
˚ptqdt. If τN˚ ą τN˚`1, see paq, then
xN˚ “
ż τ˚N
0
λ˚ptqdt “
ż τ˚N`1
0
λ˚ptqdt `
ż τ˚N`1
τ˚N
λ˚ptqdt “ xN˚`1 `
ż τ˚N`1
τ˚N
λ˚ptqdt ą xN˚`1.
24Note, N
eNrτ ´1 “ 1rτ ¨ 11` Nrτ2! ` pNrτq23! `...
.
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pcq Let 0 ă k1 ă k2 denote two distinct values of setup cost and, ceteris paribus, let τk1
and τk2 denote the associated optimal cycle lengths. Assume τk1 ď τk2 . Then,
π1˚ pτk2q ´ k2 ď π1˚ pτk1q ´ k2 ă π1˚ pτk1q ´ k1 “ ´SN pτk1q9SN pτk1q
ν˚pτk1q
ď ´SN pτk2q9SN pτk2q
ν˚pτk2q “ π1˚ pτk2q ´ k2
is a contradiction! Hence, τk1 ą τk2 . Panel (b) of Figure 4.3 illustrates the proof of case
pcq. 
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of part 2 of Corollary 4.2.1. Panel (a) shows the left-hand side (π1˚ pτq´k)
and the right-hand side of equation (4.18) as functions of τ for N and N ` 1. Panel
(b) shows the left-hand side and the right-hand side of equation (4.18) as functions
of τ if k1 ă k2, k1 ą 0.
The first part of Corollary 4.2.1 specifies parameter settings that guarantee the ex-
istence of a minimum cycle length T0. In general, it has to be checked (numerically)
whether or not
ş8
0 ν
˚ptqdt ą k. In part pbq, conditions are given that guarantee the ex-
istence and uniqueness of an optimal cycle length for the two extreme cases N “ 2 and
N Ñ `8. For instance, pbq implies that, whenever the arrival rate μ is a nonincreasing
function, a unique optimal cycle length exists (assuming T0 ă `8). The second part
of Corollary 4.2.1 summarizes properties of the optimal cycle length and the associated
capacity. In the infinite cycle problem, the optimal cycle length and the associated ca-
pacity are both smaller than the corresponding values for any finite N . Increased order
costs induce shorter optimal selling periods, and thus reduced order capacities. The
same holds true if k represents the setup cost in a production problem. In the following
section, we analyze the problem of maximizing the average profit.
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4.2.2 Maximizing the Average Profit per Time Unit
We now consider the average profit per time unit, the time-honored optimization criterion
in inventory management. We assume rptq ” 0. Many of the following results remain
valid assuming a positive interest rate; occasionally, conditions might have to be adjusted
to account for rptq ą 0. In this subsection, we abstain from explicitly considering the
odd case of discounted average profits to focus on the influences of the cost parameters
on the optimal cycle length.25
The profit associated with a sales period of length τ is given by π1pτq “ π1˚ pτq ´ k “
τş
0
ν˚ptqdt ´ k, cf. (4.5) and Theorem 2.2.1 for the formula of ν˚. Recall, ν˚ is strictly
positive and does not depend on the length of a cycle.26 The profit per time unit - the
(time) average profit - is then given by
π∅pτq :“ π1pτq
τ
“ 1
τ
pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq “ 1τ
¨
˝ τż
0
ν˚ptqdt ´ k
˛
‚. (4.32)
For τ ě T0, we assume that the average profit is bounded from below and bounded
from above. If T0 is finite, then π1pT0q “ 0, see (4.6), and since ν˚ is strictly positive,
π1pτq ą 0 for all τ ą T0. Thus, zero is a lower bound of the average profit. Let
lim supτÑ`8 π1pτq{τ “ 0, i.e., there is no benefit from waiting an infinite time. As in
the discounted case, we assume the parameter functions to be identical on every cycle,
cf. Condition 4.1.1. The problem to be considered is to choose a cycle length τ such
that π∅pτq is maximized; we denote such an optimal cycle length by τ∅. Similar to the
discounted case in Section 4.2.1, we will state assumptions that guarantee the existence
and uniqueness of an optimal cycle length.
Theorem 4.2.3 Let Condition 4.1.1 hold, and let ν˚ be given by Theorem 2.2.1. Let
rptq ” 0 for all t ě 0, and assume:
(i) the first hitting time T0, see (4.6), exists and is finite.
(ii) limtÑ8 ν˚ptq “ 0.
Then,
(a) there exists an optimal cycle length τ∅, T0 ă τ∅ ă `8, that maximizes (4.32).
25In Subsection 4.3.2, we allow for discounted average profits. There, we exploit formulas and expressions
that hold true for rptq ” r ě 0; see, for example, Propositions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
26The cycle length only determines how long the (optimal) controls are applied within a cycle of length
τ .
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Moreover, if the assumptions piq, piiq and
(iii) μptq is a differentiable function on the open interval pT0,`8q, and
9ν˚ptq “ ´ ν
˚ptq
1 ´ Δ
„
pε ´ 1q 9cptq
cptq ´
9μptq
μptq
j
(4.33)
is negative on pT0,`8q,
are satisfied, then,
(b) the optimal cycle length τ∅ is unique; τ∅ is the (unique) solution of the equation
π∅pτq “ ν˚pτq. (4.34)
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is to show that the function π∅pτq is continuous
on the semi-open interval rT0,`8q, it is positive on pT0,`8q, and it converges to zero
for large values of τ . Consequently, there exists a finite value τ∅ ą T0 that maximizes
π∅pτq.
paq The (optimal) one-cycle profit π1˚ pτq is differentiable, cf. the proof of Theorem
4.2.1. Thus, the average profit π∅pτq is also a differentiable (and continuous) function.
Assumption piq ensures that π1˚ pτq ą k for all τ ą T0. Hence, π∅pτq is positive on the
open interval pT0,`8q. Assumption piiq implies that the rate of growth of π1˚ pτq “şτ
0 ν
˚ptqdt tends to zero for large values of τ . Hence, π∅pτq “ pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq{τ converges to
zero if τ tends to infinity. Thus, since π∅ is continuous, π∅ attains its maximum on the
interval pT0,`8q. This proves statement paq.
pbq By assumption, μptq is a differentiable function on pT0,`8q. Hence, ν˚ptq is a
differentiable function on pT0,`8q, and the first derivative of π∅,
dπ∅
dτ
pτq “ ν
˚pτqτ ´ pπ1˚ pτq ´ kq
τ2
“ ν
˚pτq ´ π∅pτq
τ
,
is differentiable (and continuous) in τ , too. Since a maximum exists on the open interval
pT0,`8q, equation (4.34) is equivalent to the first order condition dπ∅dτ pτq !“ 0, and the
equation is satisfied for (at least) one finite value τ∅ ą T0. Assuming that 9ν˚ptq is
negative on pT0,`8q, see (4.33), the second derivative of π∅ evaluated at τ∅,
d2π∅
dτ2
pτ∅q “
´
9ν˚pτ∅q ´ dπ∅dτ pτ∅q
¯
τ∅ ´ 2 pν˚pτ∅q ´ π∅pτ∅qq τ∅
τ4∅
“ 9ν
˚pτ∅q
τ∅
,
is negative on pT0,`8q. Thus, the critical point τ∅ is a local maximum. Since every
critical point satisfies the sufficient condition for being a (local) maximum, there can not
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be a local minimum point and hence, no two or more local maxima exist. Hence, the
point τ∅ is unique. 
Remark 4.2.2 Although we refer to the optimal profit rate ν˚, cf. Chapter 2, any
(positive) profit rate satisfying the assumptions in Theorem 4.2.3 will ensure the existence
and uniqueness of the optimal cycle length.
The assumptions of Theorem 4.2.3 are similar to those of Theorem 4.2.2. The first
order condition (4.34) is equivalent to (4.22) when r Ñ 0. Moreover, the conditions
imposed on ν˚ by piiiq are identical to those in Theorem 4.2.2 if r Ñ 0. One should keep
in mind, however, that the factor e´rt which appears in the cost function as well as in the
profit rate ν˚ becomes one since we assume rptq ” 0. If the profit rate is nondecreasing,
the existence of an average-optimal cycle length can not be guaranteed. For instance,
in the time-homogeneous setting without deterioration and inventory cost, i.e., μptq ”
μ, ptq “ qptq ” 0 for all t ě 0, the optimal profit rate ν˚ptq ” ν˚ is a constant and a
finite average profit maximizing cycle length τ∅ does not exist and limτÑ8 π∅pτq “ ν˚.27
Panel (a) of Figure 4.4 illustrates this time-homogeneous situation; for simplicity, we set
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of Theorem 4.2.3. Panel (a) shows the case when ν˚ptq is constant and
limτÑ8 π∅pτq “ ν˚; no finite τ∅ exists. Panel (b) illustrates profit margins ν1˚ and
ν2˚ which satisfy conditions piq and piiq of Theorem 4.2.3, and associated average
profit functions π∅1 and π∅2 . Only ν1˚ satisfies condition piiiq of Theorem 4.2.3.
ν˚ptq ” 1 and k ” 1. Hence, π∅pτq “ 1 ` 1τ , τ ą 0. Panel (b) of Figure 4.4 depicts two
cases where assumptions piq and piiq of Theorem 4.2.3 are both satisfied. However, only
the profit function ν1˚ ptq satisfies condition piiiq. The value of the optimal cycle length is
given by the point where ν1˚ (dark yellow) and the associated average profit π∅1 (green
27In Example 4.2.1, we showed that if r ą 0 a finite τ˚, however, does exist.
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line) intersect.28 In the case of ν2˚ , condition piiiq is violated: the profit margin ν2˚ is
constant on the interval r0, 2s and condition (4.33) is not satisfied for τ P rT0, 2s; note
0 ă T0 ă 2. Moreover, the plot of ν2˚ exhibits a jump at t “ 2 (essentially due to a
jump of the μ function). Nevertheless, the average profit function peaks exactly at the
same point. The kink of π∅2pτq at the optimal point might cause difficulties when doing
numerical calculations.
We summarize structural properties of the average-optimal cycle length τ∅ in the
following lemma. Afterwards, we analyze how advertising influences τ∅. To this end,
notice that multiplying the first order condition (4.34) by τ one obtains
π1˚ pτq ´ k “ τν˚pτq “ ν˚pτq
ż τ
0
dt “
ż τ
0
ν˚pτqdt.
Thus, assuming condition piq to piiiq of Theorem 4.2.3 to hold, the average-optimal cycle
length is the unique solution of
ż τ
0
pν˚ptq ´ ν˚pτqq dt “ k. (4.35)
Since ν˚ptq ą 0 is monotonically decreasing on pT0,`8q, the integrand is nonnegative,
and the integral on the left-hand side of (4.35) increases in τ on pT0,`8q.29 Since τ∅
is the unique solution of (4.35) and the left-hand side of (4.35) is monotone increasing,
the optimal cycle length τ∅ obviously increases in the setup cost k; it takes longer to
compensate for the fixed cost k. This observation goes in line with statement 2.pcq of
Corollary 4.2.1. Moreover, equation (4.35) enables us to compare the average-optimal
cycle lengths for different profit rates. In particular, we are interested in the effect of
advertising, i.e., the comparison of the pure dynamic pricing model of Rajan et al. (1992)
and our dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising model with respect to the average-
optimal cycle length. First, we specify conditions (as part of the following Lemma), that
make it possible to compare both models.
28For simplicity, we concentrate on the expression for the profit rate and neglect the particular choice
of the parameter values that enter the profit margins.
29Notice that the derivative of
şτ
0
`
ν˚ptq ´ ν˚pτq˘ dt “ şτ0 ν˚ptqdt ´ ν˚pτqτ with respect to τ is given by
ν˚pτq ´ ` 9ν˚pτqτ ` ν˚pτq˘ “ ´ 9ν˚pτqτ . Since ν˚ptq monotonically decreases on pT0, `8q the integralşτ
0
`
ν˚ptq ´ ν˚pτq˘ dt increases in τ ą T0.
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Lemma 4.2.1 Let the functions f1ptq and f2ptq be positive and integrable for all t ě 0.
Let k ą 0 and define, for i “ 1, 2,
Fipτq :“ 1
τ
¨
˝ τż
0
fiptqdt ´ k
˛
‚. (4.36)
Let T p1q0 , T
p2q
0 resp., denote the root of F1, F2 resp., and assume T
piq
0 , i “ 1, 2, to be
positive and finite. Let τi, T piq0 ă τi ă `8, i “ 1, 2, denote the unique maximizer of Fi.
Assume f1, f2 resp., to be strictly decreasing for all t P pT p1q0 ,`8q, t P pT p2q0 ,`8q resp.
Assume the difference αptq :“ f2ptq ´ f1ptq to be positive and nonincreasing for all
t P r0, τ1s. If αptq is strictly decreasing on some subinterval of r0, τ1s, then
τ2 ă τ1.
Proof. We will proof Lemma 4.2.1 by contradiction. Assume τ2 ą τ1. Under this
assumption, we will show that the first order condition, see below, can not be satisfied.
Since Fi is a smooth function in τ , optimality of τi ą 0 implies that τi must satisfy the
first order condition, i “ 1, 2,
dFi
dτ
pτiq “ fipτiqτi ´
şτi
0 fiptqdt ` k
τ2i
!“ 0.
Thus, ż τi
0
fiptqdt ´ fi pτiq τi “
ż τi
0
pfiptq ´ fipτiqq dt “ k. (4.37)
Since fi is strictly positive, both integral expressions
şτi
0 fiptqdt are increasing in τi ą 0.
This property implies τ1 ą T p1q0 and τ2 ą T p2q0 , since otherwise Fipτq ă 0 for all τ ą 0.
Since fi is strictly decreasing on the open interval pT piq0 ,`8q the expression, i “ 1, 2,
ż τ
0
pfiptq ´ fipτqq dt “
ż T piq0
0
pfiptq ´ fipτqq dt `
ż τ
T
piq
0
pfiptq ´ fipτqq dt
“ k ´ fipτqT piq0 `
ż τ
T
piq
0
pfiptq ´ fipτqq dt
strictly increases in τ ą T piq0 . Hence, the value τi is the only solution of equation
(4.37). W.l.o.g., let us assume that τ2 ě τ1. Since f2ptq is decreasing on pT p2q0 ,8q, the
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relationship τ2 ě τ1 implies the inequality f2pτ2q ď f2pτ1q. Thus,ż τ1
0
pf2ptq ´ f2pτ1qq dt ď
ż τ2
0
pf2ptq ´ f2pτ2qq dt “ k, (4.38)
cf. equation (4.37). However, recall, f2ptq “ f1ptq ` αptq, 0 ď t ď τ1, since αptq :“
f2ptq ´ f1ptq,ż τ1
0
pf2ptq ´ f2pτ1qq dt “
ż τ1
0
pf1ptq ` αptq ´ pf1pτ1q ` αpτ1qqq dt
“
ż τ1
0
pf1ptq ´ f1pτ1qq dt `
ż τ1
0
pαptq ´ αpτ1qq dt
“ k `
ż τ1
0
pαptq ´ αpτ1qq dt
ą k,
where, in the last step, we make use of the fact that αptq is generally nonincreasing and
decreases on some subinterval of r0, τ1s. Hence, the integrand αptq ´αpτ1q is positive on
some subinterval of r0, τ1s. Thus,
şτ1
0 pαptq ´ αpτ1qq dt ą 0 and the hypothesis τ2 ě τ1
leads to a contradiction. Therefore, τ2 ă τ1 must hold true. 
In the following, we will interpret f1 and f2 as profit margins. Hence, the function
Fipτq in Lemma 4.2.1 is the average profit associated with the margin fi and cycle
length τ . Assuming the difference α to be positive is equivalent to the statement that
the (profit) function f2 is strictly larger than the (profit) function f1. In Theorem 4.2.4,
we will formulate assumptions that enable us to compare the optimal cycle length τR
associated with the profit function νR in the pure pricing model (δ “ 0, cf. Corollary
2.2.2) with the optimal cycle length τ∅ associated with profit function ν˚ in the dynamic
pricing and dynamic advertising model. In Corollary 2.2.3, we introduced the function
βptq ą 0 to link the arrival rate μR of the pure pricing model with the arrival rate
μ of the model where δ ą 0; namely, we assume μRptq “ βptqμptq.30 We argue that
due to the lack of advertising in the pure pricing model the sales rate comprises an
advertising rate of value one; the function β can be interpreted as an exogenously given
(costless) advertising rate. If the optimal advertising rate in the model with advertising
is sufficiently large, i.e., w˚ptqδ ą βptq1´Δ for any t ě 0, then ν˚ptq ą νRptq, cf. Corollary
2.2.3. Under additional assumptions, we are able to compare the optimal cycle lengths
30One can think of two markets: one market where advertising has an effect (δ ą 0, the dynamic pricing
and advertising model, and arrival intensity μ) and another market where advertising has no effect
or is forbidden (δ ” 0, i.e., a pure pricing model, and the arrival intensity equals μR).
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of both markets.
Theorem 4.2.4 Let k ą 0, μptq ą 0, and let the assumptions of Theorem 4.2.3 be
satisfied. Let βptq ą 0, and let νR be given by formula (2.26) of Corollary 2.2.2 with
arrival rate μRptq :“ βptqμptq, t ě 0, ceteris paribus. Assume that
πRpτq :“ 1
τ
ˆż τ
0
νRptqdt ´ k
˙
(4.39)
has a unique maximizer τR and let the optimal value πRpτRq be positive. If, for all
t P r0, τRs,
w˚ptqδ ą βptq1 ´ Δ (4.40)
and w˚ptq is nonincreasing on r0, T0s, see equation (4.6) for the definition of T0, then
τ∅ ă τR, (4.41)
and
π∅pτ∅q ą πRpτRq. (4.42)
Proof. Recall, if δ ą 0, the optimal profit rate and the optimal advertising rate are
given by, see Theorem 2.2.1,
ν˚ptq “ cλγ´1
´
μptq
cptqε´1
¯ 1
1´Δ “ 1 ´ ΔΔ w
˚ptqa, (4.43)
w˚ptq “ cw
´
μptq
cptqε´1
¯ 1
a´δ ą 0,
where γ ´ 1 “ ε´11´Δ , cw “
”
Δ
ε´1
`
ε´1
ε
˘εı 1a´δ , and cλ “ ε´1Δ cwa are positive constants.
If δ ” 0, see Corollary 2.2.2, the optimal profit rate is given by
νRptq “ 1
ε ´ 1
ˆ
ε ´ 1
ε
˙ε μRptq
cptqε´1 .
Since, by assumption, w˚ptqδ ą βptq1´Δ on r0, τRs, according to identity (2.30),
ν˚ptq “ 1 ´ Δptq
βptq w
˚ptqδptqνRptq,
it follows that ν˚ptq ą νRptq on r0, τRs. To verify relation (4.41), we will show that
the assumptions of Lemma 4.2.1 are satisfied if f1 :“ νR and f2 :“ ν˚ ; the associated
average-optimal cycle lengths are denoted by τ1 :“ τR and τ2 :“ τ∅. In particular, we
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have to show that
(a) ν˚ptq and νRptq are decreasing functions for sufficiently large values of t, see Lemma
4.2.1 and further details below,
(b) the difference αptq :“ ν˚ptq ´ νRptq is positive and is nonincreasing on r0, τRs,
(c) αptq is strictly decreasing on some subinterval of r0, τRs.
By assumption, the optimal cycle length τR exists and πRpτRq is positive. By Theorem
4.2.3 the optimal cycle length τ∅ also exists. Hence, finite minimal cycle lengths T0
and TR exist, where TR :“ inf
!
T
ˇˇˇşT
0 νRptqdt ě k, T ě 0
)
ă τR. Since, by assumption,
ν˚ptq ą νRptq for all t ě 0, the inequality T0 ă TR follows.
paq We will show that the function ν˚ptq, νRptq respectively, is decreasing for all
t ą T0, t ą TR respectively. Since we assume that all conditions of Theorem 4.2.3 are
satisfied, ν˚ptq strictly decreases for all t ą T0, see (4.33). Hence, by equation (4.43), also
w˚ptqa decreases for all t ą T0. Recall, w˚ptq is positive whenever t and a are positive.
Thus, w˚ptq also decreases for all t ą T0. Rearranging equation (2.33), w˚ptqaptq´δptq “
Δptq
βptq e
RptqνRptq, one obtains νRptq “ βΔw˚ptqa´δ. Since a ą δ, the property that the
advertising rate is monotonically decreasing on pT0,8q implies that νRptq also decreases
monotonically for all t ą T0. Since T0 ă TR, the function νR is monotonically decreasing
on pTR,8q.
pbq & pcq By assumption, ν˚ dominates νR on r0, τRs, a fact which implies that the
difference αptq “ ν˚ptq ´ νRptq is positive on r0, τRs. Exploiting the identity (2.30),
ν˚ptq “ 1´Δptqβptq w˚ptqδptqνRptq, we obtain
αptq “ ν˚ptq ´ νRptq “ ν˚ptq ´ βptq1 ´ Δ
ν˚ptq
w˚ptqδ “ ν
˚ptq
ˆ
1 ´ βptq1 ´ Δ
1
w˚ptqδ
˙
. (4.44)
Since both factors of the product are positive decreasing functions in t, αptq also decreases
on pT0, τRs, which verifies part pcq.
To finish part pbq, we will show that αptq is nonincreasing on r0, T0s. By assumption,
the optimal advertising rate w˚ does not increase on r0, T0s. Thus, ν˚ does not increase
on r0, T0s, see (4.43). Hence, αptq is nonincreasing on r0, T0s, cf. equation (4.44). Thus,
all assumptions of Lemma 4.2.1 are satisfied and property (4.41) follows.
Since ν˚ptq ą νRptq for all t ě 0, τ∅ ă τR, the following strict inequality,
π∅pτ∅q “
şτ∅
0 ν
˚ptqdt ´ k
τ∅
ě
şτR
0 ν
˚ptqdt ´ k
τR
ą
şτR
0 νRptqdt ´ k
τR
“ πRpτRq,
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implies (4.42). Note, by assumption, τ∅ is the average-optimal cycle length maximizing
π∅pτq, thus, the first inequality
şτ∅
0 ν
˚ptqdt´k
τ∅
ě
şτR
0 ν
˚ptqdt´k
τR
follows. 
Theorem 4.2.4 allows us to compare the two different models with respect to the
average-optimal cycle lengths and the associated average profits per unit time. Equation
(2.30) in Corollary 2.2.3,
ν˚ptq “ 1 ´ Δptq
βptq w
˚ptqδptqνRptq,
makes it possible to compare the profit rates of the following two scenarios: the model
with advertising (δ ą 0), and the model without advertising (δ “ 0). Verifying part pbq
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Figure 4.5: Panel (a) shows the average profits and optimal margins as functions of the cy-
cle length τ for the model with advertising (δ ą 0, ν˚, π∅) and the model with-
out advertising (δ “ 0, νR, πR). Panel (b) shows the optimally controlled in-
ventory processes for one cycle. The parameters are: a “ 2, δ “ 1, ε “ 2,
c0 “ 1,  “ 0.01, k “ 10, q “ 0, μ “ μR “ 25pβ “ 1q.
of the proof of Theorem 4.2.4 is straight forward. For instance, if the arrival intensities
are identical for both scenarios, i.e., β “ 1, and μptq “ μRptq for all t ě 0, then the
opportunity to advertise is profitable31 only if the optimal advertising rate is larger
than one (sales are boosted). Accordingly, if w˚ ă 1, it is optimal to curb demand,
and the profit of the scenario with δ “ 0 is larger than with δ ą 0.32 It is intuitive
to assume β ă 1 because generally there is no free promotion. Then, also advertising
31Profitable here means that the (optimal) profit margin associated with δ ą 0 is greater than the
(optimal) profit margin associated with δ ” 0 on r0, τRs, i.e., ν˚ptq ą νRptq, 0 ď t ď τR.
32This property goes in line with the discussion around Corollary 2.2.3, cf. Chapter 2, when does the
opportunity to advertise become an obligation.
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rates less than one might satisfy w˚ptqδ ą βptq1´Δ .33 Panel (a) of Figure 4.5 illustrates
the optimality conditions for τ∅ and τR if β “ 1 and qptq ” 0. Panel (b) on the
right depicts the optimally controlled inventory processes for one cycle. One’s intuition
suggests that, if τ∅ ă τR, the initial inventory level if advertising is used is larger than
without advertising, i.e., x˚p0q ą xRp0q: selling the goods at a higher (demand) rate
and at a higher profit rate should also convince the monopolist to sell more items.
If the assumptions of Theorem 4.2.4 are not satisfied, it is not clear which cycle length
will be the larger one. For instance, if inequality (4.40) does not hold true for all t ě 0,
i.e., advertising is not profitable on r0, τRs, then it might be possible that τ∅ ą τR. For
example, setting ε “ 3 (instead of ε “ 2) in the example of Figure 4.5 leads to a negative
value of the difference αptq for all t ě 0, but the inequality τ∅ « 15.25 ă 19.66 « τR is
still satisfied. However, the inequality (4.42) changes, i.e., π∅pτ∅q ă πRpτRq.34 If ε “ 4
- ceteris paribus - the optimal cycle length of the model without advertising is smaller
than the optimal cycle length of the model associated with customers who are sensitive
to advertising; to be specific, τ∅ « 21.47 ą 20.31 « τR. In general, if the assumptions of
Theorem 4.2.4 are not satisfied, then the only way to compare the two models, i.e., the
one with advertising and the one without advertising, is by numerical analysis.
4.3 Optimal Order Decisions with Revenue Maximizing
Pricing-Advertising Policies
In the previous Section 4.2, we determined the profit maximizing policies of a firm which
is allowed to simultaneously choose the initial capacity, the duration of the inventory
cycle as well as the dynamic pricing and advertising policies for the class of inventory
dynamics where no explicit effects depending on the stock level are taken into account.
For the class of models with (state) feedback considered in Chapter 3 we propose the
following (suboptimal) procedure for a decision maker who decides on the order quantity
x and the cycle length τ and who takes the revenue and all inventory related costs of a
fixed (still depending on pτ, xq) strategy pair into account. For any pair pτ, xq and for
the sales rate
λpt, p, w, yq “ μptqp´εwδψpyq, (4.45)
0 ď t ď τ, 0 ď y ď x, cf. (3.4), the firm chooses piq the revenue (minus advertising costs)
maximizing policies pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq determined in Chapter 3, see Theorem 3.2.1, and piiq
33Recall, an advertising rate of one might be interpreted in terms of one thousand (dollars).
34Notice that in this case νRptq ą ν˚ptq for all t ě 0.
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computes the associated costs as follows:
k ` c0x `
τż
0
e´rtptqx‹pt, τ, xqdt,
where x‹pt, τ, xq :“ x‹ptq is the associated revenue maximizing inventory trajectory. This
trajectory is given by formula (3.23) where, on the right-hand side of (3.23), T is replaced
by τ and x0 is replaced by x. Thus, considering the average profit per time unit the
decision maker faces the following ”newsvendor-like” problem:
sup
τ,xą0
"
1
τ
”
V pτ, xq ´ pc0x ` Lpτ, xq ` kq
ı*
. (4.46)
V pτ, xq is the optimal revenue minus the advertising cost when the initial inventory value
x is sold over a cycle of length τ , cf. equation (3.51) in Theorem 3.2.2, and
Lpτ, xq :“
τż
0
e´rspsqx‹ps, τ, xqds (4.47)
is the present value of total inventory costs associated with a pair pτ, xq and the revenue
maximizing policy. Besides the time-average problem (4.46) we are also going to analyze
the problem where the decision maker wants to maximize the present value of N ě 1
inventory cycles while applying the (identical) revenue maximizing policies within each
cycle:
sup
τ,xą0
"
SN pτq
”
V pτ, xq ´ pc0x ` Lpτ, xq ` kq
ı*
. (4.48)
Since SpT q “ limNÑ8 SN pT q is well defined, cf. Proposition 4.2.1, we will also consider
the case when the number of cycles is infinite. Like in Section 4.2, we will first consider
the N cycle problem (4.48) and then the maximization of the time-average profit (4.46).
Note, whenever ψpxq ” 1, the results of Chapter 3 imply that for any pair pτ, xq
the revenue maximizing strategies pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq are admissible policies for the problem
considered in Chapter 2 and in Section 4.2. Therefore, a solution of (4.46), resp. (4.48),
will be suboptimal compared to the solutions derived earlier (in the case ψpxq ” 1).
Nevertheless, as will be shown below, in many applied cases the solutions of (4.46) and
(4.48) will lead to reasonable decision rules.
To solve (4.48), we shall first analyze the objective function without taking the con-
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stant k and the terms 1{τ and SN pτq into account. To this end, let
Π‹1pτ, xq :“ V pτ, xq ´ c0x ´ Lpτ, xq. (4.49)
The subscript ”1” refers to one cycle and the superscript ”‹” indicates that the revenue
maximizing policy is applied. Since V pτ, xq “ Aptq 1γ Bpxq γ´1γ is a separable function of
τ and x, cf. (3.51), the function Π‹1 has an appealing economic interpretation. To begin
with, for every order scheme pτ, xq the revenue V pτ, xq is positive and increasing. The
special form of V suggests the idea to think of V as a production function, and to think
of the variables τ and x as the production factors ”time” and ”quantity”. The output on
a value basis associated with a pair pτ, xq is given by V pτ, xq. Then, since the exponents
1
γ and
γ´1
γ add-up to one, V is a Cobb-Douglas function which is homogeneous of degree
1. The expressions Apτq and Bpxq are but transformed values of (storage/production)
time and (storage/production) capacity; but any other interpretation of a two factor
model is also feasible. The costs of using the two production factors are given as a sum
of a linear expression of one of the factors, viz. c0 ¨ x, and a combined cost term given
by Lpτ, xq.
The next three propositions are collections of formulas to be exploited in the sequel.
All formulas except (4.54) follow from elementary calculus.
Proposition 4.3.1 Let Condition 4.1.1 and all hypotheses of Theorem 3.2.1 be satisfied.
Let rptq “ r ě 0 and let the arrival intensity μptq, see (4.45), be differentiable. Then
Π‹1pτ, xq is a differentiable function, where
9Π‹1pτ, xq :“ BΠ
‹
1
Bτ pτ, xq “ 9V pτ, xq ´ 9Lpτ, xq, (4.50)
Π‹11pτ, xq :“ BΠ
‹
1
Bx pτ, xq “ V
1pτ, xq ´ c0 ´ L1pτ, xq. (4.51)
Moreover,
9V pτ, xq :“ BVBτ pτ, xq “
e´γrτηpτq
γAp0, τq V pτ, xq ą 0, (4.52)
V 1pτ, xq :“ BVBx pτ, xq “
ψpxq 1ε´1
Bpxq V pτ, xq ą 0, (4.53)
9Lpτ, xq :“ BLBτ pτ, xq “
ż τ
0
e´rtptqBx
‹
Bτ pt, τ, xqdt ą 0, (4.54)
L1pτ, xq :“ BLBx pτ, xq “
ż τ
0
e´rtptqBx
‹
Bx pt, τ, xqdt ą 0. (4.55)
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Proof. To verify (4.54) apply Leibniz’s formula to the integral expression (4.47) and
use the fact that x‹pτ, τ, xq “ 0. Recall, the revenue maximizing strategies pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq
guarantee that any capacity x will be sold over any time interval τ . The positivity of
expressions (4.52) to (4.55) follows from the assumptions of Theorem 3.2.1 and Condition
4.1.1. 
Besides expressions for the derivatives of Π‹1, we also need derivative formulas of the
optimal state process x‹ with respect to the time horizon τ and the capacity x, cf. (4.54)
and (4.55).
Proposition 4.3.2 Let all assumptions of Proposition 4.3.1 be satisfied. For any t,
0 ă t ă τ , and x, x ą 0,
Bx‹
Bτ pt, τ, xq “
e´γrτηpτq
Ap0qp0, τq
˜
1 ´ A
p0qpt, τq
Ap0qp0, τq
¸
Bpxq
B1px‹pt, τ, xqq ą 0, (4.56)
Bx‹
Bx pt, τ, xq “
Ap0qpt, τq
Ap0qp0, τq
B1pxq
B1px‹pt, τ, xqq ą 0. (4.57)
Proof. We shall spell out the details of the derivation of equation (4.56). Formula (4.57)
can be verified along the same lines. Note,
`
B´1
˘1 pxq “ 1
B1pB´1pxqq and the derivative of
Ap0qpt, τq with respect to τ does not depend on t; BAp0qpt,τqBτ “ e´γrτηpτq. Hence,
Bx‹
Bτ pt, τ, xq “ B
ˆ
B´1
ˆ
Bpxq A
p0qpt, τq
Ap0qp0, τq
˙˙
{Bτ
“ 1
B1
´
B´1
´
Bpxq Ap0qpt,τq
Ap0qp0,τq
¯¯ Bpxq
”
BAp0q
Bτ pt, τqAp0qp0, τq ´ Ap0qpt, τq BA
p0q
Bτ p0, τq
ı
Ap0qp0, τq2
“ Bpxq
B1 px‹pt, τ, xqq
BAp0q
Bτ pt, τqAp0qp0, τq
”
1 ´ Ap0qpt,τq
Ap0qp0,τq
ı
Ap0qp0, τq2 ,
and equation (4.56) follows. 
While the combination of both propositions yields nice explicit formulas, evaluating
these expressions in specific cases is easier said than done. To compute the inventory
costs Lpτ, xq and their derivative. one has to compute the optimal trajectory x‹ptq and
evaluate various integrals along this path. Therefore, when illustrating some general
results later on we shall choose parameter values in such a way that x‹ptq becomes a
148
4.3 Optimal Order Decisions with Revenue Maximizing Pricing-Advertising Policies
nice expression, for example, a linear function of t.
Our ultimate goal is to solve the problems (4.46) and (4.48). To this end, we take
a closer look at the domain of Π‹1. Obviously, an order scheme pτ, xq should be such
that the setup cost k ą 0 will be covered in every cycle. Therefore, we restrict the
domain of Π‹1 to the set Λk :“ tpτ, xq|Π‹1pτ, xq ě k, τ ą 0, x ą 0u. For the remainder of
the section we assume Λk ‰ ∅; if no such order scheme exists, it is not profitable to
run the business at all. Similar to the minimum cycle length T0, cf. (4.6), we define the
minimum (capacity-dependent) cycle length τ0 as, x0 ą 0,
τ0px0q :“ inf tT |Π‹1pT, x0q ě k, T ą 0u . (4.58)
For a given capacity x0, the value τ0px0q is the shortest duration of a cycle that is
necessary to make a profit of at least k. If no such value exists, we set τ0px0q “ `8.
Similarly, we define the minimum (cycle length dependent) capacity χ0, T ą 0,
χ0pT q “ inf tx |Π‹1pT, xq ě k, x ą 0u . (4.59)
For a given cycle length T , the value χ0pT q denotes the minimum capacity that a firm
must establish to break even if all costs, including the setup cost k, are taken into
account. If no such value exists, we set χ0pT q “ `8. From now on, we will refer
to the existence of finite values τ0px0q or χ0pT q as the market-entry condition. The
market-entry condition guarantees that the set Λk is non-empty.
Like for the problems considered in Section 4.2, we provide an integral representation
of the function Π‹1 in terms of a profit rate function. The details of the representation
are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.3 Let all assumptions of Theorem 3.2.1 be satisfied. In equation
(3.25), replace T by τ and x0 by x, and let w‹ptq “: w‹pt, τ, xq. Define
ν‹pt, τ, xq :“ e´rt
ˆ
ε ´ Δ
Δ w
‹pt, τ, xqa ´ ptqx‹pt, τ, xq
˙
´ c0 x
τ
. (4.60)
Then, the function Π‹1pτ, xq defined by (4.49) has the integral representation
Π‹1pτ, xq “
τż
0
ν‹pt, τ, xqdt. (4.61)
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Proof. We exploit the (pointwise) Dorfman-Steiner relation (3.17) as follows:
V pτ, xq “
τż
0
e´rt pp‹ptqλ‹ptq ´ w‹ptqaq dt
“
τż
0
e´rt
´ ε
Δw
‹ptqa ´ w‹ptqa
¯
dt
“
τż
0
e´rt ε ´ ΔΔ w
‹ptqadt.
Hence, using definition (4.60),
Π‹1pτ, xq “ V pτ, xq ´ c0x ´ Lpτ, xq
“
τż
0
e´rt ε ´ ΔΔ w
‹ptqadt ´ c0x
τ
ż τ
0
dt ´
ż τ
0
e´rtptqx‹pt, τ, xqdt
“
ż τ
0
„
e´rt
ˆ
ε ´ Δ
Δ w
‹pt, τ, xqa ´ ptqx‹pt, τ, xq
˙
´ c0 x
τ
j
dt
“
ż τ
0
ν‹pt, τ, xqdt.

The integral representation (4.61) is useful to derive properties of Π‹1pτ, xq. For in-
stance, the representation reveals how the profit value Π‹1pτ, xq depends on the order
scheme pτ, xq. Specifically, the integrand ν‹pt, τ, xq reveals when profits can be reaped
during the business cycle and when losses will be incurred. There are, however, crucial
differences between the profit rate ν˚ptq considered in Section 4.2 and the profit rate
ν‹pt, τ, xq given by (4.60). The former does not explicitly depend on pτ, xq; only the do-
main of ν˚ptq is determined by τ . In Section 4.2, the fact that ν˚ptq does not explicitly
depend on pτ, xq has been exploited several times, for example in Theorems 4.2.1, 4.2.2,
and 4.2.3. Since the rate ν‹pt, τ, xq explicitly depends on pτ, xq we can not apply these
theorems in the context of the profit rate ν‹pt, τ, xq. Moreover, in Section 4.2, all but the
setup cost k is considered when the optimal controls are derived. Hence, ν˚ptq is always
positive and thus π1˚ pτq “
şτ
0 ν
˚ptqdt ą k for all τ ą T0; recall, T0 is the minimum cycle
length that guarantees the one-cycle profit to be at least k. In this section, however, a
finite value τ0px0q does not guarantee that the one-cycle profit Π‹1pτ, x0q is larger than
the setup cost k for all τ ą τ0px0q: if τ becomes large, the revenue rate from applying the
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(revenue maximizing) policies pp‹ptq, w‹ptqq might be dominated by the inventory costs
Lpτ, x0q.35 For example, consider a market environment where the arrival intensity μptq
increases over time. In such a case, the revenue rate will also be an increasing function
of t, and a fairly large portion of the total inventory will be stored for most of the cycle
length. The total storage cost Lpτ, xq might be larger than the revenue V pτ, xq.
In the following Subsection 4.3.1, we study problem (4.48), where the objective of the
firm is to choose an order scheme that maximizes the present value of N inventory cycles.
Thereafter, in Subsection 4.3.2, we consider the maximization of the average profit per
time unit (4.46).
Quite often, a decision maker does not have the freedom to choose both values τ
and x independently. For example, if the capacity of a warehouse is fixed, only the
decision on the replenishment intervals remains to be dealt with. On the other hand,
if a supplier presets the delivery dates, the retailer only has to choose the quantity to
be delivered. In both of the following subsections, we will solve the problem of finding
optimal order schemes as follows: we first consider the (one-dimensional) subproblems
of finding an optimal cycle length if the capacity is exogenously given, and of finding
an optimal capacity if the cycle length is exogenously given. Based on these results, in
each subsection, we formulate assumptions that guarantee the existence of an optimal
(two-dimensional) revenue maximizing order scheme. Finally, in Subsection 4.3.3, we
derive the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula, see Proposition 4.3.8, and we illustrate
some of our results by looking at a stylized example.
4.3.1 Maximizing the Present Value of N Cycles
We assume the number of inventory cycles N to be a fixed positive integer value; for
the infinite cycle problem we let N Ñ `8. Let ΠN pτ, xq denote the present value of N
(identical) inventory cycles of length τ and capacity x, i.e.
ΠN pτ, xq :“ SN pτq
“
Π‹1pτ, xq ´ k
‰ “ SN pτq“V pτ, xq ´ pc0x ` Lpτ, xq ` kq‰. (4.62)
We defined the annuity factor SN in Proposition 4.2.1. Problem (4.48) is equivalent
to the problem of finding an order scheme pτ‹N , x‹N q P Λk that satisfies ΠN pτ‹N , x‹N q ě
ΠN pτ, xq for all feasible order schemes. We will call any such pair pτ‹N , x‹N q an optimal
order scheme of the N -cycle problem (4.48). Recall, any order scheme which is an
35An even simpler example where the total net profit becomes negative is when the unit cost c0 are too
high. In general, we assume that the maximized revenue exceeds the total unit cost, i.e., V pτ, xq ą
c0x, and that the running and the setup costs are the cost factors which possibly let the one-cycle
profit become negative.
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element of the set (of feasible order schemes) Λk guarantees nonnegative profits over one
cycle; by definition, Π‹1pτ, xq ´ k ě 0 for all pτ, xq P Λk.
In the sequel, to identify an optimal order scheme we will first consider the family
of one-dimensional subproblems of maximizing ΠN pτ, x0q with respect to τ , x0 ą 0
arbitrary but fixed. In a second step, we consider the family of problems of maximizing
ΠN pT, xq with respect to x, T ą 0 arbitrary but fixed. The next proposition specifies a
condition such that a x0-subproblem has a solution.
Proposition 4.3.4 Assume all conditions of Proposition 4.3.1 hold true. Let x0 ą 0 be
arbitrary but fixed, and let the minimum cycle length τ0px0q exist, cf. (4.58).
Whenever there is a finite value τ¯N :“ τ¯N px0q, τ¯N ě τ0px0q, such that ΠN pτ¯N , x0q ě
ΠN pτ, x0q for all τ ą τ¯N , then a maximizing cycle length τ‹N px0q, τ0px0q ď τ‹N px0q ď
τ¯N px0q, exists. Moreover, τ‹N px0q solves the equation
Π‹1pτ, x0q ´ k “ ´SN pτq9SN pτq
9Π‹1pτ, x0q. (4.63)
Proof. Since Π‹1pτ, x0q is differentiable in τ , cf. Proposition 4.3.1, and SN pτq is dif-
ferentiable as well, the product ΠN pτ, x0q “ SN pτq rΠ‹1pτ, x0q ´ ks is differentiable in
τ . Moreover, ΠN pτ, x0q is negative on p0, τ0px0qq; recall, τ0px0q is the smallest value
such that Π‹1pτ0px0q, x0q ´ k is nonnegative. Furthermore, by assumption, the function
ΠN pτ, x0q is bounded from above by the value ΠN pτ¯N , x0q on pτ¯N ,`8q. Hence, the
continuous function ΠN pτ, x0q attains its global maximum in the interior of a compact
interval which contains the interval rτ0px0q, τ¯N px0qs. Since ΠN pτ, x0q is differentiable in
τ , the first order condition
BΠN
Bτ pτ, x0q “ 9SN pτq rΠ
‹
1pτ, xq ´ ks ´ SN pτq 9Π‹1pτ, xq “ 0
is satisfied for τ‹N px0q. Rewriting the first order condition yields equation (4.63). 
Remark 4.3.1 We do not require the optimal value ΠN pτ‹N px0q, x0q to be strictly posi-
tive. In case the optimal value is zero, the monopolist is indifferent between entering the
market and running no business. To make sure that the optimal value is strictly posi-
tive, it is sufficient to find some point where the function ΠN pτ, x0q is positive. Note, the
value of ΠN at the end point τ¯N “ τ¯N px0q is allowed to be positive or negative. To find
such a point τ¯N , it is sufficient to find such a point for the function Π‹1pτ, x0q. However,
the condition imposed on the function ΠN pτ, x0q is general since ΠN pτ, x0q involves the
annuity factor SN pτq.
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The existence of an optimal cycle length (depending on x0) can be guaranteed if
the assumptions of Proposition 4.3.4 are satisfied. The assumptions, however, do not
imply uniqueness. For example, if ΠN pτ, x0q is a unimodal function36 on the interval
pτ0px0q, τ¯N px0qq, then τ‹N px0q is unique. For a given collection of parameters and a
given value x0, the optimal cycle length can - and typically needs to be - determined
numerically. If ΠN pτ, x0q is unimodal (in τ), such elementary procedures as the golden
section search can be used to compute τ‹N px0q.
In a similar way as in Proposition 4.3.4, we formulate conditions that guarantee the
existence of an optimal capacity value x‹pT q whenever the cycle length T is given.37
The proof of the following result runs along the same lines as the proof of Proposition
4.3.4, and is therefore omitted. Actually, the proof is slightly simpler than the one
of Proposition 4.3.4 since the factor SN pT q only depends on N and T but not on the
capacity value x0.
Proposition 4.3.5 Assume all conditions of Proposition 4.3.1 hold true. Let T ą 0 be
arbitrary but fixed, and let the minimum capacity χ0pT q exist, cf. (4.59).
Whenever there is a finite value χ¯ :“ χ¯pT q, χ¯ ě χ0pT q, such that Π‹1pT, χ¯q ě Π‹1pT, xq
for all x ą χ¯pT q, then a maximizing capacity x‹pT q, χ0pT q ď x‹pT q ď χ¯pT q, exists.
Moreover, x‹pT q solves the equation
V 1pT, xq “ c0 ` L1pT, xq. (4.64)
Remark 4.3.2 Again, we do not require the optimal value to be strictly positive, i.e.,
the monopolist might be indifferent between entering the market expecting zero profit and
running no business. To ensure that the optimal value is bigger than zero, it is sufficient
to find some point where the function ΠN pT, xq is positive. The value of ΠN at the
end point χ¯pT q is allowed to be positive or negative. To find such a point χ¯pT q, it is
sufficient to concentrate on the one-cycle profit function Π‹1pT, xq since the factor SN pT q
does not depend on x. Furthermore, the maximizing capacity x‹pT q does not depend on
the number of cycles N .
Similar to the case when the capacity is assumed to be fixed, additional informa-
tion about properties of the objective function facilitates this analysis. For example,
unimodality (in x) of the function Π‹1pT, xq is one such useful property. The first order
36A function fpxq is a unimodal function if for some value α, it is strictly monotonically increasing for
x ď α and strictly monotonically decreasing for x ě α. In that case, the maximum value of fpxq is
fpαq and there are no other local maxima.
37Below, we show that the optimal capacity does not depend on the number of cycles if T is exogenously
given. Thus, we omit the subscript 1N 1 and write x‹pT q.
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condition (4.64) reveals another important property of x‹pT q: the optimal capacity value
does not depend on the order cost k as long as the market-entry condition is fulfilled,
i.e., there is at least one capacity value such that the fixed cost k is covered, or in other
words, χ0pT q is a finite value. It is clear that x‹pT q does not depend on k, since for any
(positive) order quantity x the fixed amount of order cost has to be paid.
Both propositions, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, are about one-dimensional optimization problems.
The following theorem specifies assumptions that guarantee the existence of an optimal
order scheme pτ‹N , x‹N q of the two-dimensional optimization problem (4.48).
Theorem 4.3.1 Assume all conditions of Proposition 4.3.1 hold true. There exists an
optimal pair pτ‹N , x‹N q of problem (4.48), if any of the following conditions, piq, piiq, or
piiiq, are satisfied:
(i) (a) There is a strip R` ˆrx1, x2s, 0 ă x1 ă x2 ă 8, and a point pσ, yq P Λk, x1 ă
y ă x2, such that for all pτ, xq P Λk, x ď x1 or x ě x2 : ΠN pτ, xq ă ΠN pσ, yq.
(b) There is a continuous selection function τ‹N pxq, x P rx1, x2s, of solutions of
the one-dimensional problems considered in Proposition 4.3.4.
(ii) (a) There is a strip rT1, T2s ˆ R`, 0 ă T1 ă T2 ă 8, and a point pσ, yq P Λk,
T1 ă σ ă T2, such that for all pτ, xq P Λk, τ ď T1 or τ ě T2 : ΠN pτ, xq ă
ΠN pσ, yq.
(b) There is a continuous selection function x‹pT q, T P rT1, T2s, of solutions of
the one-dimensional problems considered in Proposition 4.3.5.
(iii) There exists a rectangle rT1, T2s ˆ rx1, x2s, 0 ă T1 ă T2 ă 8, 0 ă x1 ă x2 ă 8,
and a point pσ, yq P Λk, T1 ă σ ă T2, x1 ă y ă x2, such that ΠN pτ, xq ă ΠN pσ, yq
for all τ R pT1, T2q and x R px1, x2q.
Proof. We prove the existence of an optimal pair pτ‹N , x‹N q for each set of conditions
piq, piiq, and piiiq.
piq By assumption, there exists a feasible pair pσ, yq such that ΠN pτ, xq ă ΠN pσ, yq for
all feasible pairs pτ, xq, where x R px1, x2q. Hence, if a global maximum of the function
ΠN pτ, xq exists, this global maximum lies in the interior of the strip R` ˆ rx1, x2s; recall
that ΠN p0, xq ă 0 for all x ą 0. Moreover, the function ΠN pτ, xq is continuous in τ and in
x (separately). Since, by assumption, a continuous selection function τ‹N pxq, x P rx1, x2s
exists, the function ΠN pτ‹N pxq, xq is continuous (in x) on the interval rx1, x2s. It will
attain its global maximum at some point x‹N in the interior of the interval rx1, x2s.
Hence, an optimal order scheme pτ‹N , x‹N q exists, where τ‹N :“ τ‹N px‹N q.
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piiq The proof runs along the same lines as the proof of piq; simply change the point
of view from the capacity dimension to the time dimension.
piiiq By assumption, there exists a feasible pair pσ, yq such that ΠN pτ, xq ă ΠN pσ, yq
for all feasible pairs pτ, xq outside or on the boundary of the rectangle rT1, T2s ˆ rx1, x2s.
Hence, if a global maximum of the function ΠN pτ, xq exists, this global maximum lies
in the interior of the rectangle. Since the function ΠN pτ, xq is continuous in τ and in x
(separately), it will attain its global maximum on pT1, T2q ˆ px1, x2q. 
Remark 4.3.3 Conditions piq and piiq in Theorem 4.3.1 are refined versions of condi-
tion piiiq. We shall exploit the refined conditions when analyzing an illustrative example
of problem (4.48), see Section 4.3.3.
The conditions piq, piiq, and piiiq are not only of technical nature, but represent distinct
approaches to the two-dimensional problem (4.48). For example, if the objective function
ΠN pτ, xq reveals properties which make it easy to solve the one-dimensional problem
associated with Proposition 4.3.4, then it is viable to work with the set of conditions piq
and look for a (regular) selection function τ‹N pxq. The set of conditions piiq is useful if
the one-dimensional capacity problem is easy to solve. Part piiiq of Theorem 4.3.1 states
conditions on the two-dimensional problem in a general form, as no selection function in
one or the other variable is assumed to exist. However, whenever one has to deal with a
specific problem of type (4.48) one is well advised to focus on one of the one-dimensional
subproblems, cf. Section 4.3.3. The goal is always to (numerically) determine solutions
to the first order conditions in τ and x, see Corollary 4.3.1, and to verify that the
sufficient conditions are satisfied. The latter is usually the hard task. Each part of the
system of equations (4.65) and (4.66) is identical to the first order condition of either the
one-dimensional problem associated with Proposition 4.3.4 or with Proposition 4.3.5.
Corollary 4.3.1 Assume any of the conditions piq, piiq, or piiiq of Theorem 4.3.1 to be
satisfied. Then, the optimal pair pτ‹N , x‹N q is a solution of the system of equations
Π‹1pτ, xq ´ k “ ´SN pτq9SN pτq
”
9V pτ, xq ´ 9Lpτ, xq
ı
, (4.65)
V 1pτ, xq “ c0 ` L1pτ, xq. (4.66)
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4.3.2 Maximizing the Average Profit per Time Unit
Let Π∅pτ, xq denote the average profit per time unit of an inventory cycle of length τ
and inventory capacity x, see the beginning of Section 4.3,
Π∅pτ, xq :“ 1
τ
”
Π‹1pτ, xq ´ k
ı
“ 1
τ
”
V pτ, xq ´ pc0x ` Lpτ, xq ` kq
ı
. (4.67)
Finding an order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘ P Λk that satisfies Π∅ `τ‹∅, x‹∅˘ ě Π∅pτ, xq for all
feasible order schemes, is equivalent to problem (4.46). Any such pair
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
will be
called an (average) optimal order scheme of problem (4.46). The set of feasible order
schemes Λk is identical to the set of feasible order schemes of problem (4.48). This is
obvious, since paq the first factor of the objective function of both problems is strictly
positive, i.e., SN pτq ą 0 and 1{τ ą 0 for all τ ą 0, and pbq each nonnegative one-cycle
profit value Π‹1pτ, xq determines a feasible order scheme; the value Π‹1 also guarantees that
the present value of N cycles as well as the average profit per time unit is nonnegative.
When the objective is to maximize the average profit per time unit, it is natural to
assume no discounting, cf. Section 4.2.2. In this Section, we abstain from explicitly
assuming r ” 0 since the following results remain valid for the odd case of discounted
average profits. In particular, the expressions V pτ, xq and Lpτ, xq, see (3.51) and (4.47),
as well as the derivatives of V pτ, xq and Lpτ, xq with respect to τ , cf. Proposition 4.3.1,
are well defined if r ” 0. The assumptions and conditions which imply the existence of
an order scheme that maximizes the profit per time unit are similar to those in Section
4.3.1. For example, the conditions that guarantee the existence of an optimal capacity
of the one-dimensional subproblem when the cycle length T is exogenously given are
identical for both objectives, Π∅pT, xq and ΠN pT, xq. This is due to the fact that the
factors SN pτq and 1{τ do not depend on the capacity x.
For the remainder of this section we follow the outline of Section 4.3.1: we first consider
the family of one-dimensional subproblems of maximizing Π∅pτ, x0q with respect to τ ,
where x0 ą 0 is arbitrary but fixed. Then, we analyze the family of subproblems of
maximizing Π∅pT, xq with respect to x, where T ą 0 is arbitrary but fixed. Finally, we
specify assumptions that guarantee the existence of an optimal (two-dimensional) order
scheme, i.e., a scheme that maximizes (4.67). The proofs of the following results are
much like the proofs of the corresponding results in the previous section. For the sake
of completeness and to emphasize particular differences, we (re)write the proofs at full
length.
Proposition 4.3.6 Assume all conditions of Proposition 4.3.1 hold true. Let x0 ą 0 be
arbitrary but fixed, and let the minimum cycle length τ0px0q exist, cf. (4.58).
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Whenever there is a finite value τ¯∅ :“ τ¯∅px0q, τ¯∅ ě τ0px0q, such that Π∅pτ¯∅, x0q ě
Π∅pτ, x0q for all τ ą τ¯∅, then a maximizing cycle length τ‹∅px0q, τ0px0q ď τ‹∅px0q ď
τ¯∅px0q, exists. Moreover, τ‹∅px0q is a solution of the equation
Π∅pτ, x0q “ 9V pτ, x0q ´ 9Lpτ, x0q. (4.68)
Proof. The two functions 1{τ and Π‹1pτ, x0q are differentiable in τ , cf. Proposition 4.3.1.
Thus, the product Π∅pτ, x0q “ 1{τ rΠ‹1pτ, x0q ´ ks is differentiable (and continuous) too,
τ ą 0. Moreover, Π∅pτ, x0q is negative on p0, τ0px0qq; recall, τ0px0q is the smallest value
such that Π‹1pτ0px0q, x0q ´ k is nonnegative. Furthermore, by assumption, Π∅pτ, x0q
is bounded from above by the value Π∅pτ¯∅, x0q on pτ¯∅,`8q. Hence, the continuous
function Π∅pτ, x0q attains its global maximum in the interior of a compact interval
which contains the interval rτ0px0q, τ¯∅px0qs. Since Π∅pτ, x0q is differentiable in τ , the
first order condition
BΠ∅
Bτ pτ, x0q “
9Π‹1pτ, xqτ ´ pΠ‹1pτ, xq ´ kq
τ2
“ 0
is satisfied for τ‹∅px0q. Rearranging the first order condition yields equation (4.68). 
Remark 4.3.4 We do not require the optimal value Π∅
`
τ‹∅px0q, x0
˘
to be strictly posi-
tive. In case the optimal value is zero, the monopolist is indifferent between entering the
market and running no business. To make sure that the optimal value is strictly posi-
tive, it is sufficient to find some point where the function Π∅ pτ, x0q is positive. Note,
the value of Π∅ at the end point τ¯∅ is allowed to be positive or negative. To find such a
point τ¯∅, it is sufficient to find such a point for the function Π‹1pτ, x0q.
Similar to the N -cycle case, the existence of an optimal (x0-dependent) cycle length
according to Proposition 4.3.6 does neither guarantee uniqueness of τ‹∅px0q nor unique-
ness of the solution of equation (4.68); additional information about the function Π∅ is
needed. Nevertheless, equation (4.68) offers a nice economic interpretation: at an opti-
mal point τ‹∅px0q the average profit equals the marginal (one-cycle) profit with respect
to time, i.e., at an optimal cycle length the marginal benefit of extending the length of
one cycle balances the profit per time unit. This relation has the same interpretation as
equation (4.34), π∅pτq “ ν˚pτq, in Theorem 4.2.3; ν˚pτq is the integrand of π1˚ evaluated
at the cycle length τ .
When the cycle length T is given, and we are maximizing Π∅pT, xq with respect to x,
we can apply the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 4.3.6: since the factor
1{T does not depend on x, the average profit function Π∅ is maximized with respect to
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x whenever the one-cycle profit Π‹1pT, xq is maximized with respect to x. For the sake
of completeness, we restate proper existence conditions in terms of x, and we do not
simply refer to Proposition 4.3.6 for the analogous conditions related to the variable τ .
We omit the proof of the following result; it runs along the same lines as the proof of
Proposition 4.3.6.
Proposition 4.3.7 Assume all conditions of Proposition 4.3.1 hold true. Let T ą 0 be
arbitrary but fixed, and let the minimum capacity χ0pT q exist, cf. (4.59).
Whenever there is a finite value χ¯ :“ χ¯pT q, χ¯ ě χ0pT q, such that Π‹1pT, χ¯q ě Π‹1pT, xq
for all x ą χ¯pT q, then a maximizing capacity x‹∅pT q, χ0pT q ď x‹∅pT q ď χ¯pT q, exists.
Moreover, x‹∅pT q is a solution of the equation
V 1pT, xq “ c0 ` L1pT, xq. (4.69)
Remark 4.3.5 Except for the difference in meaning and the notation x‹∅pT q instead of
x‹pT q, the formulation of Proposition 4.3.7 is identical to the one of Proposition 4.3.5.
If the parameter values are identical, then x‹∅pT q “ x‹pT q. The statements of Remark
4.3.2 also remain valid when the objective is the profit per time unit. To verify the
existence of a maximizing capacity, one can restrict the analysis to the analysis of the
one-cycle profit function Π‹1pT, xq.
Also, when the profit per time unit is the value to be maximized, the optimal inventory
capacity does not depend on the (fixed) setup cost k. It only depends on the running
cost and the purchasing cost (and market parameters). As before, additional information
about the function Π∅ can facilitate the analysis.
Both propositions, 4.3.6 and 4.3.7, deal with one-dimensional optimization problems.
The following theorem specifies assumptions that guarantee the existence of an optimal
order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
. This Theorem and its proof are very much alike Theorem 4.3.1
associated with the maximization of the present value of N cycles and its proof.
Theorem 4.3.2 Assume all conditions of Proposition 4.3.1 hold true. There exists an
optimal pair
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
of problem (4.46), if any of the following conditions, piq, piiq, or
piiiq, are satisfied:
(i) (a) There is a strip R` ˆrx1, x2s, 0 ă x1 ă x2 ă 8, and a point pσ, yq P Λk, x1 ă
y ă x2, such that for all pτ, xq P Λk, x ď x1 or x ě x2 : Π∅pτ, xq ă Π∅pσ, yq.
(b) There is a continuous selection function τ‹∅pxq, x P rx1, x2s, of solutions of
the one-dimensional problems considered in Proposition 4.3.6.
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(ii) (a) There is a strip rT1, T2s ˆ R`, 0 ă T1 ă T2 ă 8, and a point pσ, yq P Λk,
T1 ă σ ă T2, such that for all pτ, xq P Λk, τ ď T1 or τ ě T2 : Π∅pτ, xq ă
Π∅pσ, yq.
(b) There is a continuous selection function x‹∅pT q, T P rT1, T2s, of solutions of
the one-dimensional problems considered in Proposition 4.3.7.
(iii) There exists a rectangle rT1, T2s ˆ rx1, x2s, 0 ă T1 ă T2 ă 8, 0 ă x1 ă x2 ă 8,
and a point pσ, yq P Λk, T1 ă σ ă T2, x1 ă y ă x2, such that Π∅pτ, xq ă Π∅pσ, yq
for all τ R pT1, T2q and x R px1, x2q.
Proof. piq By assumption, there exists a feasible pair pσ, yq such that Π∅pτ, xq ă
Π∅pσ, yq for all feasible pairs pτ, xq where x R px1, x2q. Hence, if a global maximum
of the function Π∅pτ, xq exists, this global maximum lies in the interior of the strip
R` ˆ rx1, x2s; recall that Π‹1p0, xq “ ´c0x ă 0 for all x ą 0, cf. (4.49). Moreover,
the function Π∅pτ, xq is continuous in τ and in x (separately). Since, by assumption,
a continuous selection function τ‹∅pxq, x P rx1, x2s exists, the function Π∅
`
τ‹∅pxq, x
˘
is
continuous on the interval rx1, x2s and will attain its global maximum at some point x‹∅
in the interior of the interval rx1, x2s. Hence, an optimal order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
exists,
where τ‹∅ :“ τ‹∅px‹∅q.
piiq The proof runs along the same lines as the proof of piq; simply change the point
of view from the capacity dimension to the time dimension.
piiiq By assumption, there exists a feasible pair pσ, yq such that Π∅pτ, xq ă Π∅pσ, yq
for all feasible pairs pτ, xq outside or on the boundary of the rectangle rT1, T2s ˆ rx1, x2s.
Hence, if a global maximum of the function Π∅pτ, xq exists, this global maximum lies
in the interior of this rectangle. Since the function Π∅pτ, xq is continuous in τ and x
(separately), it will attain its global maximum on pT1, T2q ˆ px1, x2q. 
Remark 4.3.6 Conditions piq and piiq in Theorem 4.3.1 are refined versions of piiiq.
We shall exploit the refined conditions when analyzing an illustrative example of problem
(4.48), see Section 4.3.3.
Similar to the optimal order scheme pτ‹N , x‹N q that maximizes the present value of N
cycles, the average-optimal order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
satisfies the optimality conditions of
both one-dimensional subproblems.
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Corollary 4.3.2 Assume any of the conditions piq, piiq, or piiiq of Theorem 4.3.2 to be
satisfied. Then, the optimal pair
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
solves the system of equations
Π∅pτ, x0q “ 9V pτ, x0q ´ 9Lpτ, x0q, (4.70)
V 1pτ, xq “ c0 ` L1pτ, xq. (4.71)
The examples in the following section will illustrate the propositions of the one-dimensio-
nal subproblems and Theorem 4.3.2. Moreover, we analyze a very special case: the
setting for the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula.
4.3.3 Illustrations and Examples
In Subsection 4.3.1, we formulate conditions that guarantee the existence of an optimal
order scheme when the objective is to maximize the present value of N (identical) cycles
and revenue maximizing price and advertising controls are applied. In Subsection 4.3.2,
we analyze the case when the objective is to maximize the profit per time unit and
formulate existence conditions. The following examples illustrate the meaning of such
existence conditions, and we compare the results of both objectives with each other. In
addition, we discuss a very special case of the time average problem for which we find an
explicit formula of the optimal order scheme, the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula.
The following examples focus on the special case where the system function ψ equals
one, i.e., the dynamic of the sales process does not depend on the inventory level itself.
If ψ ” 1, the results of Section 4.2 can be applied and we can identify the optimal
cycle length and inventory capacity when the profit maximizing pricing and advertising
controls, see Chapter 2, are used. In the following, we apply the results of Section 4.3
which are based on the revenue maximizing pricing and advertising controls, see Chapter
3, and compare some of these results with those based on the results of Section 4.2. We
like to stress once again that the approach which considers the (suboptimal) revenue
maximizing policies is applicable in the general case of feedback functions depending on
the current inventory level, i.e., ψpxq is not constant.
Example 4.3.1 Assume all parameter values to be constant in time, i.e., let a ą δ ą 0,
ε ą 1, ptq ”  ě 0, and μptq ” μ ą 0 for all t ě 0; ηptq ” η “ ε´ΔΔ
”`
ε´1
ε
˘ε Δ
ε´1μ
ı 1
1´Δ ,
cf. Definition 3.2.1, and γ “ ε´Δ1´Δ . Let r ě 0 and ψpxq ” 1. Then,
Ap0qpt, τq “ η
γr
e´γrτ
´
eγrpτ´tq ´ 1
¯
ÝÑ
rÑ0 ηpτ ´ tq,
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Bpxq “ γ
γ ´ 1x,
and
V pτ, xq “ Ap0qp0, τq 1γ Bpxq γ´1γ “ cV
ˆ
1 ´ e´γrτ
γr
˙ 1
γ
x
γ´1
γ ÝÑ
rÑ0 cV τ
1
γ x
γ´1
γ ,
where cV “ γγ´1
γ´1
γ η
1
γ ą 0.
If r ” 0, the model ensures that the inventory depletes at a constant rate xτ ; if r ą 0,
the revenue maximizing trajectory is a convex function in t:
x‹pt, τ, xq “ e
γrpτ´tq ´ 1
eγrτ ´ 1 x ÝÑrÑ0
ˆ
1 ´ t
τ
˙
x,
The associated total running costs are given by
Lpτ, xq “
$’’&
’’%

pγ ` 1q r
ˆ
1 ´ γ 1 ´ e
´rτ
eγrτ ´ 1
˙
x, if r ą 0,

2τx, if r “ 0.
(4.72)
The present value of N cycles is given by, r ą 0,
ΠN pτ, xq “ 1 ´ e
´NrT
1 ´ e´rT
«
cV
ˆ
1 ´ e´γrτ
γr
˙ 1
γ
x
γ´1
γ ´ c0x ´ xp1 ` γq r
ˆ
1 ´ γ 1 ´ e
´rτ
eγrτ ´ 1
˙
´ k
ff
;
if r ” 0, the average profit per time unit is given by
Π∅ pτ, xq “ cV τ
1
γ x
γ´1
γ ´ c0x ´ 2τx ´ k
τ
.
Since γ ą 1, the revenue function V pτ, xq is concave in τ and in x. Evidently, the
expressions of interest are easier to analyze when there is no discounting: if r ” 0, the
(production) function V is a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas function in the (production)
factors τ and x; the function Lpτ, xq, the running costs, is a linear function in τ and
x. We will examine problem (4.46), the maximization of Π∅pτ, xq, in detail; problem
(4.48), the maximization of the N -cycle profit runs along similar lines. Although we
are interested in an optimal two-dimensional order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
, we will consider
each one-dimensional subproblem separately. We shall first consider the case when x0 is
exogenously given and solve for τ‹∅px0q. Afterwards, we shall keep T fixed and solve for
x‹∅pT q before identifying the best order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
value.
Assume the capacity x0 to be arbitrary but fixed. According to Proposition 4.3.6,
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we require the market-entry condition to be satisfied, i.e., there is a value τ0px0q such
that Π‹1pτ0px0q, x0q ě k. More precisely, τ0px0q is the smallest value that satisfies this
inequality. Since all terms of the functional expression Π‹1pτ, x0q are continuous in τ ,
τ0px0q is the smallest (positive) solution of
cV x
γ´1
γ
0 τ
1
γ “ k ` c0x0 ` 2x0τ. (4.73)
The left-hand side of equation (4.73) is strictly increasing and concave in τ ; at τ “ 0
it takes the value zero. The right-hand side of equation (4.73) is a linear expression in
τ that takes the value k ` c0x0 ą 0 at τ “ 0. Hence, there are three possible cases:
equation (4.73) has piq no solution, piiq one solution, or piiiq two solutions. The left panel
of Figure 4.6 illustrates the three cases. The blue curve is the graph of the left-hand side
of equation (4.73), the revenue function V pτ, x0q, as a function of τ . The three straight
lines represent the right-hand side of equation (4.73) for three distinct parameter choices
of the setup cost k. Likewise, one can analyze the three cases by changing the left-hand
side of (4.73), e.g., by choosing different values for the arrival intensities, or adjusting
another parameter value accordingly; however, the characterization in terms of the three
cases piq, piiq, and piiiq remains unaffected.
The (cost) lines are parallel lines with slope 2x0 and intersect the ordinate at (different
values) k ` c0x0. If k is (too) large - this is case piq and is indicated by the yellow line
- there is no cycle length value such that the costs are covered. The market situation is
not profitable; the high fixed cost prevents the retailer from entering the market.38 In
case piiq, the red straight line, there is exactly one τ value that guarantees nonnegative
profits. However, in this particular case the retailer can not attain a positive profit,
and she is indifferent between entering the market or not, cf. Remark 4.3.4. Since
for this particular capacity value x0 there is only one feasible order scheme, the set
Λk “ tpτ0px0q, x0qu is a singleton, and the minimum cycle length is also the optimal
cycle length, i.e., τ‹∅px0q “ τ0px0q. Case piiiq, illustrated by the green line, is the
standard case: the first point where the blue curve and the green line intersect is the
minimum cycle length τ0px0q, the second point is a maximum cycle length τ¯px0q: for
values larger than τ¯px0q, the profit of one cycle and thus the profit per time unit is
negative. Hence, the set of feasible order schemes for this one-dimensional subproblem
is given by Λk “ tpτ, x0q|τ0px0q ď τ ď τ¯px0qu. The market situation is so that the
monopolist can choose from a range of cycle length values. Among those choices she has
to identify the optimal cycle length.
38Since the capacity x0 is assumed to be fixed, the unit costs c0x0 are also fixed.
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Figure 4.6: Panel (a): illustration of equation (4.73) when the capacity x0 is exogenously given.
The blue curve shows the maximized revenue and the yellow, red, and green line
represent different cost functions in case piq, piiq, and piiiq, see text. Panel (b): the
average-optimal cycle length as a function of x0 according to (4.74) for different values
of k, where ε “ 2,Δ “ 0.5, μ “ 25, c0 “ 1,  “ 0.1, r “ 0.
If we consider the one-dimensional subproblem in x when the cycle length T is exoge-
nously given and fixed, the analysis of equation (4.73) is essentially the same as in the
case when x is unknown. Replacing τ by (the fixed number) T and the fixed value x0
by x, the left-hand side of (4.73) is still a strictly increasing and concave function (now
in x) starting at the origin; the right-hand side is again a linear expression (now in x).
Although the numerical values change due to different values of the exponents and the
factors, the basic properties of equation (4.73) are preserved.39 In particular, we will
also have to deal with all three possible cases piq, piiq, and piiiq, see above.
In the following, we assume the set of feasible order schemes is non-empty. Then, there
exists an optimal solution for each one-dimensional subproblem. We evaluate the first
order condition (4.68) and solve for τ ; elementary algebra shows that the average-optimal
cycle length for a predefined capacity x0 is given by
τ‹∅px0q “ γγ ´ 1
x0
η
ˆ
c0 ` k
x0
˙γ
. (4.74)
The optimal cycle length τ‹∅px0q increases in the unit cost c0 and the fixed cost k but
does not depend on the inventory cost parameter . For large capacity values, τ‹∅px0q
increases in x0: the more items will be sold the more time is allocated. To see this
39Note, the setup cost k now solely determines the intercept of the right-hand side of (4.73) with the
ordinate. The unit cost c0 enters the slope expression together with the term T {2.
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fact, notice that the term k{x0 within the parentheses of the right-hand side of equation
(4.74) becomes small, if x0 is large, and the linear factor x0 becomes the dominating
one. However, if x0 takes small values the average-optimal cycle length will decrease in
x0; recall, γ ą 1, and the term pc0 ` k{x0qγ can get large. Elementary calculations show
that the expression τ‹∅px0q attains its minimum value at
x0 “ γ ´ 1
c0
k, (4.75)
and strictly increases to the left and to the right of x0. Hence, if x0 is fixed, a lower
bound for the average-optimal cycle length is given by
τ‹∅
ˆ
γ ´ 1
c0
k
˙
“ cγ´10 k
γ
η
ˆ
γ
γ ´ 1
˙γ
.
If not otherwise specified, we assume the following parameter values for the numerical
analysis of the average profit per time unit.
Example 4.3.1 (continued) Let μ “ 25, a “ 1, δ “ 0.5, ε “ 2, c0 “ 1,  “ 0.1, and
r “ 0. Then, Δ “ 0.5, γ “ 3, η “ 187564 p« 29q, cV “ 3
`5
4
˘ 4
3 p« 4q, Ap0qp0, τq “ 187564 τ ,
and Bpxq “ 32x such that V pτ, xq “ 3
`5
4
˘ 4
3 τ
1
3 x
2
3 and Π∅ pτ, xq “ 3p
5
4q
4
3 τ
1
3 x
2
3 ´x´0.2τx´k
τ .
For the parameter setting of Example 4.3.1 a feasible cycle length τ must satisfy the
inequality
3
ˆ
5
4
˙ 4
3
x
2
3
0 τ
1
3 ą k ` x0 ` 120x0τ,
cf. (4.73). For instance, if k “ 10 and x0 “ 20, the minimum cycle length is τ0p20q «
1.15. The average-optimal cycle length in this case is τ‹∅p20q “ 432125 « 3.46; note, formula
(4.74) becomes
τ‹∅px0q “ 32625x0
ˆ
1 ` k
x0
˙3
,
with the numerical values of Example 4.3.1 in place. Panel (b) of Figure 4.6 shows the
average-optimal cycle length depending on x0 for three different values of k. The graphs
show a convex shape; each line attains its minimum at the corresponding value where
x0 “ γ´1c0 k “ 2k, cf. (4.75).
If the sales horizon T is fixed, the problem is to choose the average-optimal capac-
ity. According to Proposition 4.3.7, the (optimal) value x‹∅pT q is a solution of (4.69),
V 1pT, xq “ c0 `L1pT, xq. In the time-homogeneous setting of Example 4.3.1, the average-
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optimal capacity depending on T is given by
x‹∅pT q “ γ ´ 1γ η
T`
c0 ` 2T
˘γ . (4.76)
In contrast to the optimal cycle length τ‹∅ in (4.74), the optimal capacity x‹∅ decreases
in c0 and does not depend on the fixed cost k. This latter fact is not surprising and
has been discussed before, cf. the paragraphs after Remark 4.3.2 and Remark 4.3.5.
Instead, the inventory cost parameter  influences the optimal choice of the capacity:
the larger the value of , the smaller is the optimal capacity value. The way x‹∅ depends
on the exogenously given factor - now the sales horizon - also changes compared to (4.74):
x‹∅pT q is a unimodal function of T ; it increases for small values of T and decreases if
T becomes large. The value of x‹∅pT q reaches its maximum - the upper bound on the
optimal capacity - at
T “ 2c0pγ ´ 1q .
Since x‹∅pT q does not depend on k, for the parameter setting of Example 4.3.1 the
N  
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: Panel (a) shows the average-optimal profits depending on the cycle length T for
different values of k when x‹
∅
is chosen according to (4.76), where ε “ 2,Δ “ 0.5,
μ “ 25, c0 “ 1,  “ 0.1, r “ 0. Panel (b): the function Π∅pτ, xq for the parameter
setting of Example 4.3.1 and k “ 10.
maximum value for the (optimal) capacity (4.76) is attained at T “ 10 and is (ap-
proximately) x‹∅p10q « 57.87. For different k values, panel (a) of Figure 4.7 shows the
average-optimal profit Π∅
`
T, x‹∅pT q
˘
. Although we are only interested in order schemes
that guarantee a nonnegative (average) profit, we show the plots including negative val-
ues of Π∅
`
T, x‹∅pT q
˘
to emphasize once again the importance of the minimum capacity
value χ0pT q, cf. (4.73). On the domain p0, 10q the average profit function takes positive
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and negative values. As the graphs illustrate, the average profit per time unit sharply
increases in a neighborhood of the minimum cycle length χpT q. Hence, simply exploiting
(4.76) can lead to substantial losses if x‹∅pT q ă χpT q. Whenever this strict inequality
holds, it is optimal to run no business at all; the analogous analysis naturally applies to
the case where the capacity x0 is fixed and the quantity to choose is the cycle length,
see above.
Finally, we consider the problem when the monopolist may choose both values of in-
terest, the cycle length and the capacity. According to Corollary 4.3.2, the optimal order
scheme must satisfy the system of equations (4.70) and (4.71). In the time-homogeneous
setting of Example 4.3.1, this system is equivalent to (4.74) and (4.76) when x replaces
x0 and τ replaces T . It is easy to verify that an optimal order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
satisfies
the equation
τ‹∅x‹∅ “ 2k . (4.77)
The same condition is satisfied for the very basic EOQ model, the classic Harris-Wilson
model; in our terms expressed as τHWxHW “ 2k{, see Section 4.1. The presence
of pricing and advertising considerations has no influence on the product of optimal
cycle length and optimal capacity in the time-homogeneous setting! Moreover, this
product only depends on the setup cost k and the inventory cost parameter  but neither
on the unit cost, on the arrival intensity, nor on the price and advertising elasticities.
Recall, L pτ, xq “ 2τx. Hence, equation (4.77) can be rewritten as L
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘ “ k, i.e.,
a necessary optimality condition requires the order scheme to be such that the total
inventory costs equal the setup cost.
To determine the optimal values
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
, one can either solve the system of equations
(4.70) and (4.71) (and verify that a candidate solution actually guarantees a nonnegative
profit) or make use of the solution of the one-dimensional subproblems τ‹∅px0q, x‹∅pT q
resp., and maximize Π∅ pτ‹pxq, xq with respect to x, maximize Π∅
`
τ, x‹∅pτq
˘
with re-
spect to τ resp. Visual inspection of the graphs of Π∅
`
T, x‹∅pT q
˘
in panel (a) of Figure
4.7 suggests numerical values of the optimal cycle length. For example, if k “ 20, one
expects τ‹∅ to take approximately the value 7. In general - and independent of the ap-
proach being taken - the optimal order scheme can only be numerically determined. For
different setup cost values k Table 4.3 shows the optimal order scheme (column two and
three) and the associated average profit per time unit (column four) for the parameter
setting of Example 4.3.1. Formulas (4.74) and (4.77) suggest that the optimal cycle
length and the optimal capacity value increase in k; naturally, the (optimal) average
profit decreases in k (and in any other cost parameter). Columns five to seven of Table
4.3 show the corresponding optimal values when the production and inventory costs are
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k τ‹∅ x‹∅ Π∅
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
τ∅ x∅ π∅pτ∅q percentage gain
5 2.74 36.44 5.73 2.92 39.19 5.85 2.04
10 4.28 46.72 4.29 4.71 52.50 4.52 5.27
20 7.16 55.84 2.50 8.27 68.39 2.93 16.97
Table 4.3: For Example 4.3.1 and different values of k: optimal order schemes
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
based
on the revenue maximizing policies within a cycle and associated average profits per
time unit Π∅
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
, and pτ∅, x∅q based on the profit maximizing policies within a
cycle and associated average profit per time unit π∅pτ∅q. The last column shows the
percentage gain per time unit by π∅pτ∅q over Π∅
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
.
included in the (optimal) pricing-advertising control. The last column displays the gain
of the profit maximizing strategy (Chapter 2 and Section 4.2) over the revenue maxi-
mizing strategy (Chapter 3 and Section 4.3). This gain is expressed as the percentage
of
`
π∅pτ∅q ´ Π∅
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘˘ {Π∅ `τ‹∅, x‹∅˘. For example, if k “ 10 (second row), then the
benefit from integrating the production and inventory cost c0 and  into the pricing-
advertising strategy leads to a net profit increase of approximately five percent per time
unit. Recall, for the parameter setting of Example 4.3.1 - the time-homogeneous case
without discounting - the revenue maximizing strategy, see Theorem 3.2.1, is to set a
constant price and a constant advertising rate such that the inventory depletes at a
linear rate x{τ . In particular, if k “ 10, then p‹ptq ” 2.43 and w‹ptq ” 6.63.40 Since
the time-to-go potential Ap0q depends on the value of the (optimal) cycle length and the
diffusion potential B on the (optimal) capacity value, cf. Definition 3.2.1 in Chapter 3,
both values - the optimal price and the optimal advertising level - depend on the optimal
order scheme and thus implicitly on the setup cost k. In contrast to the revenue maxi-
mizing strategy, the profit maximizing strategy, see Theorem 2.2.1, is only influenced by
the order scheme by the length of time it is applied. For our (numerical) example, the
price that maximizes the net profit rate is given by p˚ptq “ ε{pε ´ 1qcptq “ 2 ` 0.2t and
the corresponding advertising rate by w˚ptq “ cw
`
μ{pcptqε´1˘1{pa´δq « 9.76{p1 ` 0.1tq2,
cf. Theorem 2.2.1. The price function p˚ monotonically increases (linearly) over time
and the advertising rate monotonically decreases over time.
The preceding examples illustrate that, even for rather simple model settings (time-
homogeneous parameter values and state-independent demand), determining feasible
order schemes and an optimal order scheme is not easy. Notably, the optimal order
40Recall, that for our numerical example Ap0qp0, τq “ 187564 τ and Bpxq “ 32x. According to Theorem
3.2.1 the revenue maximizing price and advertising rate for an order scheme pτ, xq are given by
p‹ :“ p‹pt; τ, xq “ ε
ε´1
´
Ap0qp0,τq
Bpxq
¯ 1
γ and w‹ :“ w‹pt, τ, xq “ 62564
` 32
625
x
τ
˘ 2
3 . For the order scheme
pτ‹∅, x‹∅q « p4.28, 46.72q the values p‹ ” 2.43 and w‹ ” 6.63 follow.
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scheme can only be numerically determined, a fact, which often implies further chal-
lenges. However, we find a particular - and only one - parameter setting where the
optimal order scheme can be described in terms of an elementary expression, the endo-
genized Harris-Wilson formula.
Proposition 4.3.8 Let δ “ r ” 0, ψpxq ” 1, ε ” 2, c0 ą 0, k ą 0, ptq ”  ą 0,
and μptq ” μ ą 2k. Then, the optimal order scheme pτ‹HW , x‹HW q that maximizes the
average profit per time unit (4.3.2) - the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula - is given
by
τ‹HW “
c
2k

2c0?
μ ´ ?2k (4.78)
and
x‹HW “
c
2k

?
μ ´ ?2k
2c0
. (4.79)
The optimal average profit per time unit Π‹HW is given by
Π‹HW :“ Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q “
`?
μ ´ ?2k˘2
4c0
. (4.80)
Proof. We make use of the formulas derived in Example 4.3.1; note, if δ ” 0, then
γ “ ε “ 2, η “ ` ε´1ε ˘ε´1 μ “ μ{2, Ap0qp0, τq “ μ2 τ and Bpxq “ 2x. Thus, the revenue
function V is given by
V pτ, xq “ ?μτx.
Since r ” 0 and ψpxq ” 1, the inventory depletes at a constant rate x{τ ; hence, the total
inventory cost is given by (4.72), Lpτ, xq “ 2τx, cf. Example 4.3.1. Thus, the objective
function to be maximized with respect to τ and x is given by
Π∅pτ, xq “ V pτ, xq ´ pc0x ` Lpτ, xq ` kq
τ
“
?
μτx ´ `c0x ` 2τx ` k˘
τ
.
The first order conditions (4.74) and (4.76) imply that the optimal order scheme
pτ‹HW , x‹HW q needs to satisfy the following system of equations:
τ‹HW “ 4μx
‹
HW
ˆ
c0 ` k
x‹HW
˙2
,
x‹HW “ μ4
τ‹HW`
c0 ` 2τ‹HW
˘2 .
Formulas (4.78) and (4.79) follow by making use of the corresponding version of equation
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(4.77), τ‹HWx‹HW “ 2k , and basic algebra. The expression for the maximized average
profit Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q is an immediate consequence of both formulas. 
In contrast to the classical Harris-Wilson EOQ our Harris-Wilson formula endogenizes
the demand since the demand rate is constant over time (x‹HW {τ‹HW ) but not exogenously
given. And not only the demand rate is endogenized but also the optimal price p‹ptq “
μ
2
τ
x .41 Due to this fact, we call it the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula. Furthermore,
the order scheme according to the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula maximizes the
average profit per time unit whereas the classical EOQ considers the minimization of
the average costs per time unit.
At first glance, the results of Proposition 4.3.8 seem to be rather limited and very
special due to the restrictive parameter setting: a pure pricing model (δ ” 0) and
constant cost parameter values as well as a constant arrival intensity. However, the
endogenized Harris-Wilson formula reveals the structural properties of an optimal order
scheme. To this end, we first collect some facts about the endogenized Harris-Wilson
formula.
Remark 4.3.7 The optimal order scheme according to the endogenized Harris-Wilson
formula, equations (4.78) and (4.79) in Proposition 4.3.8, implies the following results:
• The optimal cycle length increases in the unit cost c0 and decreases in the inventory
parameter .
• The optimal order quantity decreases in c0 and increases in .
• Both increase in the setup cost k.
• The optimal cycle length decreases in the arrival intensity μ.
• The optimal order quantity increases in μ.
Moreover, due to the square root function in all the expressions the endogenized
Harris-Wilson formula is robust with respect to misspecifications and uncertainties of all
parameters. This feature is well known for the classical Harris-Wilson formula. Table
4.4 illustrates the robustness of the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula. The first row of
Table 4.4 shows the revenue maximizing order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
for a particular parameter
setting: δ “ 0, ε “ 2, μ “ 10, r ” 0, c0 “ 1, k “ 10,  “ 0.1. For this setting, the
41According to Theorem 3.2.1 the revenue maximizing price for an order scheme pτ, xq is given by
p‹ptq “ p‹pt; τ, xq “ ε
ε´1
´
Ap0qp0,τq
Bpxq
¯ 1
γ . Since in the special case of Proposition 4.3.8 γ “ ε “ 2,
Ap0qp0, τq “ μ2 τ , and Bpxq “ 2x, p‹ptq μ2 τx follows.
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revenue maximizing Harris-Wilson
c0 k 
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
Π∅
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q %
1 5 0.1 p9.25, 10.81q 1.17 1.17 100%
0.8 5 0.1 p7.40, 13.51q 1.46 1.40 95.9%
1.2 5 0.1 p11.10, 9.01q 0.97 0.94 96.9%
1 2 0.1 p5.00, 8.00q 1.60 1.49 93.1%
1 8 0.1 p13.33, 12.00q 0.90 0.84 93.3%
1 5 0.05 p11.52, 17.36q 1.50 1.44 96.0%
1 5 0.2 p8.09, 6.18q 0.76 0.63 82.9%
Table 4.4: Optimal order schemes
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
applying the revenue maximizing price-advertising
policy and associated average profits Π∅
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
for the parameter setting δ ” 0,
ε ” 2, μ ” 10, r ” 0, ψpxq ” 1, and c0, k, and  as indicated in the first three columns.
Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q is the average profit when the order scheme p9.25, 10.81q is applied in
each case. The values in the last column are the percentage values of Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q
compared to Π∅
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
.
optimal order scheme is identical to the order scheme specified by the endogenized Harris-
Wilson formula, i.e.,
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘ “ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q. The subsequent rows of Table 4.4 show
the optimal order scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
and the associated profit per time unit Π∅
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
for the parameter values displayed in the first three columns (a selection of values for
c0, k, and ). The sixth column - indicated by the column header Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q -
displays the profit per time unit for the suboptimal Harris-Wilson policy specified in
row one. In fact, this situation assumes that the decision maker is not aware of the
modified parameter setting. The last column of Table 4.4 contains the percentage values
of the profit corresponding to the suboptimal Harris-Wilson policy and the optimal profit
Π∅
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
. For example, in the second row, if c0 “ 0.8 (instead of c0 “ 1), the optimal
order scheme is
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘ “ p7.40, 13.51q which yields a profit of 1.46 monetary units per
time unit. Applying the suboptimal Harris-Wilson policy pτ‹HW , x‹HW q “ p9.25, 10.81q
leads to a profit of 1.40 monetary units per time unit42 - more than 95 percent of the
optimal value. Although the true unit cost has been overestimated by more than 20
percent (1 instead of 0.8) the retailer loses only roughly four percent of the profit per
time unit. This robustness feature is not limited to changes in the cost parameters but
can also be observed with regard to misspecifications of the demand parameters. The
structure of Table 4.5 is similar to the structure of Table 4.4. The first row lists the
identical parameter setting as the first row of Table 4.4. Rows two to seven of Table 4.5
42The numerical values are rounded to two decimal places.
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specify parameter variations as indicated by the first three columns. The loss induced
revenue maximizing Harris-Wilson
ε μ ψpxq `τ‹∅, x‹∅˘ Π∅ `τ‹∅, x‹∅˘ Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q %
2 10 1 p9.25, 10.81q 1.17 1.17 100%
1.1 10 1 p16.45, 6.08q 6.43 5.98 93.0%
3 10 1 p11.46, 8.72q 0.16 0.14 87.5%
2 5 1 p16.18, 6.18q 0.38 0.17 44.7%
2 20 1 p5.76, 17.36q 3.01 2.58 85.7%
2 10 x´0.2 p9.44, 6.45q 0.93 0.82 88.1%
2 10 x0.2 p8.61, 22.24q 1.95 1.66 85.1%
Table 4.5: Optimal order schemes
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
applying the revenue maximizing price-advertising
policy and associated average profits Π∅
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
for the parameter setting δ ” 0, r ”
0, c0 ” 1, k ” 5, and  ” 0.1 and ε, μ, and ψpxq as indicated in the first three columns.
Π∅ pτHW , xHW q is the average profit when the order scheme p9.25, 10.81q is applied in
each case. The values in the last column are the percentage values of Π∅ pτ‹HW , x‹HW q
compared to Π∅
`
τ‹
∅
, x‹
∅
˘
.
by applying the suboptimal Harris-Wilson policy instead of applying the optimal order
scheme
`
τ‹∅, x‹∅
˘
is larger than in the case of Table 4.4. However, the endogenized Harris-
Wilson policy still provides a reasonable decision rule when the true parameter values
are unknown (or when estimates of the parameters are biased). The numbers suggest
using conservative estimates of the parameters in practical applications. For example, if
the true arrival intensity equals 20 but the retailer assumes μ “ 10, then the suboptimal
average profit still accounts for 85 percent of the optimal one, see row five of Table 4.5.
However, if the true value is μ “ 5, applying the suboptimal order scheme leads to a
profit setback of more than 50 percent.43
Eventually, the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula is more than just an explicit so-
lution formula for a very special parameter setting: it provides useful insight into the
dependence of the (optimal) order scheme on the model parameters and can be used as
a robust decision rule.
43Note, since the average profit heavily depends on the μ value the absolute values differ substantially
in both cases.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In this thesis, we consider the optimal coordination of dynamic pricing, dynamic adver-
tising, and inventory decisions. In Chapter 2, we extend the dynamic pricing model of
Rajan et al. (1992) by the opportunity to dynamically advertise and by (time-dependent)
discounting effects. For a fixed sales horizon we derive an explicit expression for an op-
timal (dynamic) price-advertising control and an optimal capacity that maximize the
net present profit value of a monopolist. The optimal price depends on a cost function
accounting for purchasing and inventory costs as well as interest and deterioration ef-
fects, and can be thought of as a markup, determined by the price elasticity of demand,
of the cost function. Typically, optimal prices increase over time. The behavior of the
optimal advertising control over time depends, in particular, on the ratio of the customer
arrival intensity and the cost function; typically, it is a decreasing function. The optimal
capacity value can be computed once the optimal price-advertising control is known. We
also consider optimal combinations of static and dynamic controls when either the price
or the advertising rate is allowed to vary over time and the other control variable is con-
stant. In general, the dynamic component of the optimal partially static control inherits
the essential structural characteristics of the fully dynamic optimal policy. A key result
of our analysis is the following one: if it is optimal to advertise at a rate greater than
one, the opportunity of advertising benefits the monopolist and the customers. The
monopolist is able to increase its profit, and more customers will purchase the product
for the same (optimal) price as in the pure pricing model.
In Chapter 3, we consider the time- and state-dependent model of Helmes et al.
(2013) where the capacity and the sales period are exogenously given values. Instead
of a stock of items to be sold, we interpret the state of the system to be the fractional
untapped market share. The objective is to identify a control that maximizes the net
present value of the total revenue minus the accumulated advertising expenses. We
use Pontryagin’s maximum principle to derive the optimal open-loop control and also
derive optimal feedback policies. To illustrate the general results we consider the von
Bertalanffy growth function. We specify parameter constellations such that the optimal
price control is either a market skimming or a market penetration policy. For the class
of general von Bertalanffy models, we characterize the time point when prices peak.
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The framework of Chapter 3 provides a tool to analyze and understand controlled
adoption models. In particular, the controlled von Bertalanffy model gives insight into
diffusion processes when the impact of the internal influence changes over time. This
insight allows for a more general modeling of controlled adoption processes and thus
helps improving the understanding of such processes. Due to the close relationship
between new-product adoption models and inventory control problems, Chapter 3 makes
a contribution to both research areas.
In Chapter 4, we extend the analysis of one-period models to multiple periods and
long-term models. We introduce fixed order cost that arise once per cycle when the
inventory is refilled at the beginning of a cycle. In Section 4.2, we assume that the
profit maximizing (price-advertising) control we derived in Chapter 2 is applied during
a cycle; in Section 4.3, we assume the revenue maximizing control from Chapter 3 to
be applied. In both subsections, the cycle length and the capacity are considered to
be decision variables. We distinguish between the maximization of the present value
of N identical cycles and the maximization of the average profit per time unit. We
derive conditions that guarantee the existence of a (unique) optimal pair of cycle length
and capacity value and we refine these conditions for special parameter settings. Beside
various examples that illustrate our results, we derive structural properties of the optimal
results. For example, if the profit maximizing control of Chapter 2 is applied, we show
that if the optimal advertising rate lies above a threshold value, then the maximized
average profit in this market (where advertising is effective) is greater than the maximized
average profit in a similar market where advertising has no effect; rephrased in everyday
language: a monopolist benefits from advertising if the advertising level is sufficiently
large. Moreover, the benefit goes along with a shorter average optimal cycle length (if
advertising is effective), and, consequently, customers also benefit from advertising since
piq goods are fresh, and piiq the (optimal) prices are not affected by advertising. In
a particular parameter setting when the revenue maximizing policy is applied (Section
4.3), we derive explicit solution formulas for the optimal cycle length and the optimal
capacity value. We refer to this result as the endogenized Harris-Wilson formula.
Our analysis in Chapter 4 assumes the profit maximizing and the revenue maximiz-
ing policies to be applied during a cycle. However, the fact that the policies are the
profit maximizing ones is not essential for our analysis. Actually, any (feasible) price-
advertising control that satisfies the optimality conditions characterizes a (sub)optimal
order pair. Thus, our analysis applies to a broader class of inventory control systems
than only those where the optimal control is applied. This observation leads directly to
a possible extension of our models: a more general demand rate than the one of multi-
174
plicative form we consider throughout this thesis. In particular, the development of a
model in which the demand rate underlies stochastic influences promises results that are
of importance for management problems arising in practical applications. Other possible
future research areas include numerical studies using real data, the generalization of our
models to incorporate stochastic influences on inventory, the extension of the models to
allow for backlogging and variable production costs.
We, however, concentrate our analysis on the isoelastic demand function that depends
on the control variables price and advertising. Interpreting these controls in different
ways it is possible to apply our models and results to a variety of different subjects. For
example, if w is interpreted as maintenance control and if the price is fixed as in our
model in Chapter 2, then the associated models in Chapter 4 can also be interpreted
as a forestry rotation model. Another possible interpretation of our models is the one
of a tool wear model. If p and w are particular controls that influence the process of
wear and tear of tool or equipment, then the rate (1.1) can be interpreted as the change
of this quality process x at time t, cf., for example, Sanjay et al. (2005). Interesting
questions in this particular context are how to control this process in order to maximize a
control-dependent objective function and when to renew the equipment and/or to which
extent. Another (obvious) field of application for our models is the one of depleting
exhaustible resources by a monopolist. By abstracting from the advertising control one
can ask what is the (long-term) profit maximizing pricing and depletion scheme; in that
particular application, the monopolist chooses a period of production and the amount
of resources to be extracted.
This dissertation enhances the understanding of coordinated optimal revenue manage-
ment and inventory management decision processes. The models and results presented
help answer theoretical and practical management questions.
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Appendix: Marketing Models
In Section 3.1, the two classical advertising models of Nerlove and Arrow (1962) and
Vidale and Wolfe (1957) are briefly discussed. The following Section 1 deals with the
optimal price and the optimal advertising control in the Nerlove-Arrow model. Section
2 presents the controlled Vidale-Wolfe model which was first considered by Sethi (1973),
see also Sethi (1974). For a more detailed discussion of the models and derivation of the
results we refer to the original literature. Moreover, Chapter 7 in Sethi and Thompson
(2000) presents a comprehensive summary of both models, and applies control theory
techniques to derive the results.
Unless otherwise stated the notation refers to Chapter 3. This includes the meaning
and interpretation of parameters and variables. For general motivation and interpreta-
tion of the models we refer to Section 3.1. The subscript ’NA’ refers to the Nerlove-Arrow
model, and the subscript ’V W ’ to the model of Vidale and Wolfe.
1 The Nerlove-Arrow Advertising Model
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) consider a firm’s investment in advertising to build up a stock
of goodwill: one dollar spent on advertising increases the goodwill by one unit. The
stock of goodwill, the state of the system, depreciates at a constant rate q ě 0. Let
Gptq ě 0 denote the level of goodwill at time t. It is assumed that G satisfies the ODE,
t ě 0,
9Gptq “ wptq ´ qGptq, Gp0q “ G0, (1)
where wptq ě 0 quantifies the advertising spending at time t; G0 ą 0 is the initial level
of goodwill of the firm. The demand λ for a product at time t depends on the price p
charged at that time, the stock of goodwill Gptq, and an additional (time-dependent)
variable μptq that can not be influenced by the firm, i.e.,
λNAptq “ λppptq, Gptq, μptqq. (2)
The total production cost cNA is assumed to be a function of the demand, cNA “
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CpλNAq, such that the net profit νNA - revenue minus production costs - is given by
νNAptq “ pptqλNAptq ´ CNApλNAptqq. (3)
Let r ě 0 denote the constant (continuous) discount rate. The firm wants to maximize
the present value of net profits over an infinite time horizon by choosing appropriate
controls p and w, i.e., the objective of the firm is
max
pptqě0,wptqě0
$&
%VNA “
8ż
0
e´rt rνNAptq ´ wptqs dt
,.
- , (4)
subject to equation (1). Since the net profit νNA is only affected by the current price,
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) argue that the maximum can be found by first maximizing
VNA with respect to the price (assuming G to be fixed). Then, VNA is maximized with
respect to w when the price p is replaced by the optimal price pNA. This approach is
similar to the approach we take in Chapter 2.
The optimal price pNA is characterized in terms of the price elasticity of demand
ε “ ´pp{λNAqpBλNA{Bpq and the marginal cost of production, i.e.,
pNA “ ε
ε ´ 1C
1pλNAq, (5)
where C 1 denotes the derivative with respect to λNA. Equation (5) is the usual price
formula for a monopolist, cf. (2.15).
Let δNA “ pG{λNAqpBλNA{BGq denote the elasticity of demand with respect to good-
will. Nerlove and Arrow show that (assuming technical conditions) the optimal stock of
goodwill G˚ (at time t) must satisfy
G˚
pNAλNA
“ δNA
εpr ` qq .
This equation is another example of a dynamic version of the Dorfman-Steiner relation,
cf. (2.14). Note, the optimal price as well as the associated sales rate depend on
μptq. Thus, G˚ generally also varies over time. If μptq “ μ, the optimal goodwill level
G˚ “ G˚pμq is a constant. Depending on the initial value G0, the optimal advertising
policy wNA is to reach G˚ as fast as possible. If G0 ă G˚, this is achieved by an
impulse control at t “ 0. Once the optimal stock of goodwill has been attained, only
the depreciation will be compensated, i.e., wNAptq “ qG˚. If the initial level of goodwill
exceeds the optimal one, then wNAptq “ 0 is optimal until G˚ is reached.
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In the time-inhomogeneous case when μ does depend on t, if G0 ă G˚pμp0qq, it is still
optimal to apply an impulse control in order to jump from G0 to G˚pμp0qq immediately.
Also, if G0 ą G˚pμp0qq, then wNAptq “ 0 for 0 ď t ď τNA, where τNA is a solution of
the equation G0e´qτNA “ G˚pμpτNAqq. Once G˚pμptqq has been attained, the optimal
replacement policy is given by wNAptq “ 9G˚pμptqq ` qG˚pμptqq, t ě τNA, where this
value is assumed to be nonnegative. Nerlove and Arrow point out, that ”the optimal
solution becomes complicated” if the nonnegativity property is not fulfilled.1 They refer
to Arrow et al. (1958) who studied a special case of the problem without depreciation in
finite time. But even in this case the optimal solution (algorithm) can not be described
in simple form.
2 The Vidale-Wolfe Advertising Model
Vidale and Wolfe (1957) do not make use of the idea of goodwill. Motivated by their
empirical findings they describe the relationship of sales and advertising in terms of three
parameters:
• The sales decay constant qV W .
• The saturation level of the market MV W .
• The response constant μ˜V W .
Vidale and Wolfe argue that the sales rate λV W reacts positively on advertising spending
w via the response constant μ˜V W ą 0.2 On the other hand, there is a negative influence
on the sales rate due to forgetting effects, product obsolescence, or competing advertising
captured by the constant qV W ě 0. The saturation levelMV W ptq denotes the maximum
potential of the rate of sales at time t ě 0. Therefore, MV W is also called the market
potential. Based on experimental studies, Vidale and Wolfe (1957) characterize their
model by the differential equation, 0 ď t ď T , T finite,
9λV W ptq “ μ˜V Wwptq
ˆ
1 ´ λV W ptq
MV W
˙
´ qV WλV W ptq, (6)
where w is the advertising rate and λV W is the sales rate, both (observed) at time t. The
original motivation was to understand market behavior and to obtain reliable estimates
of the parameters of interest, qV W ,MV W , and μ˜V W .
1Nerlove and Arrow (1962), p. 138.
2The interpretation of this response constant is the number of sales per advertising dollar spent.
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Sethi (1973) was one of the first to consider a controlled Vidale-Wolfe model, where the
goal is to determine an optimal advertising control that maximizes a particular objective
function. He reformulates the problem in terms of market shares xV W :“ λV WMV W . Defining
μV W :“ μ˜V WMV W equation (6) can be rewritten as
9xV W ptq “ μV Wwptq
`
1 ´ xV W ptq
˘ ´ qV WxV W ptq, xp0q “ x0, (7)
where x0 ě 0 denotes the initial market share. Equation (7) constitutes the state
equation of the control system. Note, the dynamic (7) differs from the state equation
we consider in Chapter 3 since 9xV W ptq denotes the change in the (relative) market share
measured as a portion of the overall market sales rate, i.e., changes of the proportional
sales rate. The state equation (3.5), however, characterizes the change of the untapped
market share, which will only take nonpositive values.
Sethi does not consider a particular price control but rather assumes a maximum sales
revenue pV W ą 0 associated with xV W “ 1. Then, the product pV W ˆ xV W denotes the
revenue function for xV W P r0, 1s. Let w¯V W ą 0 be the maximum allowable advertising
rate at any time; w¯V W may be finite or infinite. Moreover, let xT P r0, 1s denote the
target market share at the end of the planning horizon; r ą 0 denotes the (continuous)
discount rate. Hence, the optimal control problem is
max
0ďwptqďw¯V W
$&
%VV W “
Tż
0
e´rt ppV WxV W ptq ´ wptqq dt
,.
- , (8)
subject to (7) and the terminal state constraint xV W pT q “ xT . Note, since x0 P r0, 1s
the market share automatically satisfies 0 ď xV W ptq ď 1 for all t P r0, T s.
Sethi (1973) derives the optimal control wV˚ W for this fixed end point problem, see
also Sethi and Thompson (2000). In particular, he shows that there exists a constant
optimal market share level xsV W P r0, 1q; xsV W is a function of the parameter values
qV W , μV W , pV W , and r. Similar to the optimal control in the Nerlove-Arrow model, it
is optimal to attain this optimal level xsV W as fast as possible and to keep this level as
long as possible. Sethi characterizes the optimal control depending on the time horizon
T , the initial market share x0, and the maximum allowable advertising level w¯V W .
For example, if x0 ă xsV W and w¯V W is infinite, then an impulse control is optimal
to bring the state to its optimal level immediately. If the value w¯V W is finite, then
wV˚ W ptq “ w¯V W is optimal until the level xsV W has been attained. This assumes that
the time horizon T is large enough to reach the optimal level and to satisfy the terminal
state control, respectively, that the maximum allowable advertising level is large enough.
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If xsV W has been reached, it is optimal only to replace the loss due to the decay qV W .
Since at the optimal market share level 9xV W ptq “ 0 must hold, equation (7) can be
rearranged to obtain the optimal replacement policy.
In order to satisfy the terminal state condition, one has to deviate from the market
share level xsV W .3 For example, if xT ă xsV W , it is optimal to stop advertising early
enough pwV˚ W ptq “ 0q such that the market share hits the target value at time T . When
the time horizon is not large enough or if the allowable advertising level is too small
so that it is not possible to attain the level xsV W and satisfy the terminal state control
xV W pT q “ xT ă xsV W , Sethi shows a bang-bang control to be optimal.
Moreover, Sethi (1973) also considers the problem when the end point is free. He
derives the optimal control by use of the maximum principle. Sethi and Thompson
(2000) also analyze the infinite horizon problem.
3Naturally, the target value and the value of the desirable market share may coincide, i.e., xT “ xsV W .
Then, it is optimal to follow the replacement policy until time T .
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